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Prioiqg Tliooiy 
PrUiim pTPoblma has always b&mi one of the eontral 
probli»o of iho o ^ i t a l i s t aarket eocmoa^* Tim prohlm has 
homh tim otmtral issu^ of oeommiCQ @Jjioe Maid Scaith ««rote 
ttm Wealth o^ flatlona in 17?S| nearly 200 years lat^rt I t Is 
stilX amaiderted the W»rwosit&t of tim l^nee^eitterprise eo<mQ|y# 
Tor a lof^ tkm I t ar4>0ar©d as If pricing prol?leai had founa 
a Estis£^!Ctofy solution btit doxibts b^oai to grow &jrtng 
t»mitl0s imtil finally th© theory of ln^perfeot and Emmppolistie 
oo!]:|>0titi<m mmr^^^ fhe txsm d@vel<:^ »»nt MIS a great adv^we* 
I t enahled the eomiosiists to get a sioi^ r e ^ l s t i o view of 
prleiiig probles® but thia too turned out to he illusory* 
2t did not pf^vid@ to the field noi^ers and deeoriptive 
eeoaooaets neoeesarr iemm of referenoe for t s ^ i k l ^ faelaial 
aaterial . i^^eeially i t badly negleotetl the prohle is of 
duopoly ma i»lig<^oly inhere few influoneial firms not only 
ow^ete Mith eieh othery but also meort a potieriUl influenoe 
on oa® miother* limh of th^a not only adjusts i tself paeaively 
-< 
to a gXvm. nazlcet situation Ixit alao posaess&s the oapability 
of ehangiag t t e t situation* Similar prohXmuB md in partiouXar, 
th© territory betwe^ i^ pure eorapotition and absolute aoiw^oly 
has not beoi ooveroc! sa t i s f^ to r i ly . I t i s procisely ^ i s 
torritory %ibioh MB bo€»n greatly ©nlaz^ed* Con@oc|ii^ itly-« 
tho f@atur@s of modem inaustrial struetu^*® find l i t t l e or 
no place in the aiialytioal £pmQ worlc of wmmitiJBml, thaozy* 
Prioing policy p l ^ s a dc^nant role in the ovtr 
a l l polioy of tto© ftra for i t affeots the profits of the 
business materially* The three isiportant variables * priae» 
cost and volueae vhidi together cletersaine profit are a l l 
affected by pricing decisions* In pricing decisions the 
meiber of possible alternatives are relatively niis»rous» The 
ecsaplescity of the problem increases manifold in a firm nAiich 
pro iiioes aox^ than one product* iiecuiise of these c<s>liccH> 
t i^ i s and the nxm availability of the re<iuiret! data» business 
men usually adopt price policies or rule of thuiab to guide 
setting as>ecific prices* The pricing policy i s generally 
ddloa^ted to siOdorcJinato levels of bualn&B3i tlais preserving 
the tine and enor^ of top executives for other lii^ortant 
responsibilities* ausinesacsen ueually distrust the prioing 
siodels of pure theory for they consider thea the product 
of ini^raotical long«4iaired theorists* Xt i@ true that an 
underotcindiaig of tho economic ijrinciples of price detenaina* 
tion tnay not ler'.d us to an all-purpose pricing forsulaf l3ut 
i t can help us in the ostablishraent of a wise price policy* 
In the ; rioe*output strategy of a jrwdem ooc^titive business 
firat the three laost critical variables are; (1) Price 
acijiistnjent} (2) I'rof'uct improv©m©nt| aal (3) Sales 
proootion* It i s through these a44ucti»nts that tho flna 
aaintalns i t s coo^etitive position and tries to acliieve 
i t s objectivofi* It crm hartily {:3anipul3te co2tf!iunity»s inocaae 
and the prices of tlie substitutes for they au'e beyond i t s 
control. QvBirf strategy of the fijra shouldi thoreforet 
recognise the existence and interdependence of the above 
trilogy* Since the tmditicmal theory niainly dealc with the 
priciiis of the prociict, the present chapter i s devotee! to the 
pricing policy of the firm in various eoapetitive situnticms* 
^ 
Before m^ytdtm the aetuol pricing poXiey of the 
firm i t i s neoesaarf Ibr us to ddlsats® the prioing of the 
firo from a theoretioai point of view heoetise an underetaiiEl* 
ing of the prinoiple® uaderiying the operation of prioe i s 
ne^rtholees ^ i essential prerequisite to an understanding 
of the pricing nroblsa of a f i rs t 1?o b@gin withf we ebalX 
mmsm that} (t) The €irm i s as o n t i ^ thot biisrs factors 
of prociucticm in one set of markets and tr^wsfonas thea into 
finished products and ^Xls in another sets of aarket* It i s 
a isjit :>riJMrily cieai^i® i to earn smxtoua profits (2) I t 
i s sot a coalition* Xt ooKes decision tm ^ough i t i s nm 
by a single individiali (3) The ^ds i i ^ i e of production i s 
deteroiineti hjr the relative prices of the factors of productiont 
(4) I t pro<luces only one outputf (3) the parties involved 
are •* b^yers am sellers $ (6) t^e mmmgomnt kaoms the sh^^es 
and positions of i t s deciand and cost ftmcticsist (7) the firm 
i s laainly concerned ytWi price«<»itput deoisicnsi and f imlly 
i t does not aaeqjjiate3^ flesl with the (^mmsics of pricing* If 
the above assiM^tions are given* lAm optiimsa pricing p o l i ^ 
of the firm can he determined W the nature of the c^peti t ive 
sltuattioos in i^ hloh the Sixa soils i t s proc!tt0t* Boonwuists 
classify oofj3|>9tition on the basis of th« nature of the 
product and the nuciber of busrere and sellers involved* In 
order to ahov in a single W3sy$ haw the price of the fina 
i s deteroiined vm shall start iirith pure oo!i|>etltion« The 
piirposo of discussing the < )^eratiim of an enterririse uncier 
the coniitions of pure coni^etition i s to eQi|>hasi2e the 
relationship betvieen the prevailing oarket >rloe e^ the 
level of output at which the f im win siajcimise profit or 
minimise loss* 
Pricing md Output aooislono under Vxam Got^p#tltiqn 
In pum ooapQtltioa tli® nuaber of buyers imd 
sellers i® aa lai^ s© t t o t wadi on& &£ tima is «o gsmll eompar^d 
to t!^ ^pantity of noocls ^iohsmg^d that his aetivit ies oan 
have msmmliMigly Xittlm influm^tm @itii»r cm the to ta l supply 
or on th@ total <l^ !iisid* lionoe eny aingjuo hnyer or mllQr 
eon hanm no peroeptibXe influ^ioo 4& dstonnining th» aai^et 
prioo* The oomiiodity or 8«rvlo« in i^hieh thoy 6imX i s 
hoisog^ioousf therofox^i bu^ars do not hav» or^ pr©f0r«no« 
ior any soHer* <k»IlootiV0 hargainii^ txituvon tho groupo of 
buyors aaid asXXors too i s ahtsent and no restrictions are 
is!posoci on the entry or exit of the buyers md seliers in the 
aaiicot* In aioh a oo^^^etitive situation the sellers oan have 
no pricing policy* they are 4u@t prioe takers* They have 
no prioe discretion but have to sel l at the market prioe 
over ij^ iioh they have no oontrol* C4aflcet prioe i s determined 
by th© coliective aotiwns or tfo^mrB mam selxors at various 
tl-.© iatorvsiic* tho raarkot prioe ao determined t^sds to 
equate tho awomct seXXoro ore willing to sell and buyers are 
willing to buy. m tli© pixsoess of e.,pilibriuEi the indiviclial 
/ 
iim partloliat^i but i t s influence i s nogXigible* Tlio 
tirm^B di^ and ourve in pxixmly «>rapetitive oondititms i s 
perfocUy elastic or hori^ ^ontol at th© prevailing laauicet 
price« '^ha% i t means i s that the firm can sell a l l i t 
deniros ot tt^ preimlling prioei at an^ jM:»ioe lower than this 
i t would not sel l !md at any higher price i t can sell nothing* 
rhe rira oawssot increRoe the price eimply because i f i t aells 
above the laarket price ite potanitial oastoaers will go else-* 
^^ »r©« rbo fina nay i f i t deaiix?Si sell below the martet 
price but i t wouldbe foolioih for i t to do ao> because W 
V9iy natujne of the market i t could aell the sS^ t^antity that i t 
oay dooire at the oaxlcet price* Therefore* i t iamjM not sell 
at a lower than narket price* The fir® has no otiier choice 
except to oell st the mling price or does not sel l at all* 
The demand curve of the f iv>nls also i t s marginal 
rmmvM curve because the revenue i t obtains fE^ oia jselling 
one aoro unit* i s ^ba price* It i s the firm's average revenue 
curve and ^ows nric© or everQ«^ revenue per unit of prodi«st 
sold* Xvercx^o revenue curve i s also identical with what i s 
Imown aa the firm's narginsil revenue curve* Avernge revenue 
8 
curve is horiaontal an! the niarglnal revemis ounr« i s also 
borlssontal and identical vith tDe *^^ verag9 revemia curve. The 
revenue to be olstaiiiee froa a aingla unit i s sizroly the ruling 
price as a cons6«ii;^ nod« the totrnl revalue wlXX rise in socact 
prot>ortion with the luantity gold* the average revenue vilX« 
of coui»no* be the san» an t!ie :»rioe ^dll not change vlth 
respoot to the chai). :08 in the rpaatity jiold. In artditloi to 
denianti futnction, the nost l-ir'jortant elo.-iont in the dtitemina* 
tion of optiaal output i s tlie co$t«»output reXaticmship. Cost 
depends upon the quantity prcdi»ed# U? to a certain point M» 
generalXy observe coirte ^ diminish becsu'se of tJwi a<!vnntages 
of f^ecialination thpt <^ xiXd be obtained vi th increase in 
output, i^it beyoiid certain Xcvelfs of output we couXd expect 
t^at vith 0.^h additional output t he v??rlable f'^ctora ;are 
over crow i^lng on the fixe<3 factors ei^ecieXXy the laanngcsient* 
They find Xesc of the fixed Tnctors to vorls with. CcneeiiaeatXy 
the contr bcginc to rir.c. in view of the^e conditions we 
troat tiie average total ooirt; and overaije varl'^iXe cost curve 
to tx) U«olKspe--l. f.'ith tiven (Se<n!ttid ant! cost conditions the 
1 
only dectaion that tie ttm hrxc, to aiake In to dstermJUi© i t s 
oui^ 3ut» In or.er i;o aoHievtt i t s ob^oetiv© of profit laaoeiraisa* 
tloxit the firrn simiX raise the output i%) to t in t extent that 
e l i t e s mrginal cost with aarginal revenue or price* 
Theoretically tho fira shall pivuuce ^p to that point at uhieh 
the cost of the las t increment ( margi^ial cost ) i s just e^ioal 
to the selling price* Upto this point the inorease in output 
in pix) 11 table beofsuse i t adds mar^ to rove^ ciue thsm to cost* 
'Mt oeyoiid tills stage ix i s not advisable to eicpand output 
for i t ad B nioi'e to cost than to rev«it»i« 
IhK following figure shows the %i5ay the supply and 
diriiiKl curves for the iifhole ^aarlcet bet%ieen theci deterstine 
price. Tho ecjuiilibriu'i price i s OP and the equilibrium 
outpiit «»ii>)lle<: m"Kl t'msand itj Of^« Figure % » sliows the 
i43i3licatlon ii7 t2.1r> for' e 'Ch ^Irra, Eich fim har. to accept 
»^@ :^rice Cl>, set by the najrtcet. the profit fiaxlaiains output 
i s obvlo Jaly Ot^  where nmrginal coat and nai^ginal revenue 
oi'trvos out oaoh other r»t Js, At iAm out^sut 0% total revenue 
is OPil; total cof:t i s OSlMj tot%l profit i s , thereforof Bias. 
/° 
Thii Is the largest profit that can bs samsd. It Is grsatsr 
than Boraal profit ( th« opportunity oost of capital )• 
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Th« abovs figure dopicts a short-rua situation* 
In ths long-run tho sxosss profit will attract new flras la 
the Industry. Higher the price set by the industry the acre 
of It will be produced. The Increase In output ooaurs la two 
ways, by wioouraging the existing flxss to expaaa, and by the 
entry of new flms not preTlously producing. This phenoaenon 
u 
•zerts a dowi*vard pressure on price and ndpes out any excess 
profit. In the long-run price tends to be equal to the «inl«un 
aTerage cost of each f lm. Figure B shows this position. 
3 
> 
a 
In ttm lon^rmif tho dlfferwaoo botweoa tha prioe 
and tiie avercige variable cost should atleast be ei|uaL to the 
oo0t of the fixed assots involved beecxuse fixed ooots hove to 
be covered eotao tisie* The fiita ytiXl 0tax*t to pxoduoe only i f 
i t 0X£>ects to oovor oost of replacing ita fiseed faotorsf tbe 
cost of variable faotors plus i t s norssal profit* In 8hort«»nm 
if firffl*e eixpeotatiims are not realised { the prioe that the 
firm fooes ie suoh thnt i t covers ;)U3t tim variable oost| the 
firta tsay forego the fixed oost provided i t s e<|ui^ oent i s siM^ 
that i t has zero <^r>ortiinity coot because of hi^ily specific 
nature of the siacdiinery* In that case i f i t stops proc:uotion 
i t saves nothing* In eo<momic@ bjr^ ones are forever by@(»30s« 
The firm shall* ^^eroforei tdim a philosophic view of the 
situation and shall produce &vmi below oost of pro '^uotion 
4uQt covering average variable coot* It will certainly shut 
dowi i f i t fails evtm to ^^ et variable coot, theoretically 
the fizia in pure ooopetition produooo at a oinl^tsa cost in the 
long run« the size of the fira i s the optinum or siost 
efficient size* The size and optinma output of each fir@ 
differ from one another because of the difference in cc^ital 
/3 
ec|iiipDeiit» Xooationt oanagoriaX abiXity oto* In px*^tioe the 
optiimn size o£ eaoh f ina is not a Sismd one but chai^ &s 
with obange in the prims o£ factors of production mid 
techniq^o of product ion. Honee the eorioept i s basically a 
theoretical oono^t* k firai in pure ooopetititm can sell 
what i t Xikes at the ruling price but the ruling price 
does not ml© for long* The laarfcet being a fXex-^rice 
rsax e^t reci^ onds qiui^ cly to sntall changes* The stock exchan e 
la a good eacaople of thia* The implication of thioi therefore* 
ia tliat t e firm launt be «oll informed about the £;en@ral 
eo<»KMio situaticm in ^hs tnarlcet as a ijhole* It mxnt Mve 
a good srasp of ©c«HK>faic» probleas of tlie industry. It 
needs a better uivierstaniing of £^ iorti»terQ and lon@*ter!a 
influences that alter tiie prioci because i f i t aoea so i t 
niay be able to sell the s o e aoount at a better price later 
oa» If i t ignores the general oarket situations i t aay have 
to aoc^t a %iorse price later on* f^ ony @ovemc»nts have acted 
to prevent free ond keen co!!^>etition for a^irioultural prortucts. 
They have done thio to protect fanaers from the protOeos of 
inevitable fluctuations in price* 
1^  
Ei^^rienoe MoaM t e l i us tfiat few flna© opertif 
under conditions fiimiXar to purt coc^etitian, Th© etook 
aariset and th« laaii^ ets tor oerts&n tj^ pos of sainoralB and 
agrleuXturaL and e^niifaoturdd products approxirsate the above 
ocsiditiona bocaitse the sellers ot these products are at the 
dercy ot l^e laaricet* Thef find i t diffioidt to infXuence 
the price* The^ ^ have to eeXl «hat thejr like at the martot 
price. Pure coc^etltion ie al; o observed in a hi^Ay developed 
sector of the econosQr inhere th^re are few lines of pro<2uctie»i 
and -^ ro^ucera make exactly th© i^ntioal products. Even 
%fhdz^  this thing i s foumkl* only one of the prereqioisite for 
pure oonpetiticffi is towuX • a l l procoicts pnxiuced are identioal, 
The second prerecpisitOf that ti^re ehall be a large number 
of sellers %»111 not nec^s:iarily have be&n iaet« It io necessary 
to point out that pur© C0(%>etiti0ii i s the exc^ti<»i and not 
the rule in oiodem economic life* The price policy of the 
individual fina, thereforet draws very l i t t l e from pure 
laarlcet* Ttough the inipereonal larket forces have aoiae relev^oe 
to a firca /et th© price policy of a firs mist go beyond the 
situation of pure cosioetition and i t should be supplemented 
/i) 
t^ anal/sis of atarket oonditio&s in vbidi th@ flxv has 
80oe Gont;x*ol ovt^ r proc j^ot and prleo» 
The neo-^Oassical ca!|>0titiw theory has po^r ond 
uttriiotlon <luo to i t s simplicity and dotorsdnatwiess* This 
i s due to the fact that in a ec»apetitive eaarket vbore sotall 
firas froely ct^ sr^ eto to earn niaadiiiifia profitf the point of 
price eiuiXibriisn follovs a@ a logical necessity* There is 
no doubt thnt t^is theory satisfactorily ea^lained prlcii^ 
probleme in tl\o typical siid«««in©teenth century omrkets there 
ia also l i t t l e doubt tiiat i t i s s t i l l a very useful for 
s o ^ of the present-day laarlcets* But at the sacae ticie i t 
has boco!ae clear th^t idlth laodem triads towards product 
dlfferentiation» state isterventiont odvertise^nts and 
trade ogjpe&asD^Q^ the coc^ietitive price theory lost lauch of 
i t s force* Alt}K>ua^  fieurshalli Edgewcoiih and tlieir c<mte!!^ >o* 
rarlon were avnro of the iniperfections of the iiaiiietf thsy 
icpiored thoa. h^trt they f^ocussed in detail was the case of 
1501*0 oonopoly which to aotae extent i s an economic laonstrosity 
16 
because pure monopoly hanily exists in the norld of 
substitutes* in the next section« we ^laXl, tberoforet 
discuss the pricing of pjnoduots in raonopoXy i^iere eo marv 
oibstitutes exist* 
/? 
Prioing Iftider '^ oiwfjoly, 
Vm MlB^UmM, m^^U» 2*© thooiy of awiopoly 
Is laors appsi^ opriate to smalym$ not booau90 i t i s aoot prevalent 
but beoausft i t i s most rolovant in dealing with tha oosaplex 
probloas of Asxy to day pricing* Fbr years peopXo have taikod 
about nonopoiy but Mtith. reservations* It has nieai^ t dif Permit 
things to differont people* fo sosie i t sieana "one selXor" 
whUo to others It Qeans exolusive control* To eaoQosiists 
i t sieans a maimt situation ^mro there i s only one seilor of 
a product -^at has no close sufostituis* In aonc^olyf firm and 
industry are identical; a single rira constitutes the entire 
industzy* Since the laonepolist are price atakerst not price 
takers, the theory ^yplies to fix^s having freedoa and 
independence in prise taaking* The ess«!itial® of the sKmopolyi 
thereforet caaet It refers to a single fira having oxcXusive 
control over the ou^ut of a ooeiaodi^ for ^lioh there is 
m other caiciodlty ydth a strong cross elasticity of detaand* 
iSonopolist i s Q price t:3aker and in taking such decisions he 
i s independent* Iii@ deniand r^iains steady in the sense that 
i f he alters his price i t provokes no reactions* The deoand 
l& 
for ^i© €Hj%>ut of a mmsfpo^st always tm& a negatiw »toj^» 
;ioiK?pollst oan Imv© !!»»nopolistic position in on© smxicet tout 
not n@c9s@arilr in anotliar. With t ^ exert ions of public 
u t i l i t i e s or institutions of similar naE^iret *ftK>s0 prioeo 
are mt W regulatozy bodiest sKmopolids rarely exist* 
!lonopoli@s tmy b® classlfio<? into private aonopolloo 
cuad public nionot>oli08 or t^ oBO with offectivQ throat of entry 
and those without i t or six^le and dlaeriainating monopolies* 
The !!iost significant indicators of fscmopoly power are tiw 
^eistenoe of a fias&d price and t » ooneentr^ion of Xm^ 
proportion of the tota l output of a ommoiSiity in tlie haMs 
of a single seller* 4t the outset we ahould reco^iiise that 
an unusual etmbility of prices and a high degree of oono^itra* 
tion of prodKKstion cim exist csEily m long as the monopolict 
i s able to bar the entry of it® potential rivals* f!ie 
^aergence tmd continuanoe of iscmopoly poiier usually depend 
upcm differeitt mft of oonditloiis nmh ae oonts^I of strategic 
raw laa-fcerlals, legal baoldngt oioi»>pollstlc oossbinations^ 
reotrictec: ^mrlcot for producto cmitrol of secret |jrooeeses» 
03cistance of pUbllo u t i l i t i e s and goveftiaont participation 
in business* Monopolistic ooabinati<me sooetlmes tal^e the 
/ ^ 
shap® of pools, cartels ?>jid rs^ mdicat©,'' or tnistnt hoXd$f^ 
coaoanies and rmrg^ra* Apart frcM th^se fonaal eotablnitiofis 
th©i-0 oaa b© t!)i\>rDai agf^eiwits aaong ©oeip0tln?j fli^ss 
rooyltinj to gcaitlira^j'o agr©@3PfitSi Int^rlcN^iing of dlrectoi^t©s# 
prJUs® leadership md »liif© a«d l@t liim* tr^ JO trad© asscHsiatlooe, 
.^ 8 will be seesif t!ie volimt-^ry :^ »io'-K>li©0 ot aoaoijolies 
lasod on oifif^rshlp of row iutit®rlal or posses''>lon of secret 
proo®sr?©s do not amtXmxQ for long* Sioilarly nK^no^olioo of 
l ^ a l and ins t l t^ l tmal cliaractor or mottopoli^s baok©d by 
resource® tan© L1C>Q «SO not las t long* Th&f are niostly 
destroyed by legislative tsjers'iures* Qatily oocial moaorxjlles or 
raablic u t i l i ty aonopolies liave a t^ siideiioy to contimj®* tlot 
only because tbey twid to avoid ooii|'>etitloa but tbe society 
i t se l f r@<iuir@a ttm^ for tii® ssilae of ecoisOTsy md effioiertey* 
.\lttoagh imre nK>fK>poly lilte puro cos^setitiai nirely 
eitiat;;, i t iB s t i l l w>rth while tt> analyse nionc^ poly :«irkot 
2^1.'^ tlc}risliip siiToo i t ::>rovides iie^ssary iTick^roiind to 
03tl-icit® q3ti.„«nal f4*Ta tmh-wimxt in situitions tla-it c:lor:iiiiate 
tlie real m^ld* if/e uauali.y eoneeive of a fw n^oijolit-^ t i.c a wan 
or fina vAm acts as tlioagh ottons cannot enter the industi^» 
?0 
His erpan of contxx>l appends upon the eaetent o£ substitutes* 
If thore i s a tstxs^lete abaenoe oX ooc^etition in s e l l e r ' s 
market^ the nionoi^ oXiist i e taont l ikely to have a o c ^ l e t e 
control ov®e tim sals of the .^rocluot mA vloe.versa* liofore 
mmnhiiDg the logic of monopolist's output and piloo deelsionSf 
«© sMl l asaufiO, as ^3©fore, t h i t }m seekn to naxinia© prof i t . 
ThiG a-nuwntion needs naalif ioatlons, Wo often know that a 
nonopolifit o.inncrt 'mximiZG his profit* He cannot i f he i s 
r<^^l\te^ by a oublic afjcsicy or he has only the ifague noti<m 
of the denand for h is pro'uct# %c»eti'ses he doeo not want 
to naxinlse profi t becaose of ^i© fear of govemaont interven-
t ion or the eracrgenoe of pot^Kitinl ooi3r>©titiori* Instead he 
%jents to nasciinize Iiis u t i l i t y ifunction* The eeoond Qssung;»tion 
v/e shfill contiruie to carry on i s t i r i t tJiere i s a oa^i^jotlticm 
in factor ranrtet hence the aoncrpolist ts a nrico taker v-lien 
L© I'-dV'Oh'^r^eB t t e input-.# I^antlyt ^"^ shal l ai:;o a,.mt:K3 tJiat 
tine flrni rainlaiaoG costif and lienco the coct-»output relat ions 
are tiie satae for oonopolist ar' for t-'ie co!!r:'Qtitiv® fir::i. 
Vrom now om«u\! our stssuc^tions are tha t the laonopolist 
knpws his narket andf tliereforei the d^aand for h is produotp 
PI 
knows Ids C'^sts ani seoI:G no otii@r ybjectiv© tlian to 
raaxi^dso liis p ro f i t s . 
PriogwQut^ut daolsicaiai 
Wo shall f i r s t ©xaaiiie p r i c i i ^ theory i'or the 
pur© short»run monopoly, sine© i t aay b© taken as a f i r s t 
approximation to re:ility» ^y pur» i^^nopoly «e shall »e>mr 
mean tho ideal type v«her@ a l l subst i tutes sure absent l^it 
we ^lalX siean a tim whose ^jroducts* substi tutes are so (iistait 
that i t s salen '^olicy doronds u .on i t s own prtee and i s not 
afi'ecte<* by the mib'?titute srt)up, i'ure tounopoly thus differs 
frota pure co!:r'Otltloni wl^ ere Tiraa rire price talcers ond iw 
indivitftiol action Is imG<iQ:.-.iy U> stiimilato rteirnnd. I t 
contraotfs also t/ith olisojoly viiere ©uch cofspetitor ia 
basically in torosto ' in the polloion of liie rivclc* In 
Bcxnorjoly stace th© <%e ind curve of the f i r e i s ident ical to 
the d© nnd cur\'o of t!:e in.iur.tiy» iii 310^00 dowk-warU to t © 
r igh t . I t indicnto.i th? t t : » .loaooolist caa sale ooi'e only 
at lower pricen th in at high, la view uf t\^ siioci^ l>osition 
of t;he rsonor^olirt be cnn ft;: eitiior ;3rice or quantity but not 
both* Given one th© value of tli© otliier i© autcKaatically 
5;? 
dcfcomlned b^ the r^lationefal^-^ es^reDsod in Ms tlea-ind 
A monopolist nay se l l a larger (loantlty a t a 
lower price or a sstaller quantity a t a higbor price* When 
deciding yitiic^ price policy to fbllow he will take into 
conci'oration dei^jid el ' in t ic i t loa, potentialifcifif? o.f tho 
nubstitutcr, latent coiipotltion, iniiort noo'slljolities 
ant! .'^ova-'^iont *^^actlon• '1on<rvolJefi 3re unually c r i t ic i sed 
becia:^o tijoy CEicourat^ i^y*Q^nonsibl9 p r iv i te po^er^ nm nXow 
in afiootin." mm -retliodE and teclmi'Ties of protltction and 
goiieraliy result in V^imr cjcoaioniic efficiency and 3ut»put 
wifcli lal'jhor cjnt::» Ho^fev^r, t<«j ahi l l continue to ,)n3faun8 
ttkit t t o Tono)oii-:t uner, t%^ fja'-© prof i t n'lxioin.'^tlon rule 
anri cpoi^ator ar ! t h i t prof i t 'rxxirti^.inQ or XOQB minlni^irii^ 
out i'Ut .It vi^ iich a-^rt::!!^! cc^jt r-M siarjjinfiCL rovenu© are 
eqt4at, aa in tiai c'rKi of any ot'wr type of fina, linae the 
analytical ^^roblo .s of f e theory of riononoly -^rice ar© (m 
th© do-ondl siaCf not on th© co'^t .^ide, we ohaU concentrate 
aoro on denand. T-^Q de'iand airve faced Isy the ';K>nopolijRt i s 
not Jiorl2onti!l but slop©*^  ^<^'^^ ^^^^ ^o the ri ,^itt so n.irginal 
roven-jo does not coincide \#ith r>3^ iee but £or t^ *e firr;t unit 
S3 
of output, Iho isargliial revenue curve l i e s below ti^ ie deTiand 
or avorafjo revon lo curve, for reasons already oxplaio©-:, SUQ 
Sirm -jay achiov© ©'-iuillbrliEi r>ositioa in two vtaysi I t zay 
place before tlie .irkot i t s tiuantity ^iiob will Totch a definite 
^rico; or i t iiay set cer tain prico and l o t the larHot decide 
the ' luantity, '^ o normally aoau .o tlicit tlie :3onopoliot fi::e-. 
t!iG price BDd alXov.'s t«ic narket to deterraine tlio '-ioantity. In 
theory y^on evor tli© firns ©quatoo i t s ..-.argiiial coot -aid 
-lar^^inal revenu©, i t simultaneously deten^ines i t s lovol of 
output oxid the p r ice . In actual practice the problea i s not 
30 ainplQ^ '2he f i r s hardly knows tho ohape and tiie eixact 
oosition of i t s doaand, Tioroovor^ the de-iond curve say bo 
aEKil:")Ulateii throu,^ prosaotional activity* Beoidoo i t i s 
believed in thooiy thT,t the cost curves are U*3h»^ >©d \Mt the 
evidence on record reveals tiiat they are not oo» These 
correctin(j factcn-s, !io^*ever» do not c!ian(je ti^e tJlieory, 
Dotiaua s t i l l roriains a t a point a t whidi "rnrsinal cost and 
5^ 
aarginal mrmivm ar« «qu«l as dtpioted in figure 1* 
y FioudS ~ J 
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TIM abov« figure i l lustrates ths price and output 
detsrsimtion under siaple monopoly during the abort period* 
for the salot of s lap l io i t j we hare oaitted AFC and ATO curves* 
Here the fins produces Og units of output at cost of VC per 
unit and se l l s i t at P H, The fixm, therefore, earns P C 
profit on each unit of output* Since i t sel ls OK units, i t s 
1 1 total profit i s equal to OK t ises PC or equal to the area 
PP C 0. If hy chance the optiaal short-run output i s deter-
ained as such a point at lAiieh the price i s belov the ayerage 
•ariahle cost, the f iza will not engage in production. It 
vould like to shut doitfn for the losses would have been 
^i' 
•inlBlstd by shutting do%B rather than eontlnidng 
production* 
It is %<orth noting that a monopolist usually 
aspires for Huucimua net revenue in the short-run and maxisuB 
net profit in the long run* In order to achieve this objective 
he concentrates acre on average variable cost in the short 
run* The average and Marginal revenue curves for the product 
under the above sitiaation are shown in figure 2* 
Pigure- 2* 
It i s assumed that the average variable cost i s 
constant upto output level OD and rises beyond OB* The 
average variable cost durve and marginal cost curve, there* 
fore, coincide upto CT« If the firm desires to maximise 
2C 
profit, it will dtold* to saatJjiim total contribution froa 
the Ml« of the product* This will he aohieTed yitmn. t2ie sise 
of the rectangle PP C 0 1« at a aaxiniai* Total oontrlhutioa 
equale total rerenue alnue total variable ooet* With the cost 
and revenue curves given In the above figure, aaxlHUB profit 
and MaxlKai contribution wLU be earned only at output (M. Vo 
bigger rectangle than this can be drawn between the average 
revenue curve, the average variable curve and the Y«>axi8» 
The greatest practical probl«i ndth this kind of 
•odel is that only very rarely the f i m can have any clear 
cut notion of the actual shape and position of its average 
and Marginal revenue and average and aarginal cost curves* 
To avoid this difficulty and to awtke calculations easy the 
theorists take the support of total revenue and total cost 
curves to obtain profit •axlmizing output* Plgure 3 shsms 
the equilibrlm of the nonopollst %dth alternative technique* 
ngure- ?, 
TO. 
a? 
fht aboT« figurt ahoiw TR, the to t a l r«Tenue fbr 
rarlous units of output and fC, the t o t a l cost for pxx)duoii« 
the units. She point of iMtxinun profit is output ON 
vdiere the spread bet\«een the total revenue and the total 
oost that is SR is maximun. This spread is non else hut 
•axiHUBi profit. Although this figure does not reyeeO. the 
prioe directly, we can obtain it by diriding the total 
roTonue SH by output OH. The average prioe, therefore, 
turns out to be ^ 
OH 
I t i s a ooBBon fallacy to believe that since a 
f ins i s a Monopolist i t lAiould necessarily earn large prof i ts . 
In figure 4, the aonopolist, however, suffers a loss KL 
per unit of output. Since in th i s case the f irm's price i s 
higher then i t s average variable cost, i t will not shut down 
Or 
ATC 
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in tho ohort-run. Obviously, thio si tuation caiiiK>t continy© 
for loti^t la tho Ion; run ei ther th© desiond cu£<ve auot 
sliirt U|->iKirtl or tiio ooat carves jmist oooo clowawortu 
Ik^netholooSf ti^o auno^ioliat Is ?3ini?3i2in{r liis IOOCOG 
by produciaj output, OJi and ooXlinsi i t a t 0?^, i r 
tlie loss repreaented by th© roctangulor ^\l^2 ®^^ "^ ^^  ^ 
eXiminatod in the Ion;:; run, tlie firra would so out of busiiK933« 
X£ there are profits In th© abort x\in, i t cannot be prosu^aed 
that they v^uld disapiear in t l ^ long run# On the contrary 
they might stay or ev®n increis® provided th© barriers to tin© 
entry continue* soootiraes i t i s stated that a laonopoliat 
Jias a tendency to otorgo t e highest ^rice» I t must be 
laiderstood tl:at lie i s never intei^sted in a hi»^ price or 
in a hi,-;h or aiaxiauEi p ro l l t .or uriit, for he i s reatrained 
due to tho fact tj^at a J; higher prioec lesser -i^-iantitioc 3an 
bo sold. Ail© oize of tlm ?3onopoli£it's profi ts do-.jorids t^ ?on 
tiio re la t ion boti«Doa dO!:»nd mid coat. I^ tlie denand curve 
i s above average cost curve Ills© itf)^  in fi^^ure 5, tiio j,)rofits 
are lai-^o. iJut i f i t i s DD, he receives no net profits} 
3^ 
l>ut i f It Is DD^  he vDuld suffer losses. 
Figure* 5 
QuANrny 
Prlot and Output Dsterminatioa in the Long Run. 
The dstexnination of price under monopoly in the 
long run i s aore or lees similar to that iinder the short 
period, The significant difference i s that in the long run 
the monopolist operates only \dien he i s sure to recover a l l 
costs. He will not operate If he i s suffering losses. As 
Ke can see in the (mmpetitive situation, competitive firms 
i=> 
operate in the long run at th» alnlmimi points on their 
long run ave age ooats. This condition need not apply under 
monopoly. Since a l l costs in long run are rariable, the 
Bonopolist t r i e s to adjust the capacit ies of his plants to 
changes in long run dwiand. He even advertises to make h is 
product more acceptable in the eyes of his actiial and 
potential consumers. If his scheme i s successful, i t pushes 
the demand curve to the right and mals»s i t l e s s e l a s t i c . 
When these long run ad;]ustm«its are complete the firm vrill 
have a long-period equilibrium by equating long-run marginal 
cost with marginal revenue as shown in figure 6. 
Figure 6 
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The aonopGll£5t flm In th© above cas® will flxt 
1 1 
OP priG^p sola output ON and secur© PP'C'C profit. The 
above finn is a natural !!xinopolist a condition ^ ^ < ^ it 
fulfils for it operates over a rmiQ» over v^^ profit 
maxiaizins output occurs at a point of declining long run 
average cost* 4 mommA*Q refleeticm i^iU show that it is 
difficult for U8 to drive th© ssupply curve of tiie aonopolist. 
'^ e oaiKiot cioteraino the quimtua of the produce that the 
aoaopollst w H l sell at a given price nimpXy because his 
out:)Ut is dotorraiaeci at •^  point tdiere .mrginal cost equals 
mrginol revenue and since a giv«a value of marginal revenue 
can coincide with any nusiber of different prices* Under 
monopoly excessive profits are probable but not inevitable* 
Sosietinies the sionopolist nay face a deciand curve which is 
tangent to the cost curve* In that situation he h%8 to 
be content w i ^ nonaal profit only* Ssm&tinQ& it is stated 
that with the increase in demand the sxHiopolist naturally 
increases the price* This is true in case of pure oaapBtiti<m 
but not necessarily true under moaopcHy* It the aonopolist's 
^aarginal cost is falling or the new demand is taore elastic 
3^ 
than •Ui© old one, tlio aoncpolist lowers do%«i hla iwiee wh«n 
d«r .and InoreQsds ao long ns the new ©tmality befrween r^arginal 
cost and oaf^inal r©va»ue i s ccaapatible with a lo^^r prio«» 
i>l'3llarly ha t^ ay •ven raise hie prioe in i«ake of decline in 
d^mnd provided the new d^aand i s leso e l a^ io than the old 
one. '^/he» the costs of aonopoliGts go ir? they are wepected 
to raise tiieir prices but twit neceseorily to the extent of 
th© rioeo iii cos-v.e» Ilwy look only to the ©^Mality of 
aarsi"^! cwot oM rovonue. v/ith tJie inci'^asen in costs 
new oarginal oootr. are created and tliese njono:iolistr! adjust 
their outputs and prices in sudi a way th i t their higher 
marginal costs equal their iiotsinal reven i^^ is* Ijhi^ conoXud'-
ing this section iie w^uid Ilk® to hint at the relatlonahlf 
between jarginal revenue* imrsinal cost aa! the elast ici ty 
of dffiand for the result will be helpful to us in arriving 
at certain conclusions* 43 can be aeon« the elasticity of 
decjand ?.t any point on sloping average rev<mue curve of the 
rxtnopolist is e<iu^ to avorcise rev&mw \;^on avera^ reveniMi 
nsinua ssarsinal revenue* If wo rewrite t ' a forrajla we geti 
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J* »• - and in OijiaXibriiiia since lV>nH i B ... 
whero £ stands Ibr ^astioit^t 
P stands tor prio«» 
I4H stands li»r Max*sinaX revenuet and 
IC stanls tor marginal coat* 
Tho above fcwniula eon b© rearrmieeel aai 
P • E ( ^mtm ) , and hsnoo 
The Ibrsmla can i^ lso t*e rewritten in terns of price as 
folXcmst 
P «• ?-! ft ^ 
^1 
By substituting IC for r^fH* «« obtain the toXloving results 
i>1 
TMs statos tiiat in e^iuilibriua the nionopoXy price is eqsjaX 
to :aarginal rov&ckim or aarsinal cost sultipXied by elasticity 
divided by elasticity adaus one. 
'^1 
OoMparlaon l>gtiwn Monopoly and Competitive Pilcea 
While coBparlBg prices and outputs under monopoly 
and pure competition we assume that both of them are In long* 
run equilibrium and both of them have exactly same costs* 
Besides It we also assume that both of them have same 
production functions and both are profit maxlmlsers. Figure 
7 shows the comparison of equlllbrlim price and output In 
monopoly and competition on the basis of llner-demand*constant* 
cost asBiuptlons* 
Figure^ 7 
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Since the competitive price in the long run equals the long* 
run average and marginal costs of the flzmS "^^ ocmpetlve price 
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tvams out to ha Pe ^B astilnst sionoTjoly price vihXch staya 
at PtU It la, thtr^for©, obvious that tha ocaiopoXlst^s 
price i s higher nnd li© produces loss. In coQi^titicm 
narsinal coot Is not only © lual to laarjilnal refvonu® Uit It 
la also equal to '^ rle©« As -against this r-arglnal cost under 
raonop<ily i s no <:!k>ubt e^ iual to aarglnal revenue hat i t la less 
than Drloe. Price under aonofjoly situation i s greater than 
marginal cost as well as rt'^ r i^nal revenue. The fira laider 
tsonopollstic condition usRieXly gains and the consumers suffer 
sire© they li^ vo to my a nrlew that eicceeda cost* 1 ooa^nrt's 
reflection will reveal that the loss of conairaers i s greater 
tiian the gain of the monopolist to the eactent of the triangle 
Lrac ^^ch 1J3 Imovn as the \«ilf rtre loss. '"4noe njonopoly 
redistributes income from poor to rich and also distorto the 
allocation of resouroe:» i t violates the otandards of ef f ic ient 
and e pity* T!x> exr^erienoet hoiwrsr, dhows that with chan os 
in tasteGy laproveEiwit in tochnolosyt introduction of new 
profiuctc and the mmrgmkoo of new f Iras oonopoly la under-
going a change* In ccKirse of tl'^ oe m03t of th&tm laonopolies 
are eit^ier changing into olis<^>oly or laonc^olistio coapetltion* 
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r>ricQ Jigtrl3lnation» 
i^^ior© flaiaMn^5 pricing uncior moaopolyi w ^laXI 
take 14) briefly aric© dlsorlialivatlon under sKmopoly* In 
g^ioralt pric® ai£»j:*i!!iinatlon laeans oharglng tw> or move 
prloos tor the sajae product a t the eac^tl-ae. I t aay also 
raeon tha t the dl^f^renoes In tho prlcos of the products are 
^ro^tor than the cHiirersiices In thoi r cost of pro<Juotlon. 
T-r^ lce vi^rerentl i t lon orm ac^ul '^^ e .lany ahapost bat th© laost 
i;2port;:sit ar0t part i t ioning tli® snarketf differentiat ing 
prices within a geographical ai^a^ granting discounts to 
distr ibutorst chirking Olffer^nt price fraa different persons 
according to inoamt ago# oeXf s tatus and aXoo fixing dlfferen-
t ia t i*\ ; ,>rloe4J on tii© basic of qpaXity of pnouuctst XabeXfs 
on procUictSt alse oi' pr-odfiuots and p^ik ixad off peak services* 
A* C. Plgou, tii© Bagliah Kconaalst laye down three degrees 
01 di3criainatioa» In diacriniination of f i r s t d ^ r e e t l ^ 
monopolist i s expected t o know the masdmsa; eyi^ nvxt of racmey 
Q-ach buyer urill pay and keeping th i s thine In silnd he aete 
such prices tliat lio ultimately takes ^^ntir© amount of Idie 
oon6U!!)er surplus of the buyers* In dlsorlnilnatlon of 
3? 
•#cond «rder !•>© captures onXy tx p.ii't of his buyer'is 
ccnsua^r's ^urr^las but not a l l* In oag© of third-^iesr©©-
discrirdnation the rjoiK^ollsrfc dtridos the custoneri; into tw> 
or nioro claanos and cshergas different prloeo to each class 
of txayor# 
TiTe prGro^iisltofi: for price diTferGntl^ttiOK ar© 
thiit tliO sjorkets naijyt bo a t loas t tv/o c^ norc than t ' ^ and 
thii^ diould b© t5«parat0d froo e"»ch ot;.er in ZC-TQ uay» Th© 
©I'lstJ.clty or de; Tid in ©<-'cL of then© .—ir^ -.otc r-hould be 
difCareiit, T!.o c^o Ic nlK>uld not b© tr-.mafernble* It any 
how they aro tranBtorr©/" tlie trr*nsf«re«*i» slioulrt not gain tiy 
doin^ i t 30# r i jml l / t "the price di8crlr:inating f l ra laust be 
a nonopolist or i f i t i s not so the coaj^etinc flrsa should 
agree to follow a unlfora price policy • r ice discri:aination 
i s very often cr i t ic i sed in view of the f^.ct tha t the aonopoliaft 
destroys the financially ymak&r pnrt ies thx*ou^ chirgls^s 
longer oricen in the ocnroetitive martet rmd recovering the 
loss fron tlio !ac»topoly narket. Bat oc^etij: es •:isorl-ninatlon 
nay be ^ s t i f l e d i f the aKmopolist chTrsee different prices 
2>8 
trosk ditfeareat prn'mau jAmQrdLi^ tw their obi l i ty such as 
dlfi"«*'«ia'i; ip%-i;^3 oi*© oiifit'go.i for tm LQrviCQB Q£ i^ailwuya 
aooortiliig to vfiiat Um ixnaXXic aaii ueor. Jnif&xm prices 
fro® a l i j>®rsoas will iiot Qi»ly d«l»ar Jitaay po«jr people £rosi 
the nect03@itit>s of I if«i but i#oald also rooult in low U^oim* 
rjiacrl-ninatioii m-ay Q£ oouTijoy UD iurjiiSul £o r ich olaa^.^ but 
i f t\y& e^ 'i^ ^ to vii© poofo uioj^ tiian uiTfcott:. tho 1OB3 to t l * 
rictei* ^>^roonai tliQc^o i s no IJ^ .VTI iii di.:icrl:»imt;ion. 
I>i^:rlMiii?tiiOii o l iiUi!iiii,j ty^jo 1:1 isSiioii uiKiJ^^oliat Qh.wgQB 
higliov ^ricoiJ S.r(Mi atie iio^ iio *^2i;et Lat lovor tii'iois;^ frosi t^ iie 
foreign aarlwt osn b© ^aa t iHe i prcividgij t»ie aoaopoly industry 
i s subject to inoroaolns /"e&ims or .leoroaciue coat* l as t ly t 
the t!©urj^ of • laorlaiaat loa h::s wide a^i^lioability i a 
business decisioas opid in the aiialyaia of ocono.alc lasming « 
:\) r^ir Itwrisinatiun .as-iri^ } Ira^^er out rat cit lowor prio©» i t 
i s co'f*% !xit IT i t .'musiT; cut-tV»ro,;t co'^^jotXtion ai't. ©x;.lQita-» 
t l€n of tlie ourto;.i'5i''f i t i s caid^mialxLe* 
Teoj-iaisjue of Vrjj&t Jisoriaination* 
i-ot u& now lock :it ti-je tsobniqu© of price diEcriT:lna" 
tlon* As ueuol, we shal l a6.'m:!» tfeit t t e :.»ur^ iose of prio© 
i^  
dlQcrlaliiation i s to raaxlniz© liOnopoXy prof i ts and t h i i io 
posjiblo only iT th©r» exis t atXeast two sKuicets with 
different e l a s t i c i t i e s of dimwA in 0ach aartset. Tha tmUmiqfm 
of price aad output d©t©rainati<m i s precisely th@ sac© as 
we have discussed befom. InitiaiXy the aosK^^ist finds 
out that lavel or oat^ urfc x\>r i^Xch ccxabin^d jmrtslnaX t&'mmm 
eciuaXs niarglimX cost for his to t a l oatput uid tl-^n tie divides 
t h i s aut?->ut between dlfXei;^n,t i^ jUA t^a sv i!int '^ix:X^*^ revaaie 
in each i s eiaaX to -uiit^iA:;! c-5v-,t of tl;e iholQ outv:t« Let 
-^ c be^jin 'fith a 55i'T*ylc c - •'•« '^^roac ths ".onooolint faces 
tvo iJi'iH^etc l i cT© of y&Azh tbera in pur^ co"netltlon« For 
€Kjtr.Ml0 nirket A i s a protcctad n:?art<et OT:1 "tirket r Ic a 
co-Ji-^etltive one. Let urs aXr.o «.ii'j or.e tha t there I'--; only one 
)lant for ^^o nolic th® >ro iiict* The avera^ rev-snue curve 
\nA of :^3i:et A t-rtii, raono dowmard r^ nd -narrjinal rev9ni» curve 
'!'1\ r f t^t5 ':?'no -rirl-rflft '^^ 511 ilno nlc-?© dcwnward. '•- against 
t h l r t^ ^e avc***^  -© revem-M? curve \^ JJ of f.vaHiet !• v i l l be 
hjr ir-xit '1 "; tr- l '^t l ino -nd isholl c^iiicidc \tlth the nrii-ginal 
rcvrnxte c^ u-vo "v:\ Tl'5» A-u'^ -liiaX cost 2QV tiK? output i c t C 
In oriie ^ to c^lftcover tlT«» ®<2uilibrius! T>oint vie sliuXX have to 
discover n -••^ oint \4wm tMn nasrinal coi*t oirwg cutz t l » 
HO 
Coabined aarglnal reT«nii« curre (9(R SOT both VDB aaxkets* 
Tht combined marginal rtvenue ourTe ABO has boon drawi In 
flguro 8 by adding both the aarglnal reyenue curres MRA 
and MRB side vays. 
Plguro» 8 
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\iie--c Cuubii>4; >i-*i|ii4ul i-ovwiue t;urv© o^uaic- ..lar^ liiaUL cost# 
Tli© out^jal Ui 3.5 to l>0 Biiai'eu botweou ;aarket A aaa B* ulnc© 
airgi:»al i:"fc>Vfe!irie .^ JJA ill Liarhot -i ia 0^0;^ tu murginal cost 
K;;, <.\itjul "%'-.i '.^m lie iK»Xil in :jarlt©ti n a t pi'ic© PA, TtjQ 
ro'v-'.inin; '"4^-rv, :i:i(*«0Ii3) uculc bo t^oia iu siiorfeet J rxt a 
tci ;"'i-',;ii-al C-J t "" . « r'lljuerw viiiei *ci.cu '.x.'J... i'av:«l 
t;i'w l i ce 1- .irkoi; " lo 'Jc.'*t»* •'^ •s*^ ^ ti..iw wi i , Uecauao ot 
the 7-j\'K5r t!l~j.^iolty oi" W *u.uC, -i.^ > toi^Ji .laiiOi.uiy profi t 
fTQ^x ' o'Ui "• r^'^ ccvr v/o sic he 31''^^ 
iiow i.©s U4i o-^asitier a aaa© w e^r^ e a f l ra 1B a Jionopollat 
in .aa*'*I«3t A as woli aa ariri®fc b wi'tii a t'iii'or^ice tliat i t c 
av '^jcoi^ e jj»ov®a5ie cui"v© Atv4 iii aiirtet; A ic veiV iiiolastlc but 
it© ave '^uige *'««VGIIUO cur'vo .\<ii) lii raar^et - i s reXativoly raor© 
ola4,t;ic. xiioii* .u-irgiaai i^eiisnus curves are -stt^ v s«Jd .-lai'^  
pei;y*>c^i-veiy* *c> ti»r**iV6 a t tie t o t a l out.nst of the flrrn •.•« 
dk:ill cdcvilatia t'i» conibiiieu' a'-»rti.liml revenuo curve by addling 
to^©ti*ar ciue UToyc tii© .r^ -iri^ ijawLl reverj^e e?irves .for both 
then© ta:irk0ts» Tijur© 9 sliowsj t^iat the profi t n.ixl:-;isins 
output i s on vftmre tlm .'iiaiiginal r&^mmm KJ-I i s eqMaLL to 
^z 
Hargliial eott QD* 
Figure* 9 
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the outpitt C^ l wUI be diatrlbutod in oarlcdt A and B In suoh 
a woy t ^ t HOHf^  • MHQ, This happ<mo In laarlcet A at out^ put 
level OM «h9r9 aanginal cost OD (OS) i s ocjmal to oarglnaX 
rovemio HllAf as 0110b th© piloa in this nsirket i s PA* 
^timiiariy In cjarkot Bg aarsinaX oost CO (OS ) 0(|ua3. nai^inal 
t9wm» H HB at ou%7itt Ijsmll (MB^ beno0 price turos out to 
bo PB* The eod i^ndd profit £rot3 the oaXe of output (^ ! i s 
TKtl* It tdll be obsorviid that tho prioes in both these 
taerketa are different* Tb^ price in imrket A «^re the 
demand ie relatively siore inelaetio i s hi^er than the 
price in saarket B where the deoand ia aiore eXastio* 
Xn@t^ 3d of drawing three diff^^^xt figures we say 
draw otHy one figure w& deiixmstrate the teohnitime of price 
dieorlminsrtion* In figure 10 AR4 and AHB are two curves 
ahowing av^ '^ogo revenues for aarlset A m& Qai%et B« Their 
imi^ EinQX revmues are :Wi osaA nm Respectively* Line Cin 
IB the ooi! i^ned revenue ourvo tliioh i s the iKirizontal cfummtioii 
of tho two ceparcjto oarglnal revenues* The line ETIR io the 
lino of e^nl aorsinal revenue* Since C-IR io Oipal to 1^C 
£3ct point Ef 00 the total output of tlie !aonc:^ }oli©t would be OT* 
This output would be shared in ntarlet A Mid B to t!ie extent 
^ ^ 
of OA in market At at price PA and OB in market B at price 
FB. The output OT ia equal to output OA -»• OB. Both MRA 
and MRB arv equal to MR aa veil ae the marginal coat ET« 
Shis figure also reyeals that the 
yiaure* 10« 
p^ice FB in market B ie higher than the price PA in market 
k because of the steeper and relatively more inelastic d«nand 
curve of market B* So far we have assumed that the monopolist 
produces only on a single plant but in actual practice i t has 
liS 
seen 
beoa/that the rsonopoIiBt iitilizes aore Idian ooe pXaxtfc* 
aippooe a ooaopoXiat producos cai two plants A and D and 
s«Xls In two markets A and B tiidn in that eaoe the pxvilt 
Btasdlmlsing output i^ halX be stained at a point i«bere nm^inal 
oo8t in plazrt A will be eqpaX to aamginal oost in pXant B and 
both WE>id.d be eqiual to laax^naX reveifiie in naricet A and 
oazi^inal rovenue in markot 3* 
fhe theory of prioe aiseriminaticMi can be applied 
to the problem of price determination for the n&atiple products^ 
It has been seiin ^^t siost of tlie finaa prodij^ e mcKre than 
tma product* In order to utiliao tlie idle capacity of 
plantstf orggnioatitm and persomwlf tliey produce few oore 
products to be aold in other narfeets provided the demand 
in these iiarHetc is above th® siarginal costs# Figure 11 
X^9W8 a fira that :>roduoea three i»:x>diiots thot are to be 
sold in three different niax^eta* The average revwauea fbr 
nsaiicets Af B and C are AHAt AHB and AHC respectively* Their 
marginal revenue curves are the lines lying below their 
respective average revenue curves* The line EMH repreaente 
the ecfjkal zaarginal revenue line* The maxiaizing output of 
k& 
the f i m la 09A for narket A« HA KB for market 9 and SB 
XC for oiaxket 0* 
Fifwr«« 11 
f N)t' 
Thft firm »axliai89B i t s profits only when i t s e l l s quantities 
of eaoh pz^duot such th t their n&rglml rerexBies are not 
only equal to eaoh other but are also equal to be marginal 
ooat of total output. Prices in a l l the three aarkets are 
different depending upon their e last io i t ies . fhe more elastic 
the demandt the closer viould the price approach the narglnal 
cost. Price discrinination on the basis of t iae i s alK> 
significant. Souetiaes the demand aay even shift in fa i t ly 
k7 
short Intervals of t int , even wLthln a day. Porinstancs, 
ths d«aand in oass of ftntertaisment i s a function of the 
tiB0 available to buyers, i f dwaand shifts on a fairly 
predictiUQle basis i t i s tiseful for the monopolist to charge 
different prices on the basis of tine* Figure 12 shows 
average revenue and aarHin 1 revenues curves for Boming and 
evening shows for a theater. ARE and HRK are the average 
and Marginal revenue curves for evening shows vAien more 
pi^sons attend the show at a given price. As against this 
ML. and NRu are the average and aarginal revenues curves 
for aoming shows when few people attend the show. 
Figure- 12. 
A^. 
-^  \N 1 ny 
li& 
:3liio© for theater laost of the costs ar© fl3o&d escce t^ for 
oortoin chargoa vhieh vary vdth each show we treat the 
oQJtJtnal cost ^ an ccmstant for both ^t«mB ever tlio entire 
range of t e seating capacity of the theater* The atxjve 
figure reveals that raore pernons will vis i t the evening 
show and pay hl^ier prioo than those y^bo will attend %h6 
rooming oho%». It will , thoreforet pay to the onmer to 
ohai^ PE price for evenii^ ohoir and Pri price for sioming 
t^wNtm If the fseatiz^ cs^oity of tiie theater i s Xeo@ than 
oris i t vUl. pay hiD to raise t\m price but i f t ie capacity 
i s c!)ore i t %iXX pay the firta to Xesive oone ceots eo^ty* 
To CQQCiude price disori^nination \^ nay soy that 
i t i s carried on secretly or (^ jeniy because of nuitifXe 
deotond elasticities* niarket se^oitation and aeating of 
aaxicet etc» i^«Lth a view to earn rwMaopoly profit. The 
teohni pos are ^secif iealXy airecteti to appropriate 
conouaer's surplus 30 that i t acoruee to tm nionopolist 
ratlier %)xm to tl^ e ^fmmsmwm It ia mmttlsviQ carried on 
to develop new :3ai^ ot£3» to laolce use of umitilised ospacityt 
to ralijo iliture salas and to destroy potential oe»a|>etition* 
:iono.)oIistG r^atly diooriainate between persons and persons 
%^ch i s known aa personal price diserinination suc^ as special 
^1 
pric© coneffcnlons ai^ c ';;ivor) to C>n>;any's oxm «n.>lc/^3s 
or persojml acqjaalntancen* I t Ifj -\lr,o :)rictloO''» aocordltig 
to coii3iir«js*a cat«^ori©j5 or accorr»tig to ua© of the ob^octat 
mmh as difr@rw!it inteo are charnod by railwiys froa ohildreii 
and ad al ts or ^Xootriolty conc^ai^  cht5i»pjs different rates 
for ham con0^i^tlOR and imlustrial uses, r-osiotlies 
discri^alimtion is followed on the basis of goosraphical 
locntion wltSi a view to es^loit th© differences in tran^^ort 
costs due to varjrins dictorces bot%j©on the loeition of tljo 
jilante aiaJ t!io oonaaLiaors. Cliarstnc vnryin^ prices from 
cusrtoaers cm tho basis of tin© IG knoiai an clock^tiiao 
differentialo ana calffi^ar-tlr® diff«?0iitialo# Tlie c<KKion 
cocanplo of dodc- t t ie dlffercmtial i s tlio oliarsing of 
dlCforont rates on tnaHi colls in the day aiKi in tli© iiisljt* 
ifhcreajs calendar ti:;5e difforoiitialc refor to variations In 
prices aGCordins to ceaccsw} such as different rates are 
chcix^od froa tourints for hotel acccxas^Jdation at hiH 
stations at tae ti'-ie of pe:^ and off socisons. iJooiUes tliist 
cash ?i3C0untSt 'jn-mtity dlcccuntG ana ."Ixjtributors 
("ific-fiautri are y^ry coT.»n, Joaotlies .:iscrit..ination ia 
nerrr.iO'.t on tli© basis of tiMdo status. For inctanc at tl^ ie 
Co 
p.-ioes .aoutiiy vcay accoi'aij;^ to tiiu olassifioaticm ur tije 
i s also u t i l i s ed oa tiie bacic o* iiatioi:ial areao wlien 
dcxaeotic iJuyere iiavo to ijay a hiiiiier price tiian foitjlgn 
iMJ^ yors arid tli@y conniot li^xirt froa foreign cuuwt**ieG becauc© 
ol tiMciB r e s t r i c t i ons . 
If vo look to(waxMs t!i© at t i tude oi tiie TKJOOI© 
toiKirEls acBaoi>oly w© slwll oboerv© that io not m*Doura{;ir^» 
llostly ^eopl® bellove tiiat a oonopollst hac a tendency to 
r e s t r i c t t i ^ output aaJ to ra i se tlw prices which wrongly 
allocatt ' ' . ngouro0s of the country* ^^ecause of unfair 
practices esnd po l i t i ca l and economic comrjt ion the 
sjonopolistG act only cllacourage technical progress l>ut 
also create ins tab i l i ty in the econosy, Ac asaiiist t h i s 
few believe tha t the aoaopoly liac an abi l i ty to face 
depression* I t i s essential for public u t i l i t i e s and aiore 
v l t c l to e5:|)aiid ths raarlcet and t o face the f o r e l ^ 
competition* To ::i3cc«Jirat';o nmnopoly ussoe countries haw 
adopted antl««Jonc9oly leciolaticms while others have ap:)lied 
price and output ocmtrols. Pew ooontrioe have even att«K3pted 
to .v?.l:-5&a?ii ?-;ir oo pot it? on through uiblic.lty, .urc!m30r*s 
iG'^ocLrtijr.3 n *(! .it.il© control o^ lofiopoXien* "^omito -ill 
thc38 jtiort-coniiics nono^jollen IJTO tlirlvinc ^i^- shall 
contiaa to thrive «^1ienaver they f^oidi! bo feasible* 
\> VSJOQ ^uyustaopfes Utador lonapoXlstic COai>etition» 
UkitiX tho 1930*8 eoonomists distinguislied only 
bot^ won perfect coz^>«titio» and monopoly» By that tia© 
I t was clear that pure coapetition ami puro aonopoly rarely 
escietod* On tli© contrary laaat narkets esdsiblted ceirtajLD 
Toatures of cca^^etltloa as mU. as laonopoly* I t wns la 1933 
that ii# ..* .i>, Ijsrlln in the *Aiit©d 3tat©3 and s'lrst «Toaa 
t^ltiximn la Uhlto<: I'-lr^do.i pi'o:-eated a new theory isSiidj they 
called iaonai>rlictic ccjrvetiUcaa and lir^erfect coi^petitloo 
respectively. At un© tl^o these tuo concepts ^mre -ebated 
widely, .jcaa dultjecl tl^at tlaey mm oaise ciiio© bcth started 
Q££ with jierfect ooc^fcitloat -isod the nan^ "icrslnal-oost 
faarglttal revemje tools and arrivoii at cliost tJ^ sa:::* 
00iK)lu8ioii3* Others aaiiitoincl th..t ther>e tmt ooniotfpts uere 
di^ f«E*ent* Chaaerlin statOG that hie concept i s £!iQ>erior for 
i t i s wrong to aeeutae that cionopoly and competition fire 
s:( 
*.i*lc!j I1 ilTKO-i-A in "-l^ n, ':lQhir\mn*r> ojnolynln. i?-onlt'!e3 t h i s 
the terfi * i r^r fec t« ,ts oorrsa \*-'it inar-:?ropripte rinco I t 
«'?-CiSe-ts c'.lsappn^vj?.. In rea l i ty lanorfect mrkot i s a 
aegati'sm t@rs»»referring to a ?mltltud© of ?nirket situaticma 
In ''•^et\mQn tacmopoly and puro eceapetition* Mrs* noblnson toe* 
note af varimie fsMStors such an buyers prefermxjcs, dlffercBio*^ 
in troiij^crt coct | differcfices In qpuality of product eto«i 
\ j^ch creoit© inip©rf0ction in tho oarfeot but re^jected the 
concept of : ro(!itct dlffiprmitiatlon whid) i s the comer stone 
of Cfia'nborli'i'j; onalysin* Chisnberlin never regarcis on 
ia|)erf©ctXy corrpetlve in!iictry an one ^ i c h i s homogeneous 
in itsolX but tjreat.'j i t nr. on® itiich generates competition 
witliin vorivvac monopolistic units* 
Mrn* t^bixus&n han ignoj.'Oti non-price <x»iri)Gtitlon 
beeaiioe ahe found i t fav,!kiimrci to deal with r,uch m m l i t a t i w 
si tuationst but Chasberlin tos assigned pr<^ainent role to 
pro<?uet variation and eeli ing oo^t in tlie eiuilibriuii} of the 
nononolliBtio flrta. Ill© wntir© ©tf^tuisio i s not oa price 
cometiticoi oXmiA but tm price differentiation* product 
variaticm and promoticm ad^u^aent* i%>3« .obinson has alee 
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0";ltt.^' oli'^fi idly tecu'^o 'J^ hur ^irxjcoii^^'itlo'-j with t!i<? 
d.-^ wiwr-^  fCr^iv t^cynud ciirve* '*h<9 f'l^tlrvT^Iahos perfect 
ani^  i'-'porferst. iar!:et'^ In tm'' »'• o^ ol-'i-t^city of .Ic-.irid which 
©'•^ n Incluflc crAy \ "'^ '•z ty-^.n :if ollc^r^oly nltiiations, 'o 
again t tJil'^. C s^a"*be--'lln liss .isatt u-jth both cliiopcly am! 
oliQOi^ol/ c lc i r ly ririd r,r©oi"45ly. I^^ s^^ l^ '^ al revenu© plays 
{1o.nln.'mt I'D!© In "trn, ^oblnson^.n -milyisia. lie t'.ictinjuifshes 
perfect cBid liporXeot oo-notition i:sR tin* ^jarla of -.nA l^n-iX 
revori '^O or on tlio livedo C e.iiiality '^ otweon ;3artli-ial ooot and 
ao.T'gii-isJL rovcTiJ®* CJanMO'^ lin*,o contlbntion Is tliat a-i.r/_ i^aal 
revtmuo is? next rnl^oo in •rjcmot^ollntic csois-^etitlon. Ttue oqpatiiMi 
Of ssarginal cost and -mrginal rcvojuj© i s a gemraX prlnolnl® 
wiiioh i,3 applicable to rill th© firms \&ieth9r they operate 
unOur cometi t ions or under rfmtojoXf* haottmr dlotlnctloo 
betwten the two approaches i s that lro# Hoblnson t r e a t s 
puro oo^)©tltlon an ideal froo tlie vlo^ point of \#Blfir«i« 
Caa-fDcrlin on tlae othor hand belimrso tha t flrr?t of ^11 
porfoct horwgonolty i s Icpos-ilble to achieve, BOcan^^Ayf the 
docire of ccxnswwr for Vvirloty enhances rsitlior t.'.an filainidtos 
hi^vm ^^elxnre. Li r t ly , rirs# Joan lobins^n argues t h i t tlisr© 
i c o:c-^lcitatlon of la!-o'ar andor iia-^crfoct ^arfcat l^ ecaufj© 
Sit 
laboures^s ai?© paid wxises which are less than tho value of 
the i r -T^r^jinal physical products. But according: to 
Chamberlin th is -jrinciple equally applioo to a l l -productive 
services for each and every f ictor la paid loso than tho 
value of i t s '-ar^i^ial pi yslcal product* 
^'.rter havlna diocu.^sed the disol^nilaritlos bst\«5on 
tii© tyfo concepts lo t as analyse the raaln features of 
raonopolistic cooi^otitioa. Tlie nonopollstically corispotitive 
ai^Uet i s cliaractorisoci byt (a) a large nuabor of ClriSt 
(b) a clirroroiitiated r^roductt (c) ease of entry and 
e^sressf (d/ an lusurficiont Information aixjut the Tirkott 
(e) no»"prioe ooqpotltion and (D iiTporfect 33bil i ty of 
factors of rroduction* tbnopolistic coapetition i s a forra 
of I'aperfoct conK>etitlon where the nujnber of s i^pl iers i s 
usually not large . Althoush soao of thofa oosrarKi a considerable 
Tiorket steiro, iKJwevert each flra i s so ssaall tiiat i t need not 
yorry about any re ta l ia t ion frora other firnis in tlm vnko of 
c]ian,-;os in i t s price an/l output policy. The pro-luct o£ tije 
fir.? i s differentiatCKi in the sense that a t leas t tliero are 
oonio custoraors ^K) do not regard tho procliwst of tii is f i ra 
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as perfdct substitute* Tho piroc .^nct •^I-r' T tl-'C 'jo^ifl'.tions 
of sale differ tpon firm to f i n , "^ic:^ ".r© no e.lt'iil.flC'SnSi 
taarrierf? to «ntry. The tiv^.f^ mny ontor tho Indimtry \n{5 
t>rodiie« good« *ttiot ar© very jilsnllar t'.it not noce'^r?nrllf 
l<lentieaX« Buyers ?»»! .nollQre imde* isienopollstic co-i'ip^titlon 
often act on insufflelsntt information -^bout the nature of 
th© narkot, Tl^ e ooXloction* mmXnatlon oxW intorn>.rotati£»i 
of data I s oostly and t ine eonsumlnj; li©nce tho sellorr, and 
buyers act on t he i r ll-nttet^ knowledr^, Besicten th l^ ^rioe 
and qpn^lity are not t^ i© only oonsidorntions before the 
hir/Grn* r^lnce the Inciivi^ual preferencos eoclcty r e l i a b i l i t y , 
£^ [}0Clal -ititeriticjii, deliveiy on t ine e t c . , •nXay nore 
liniKjrtaiit role ^lan price or 'mal i ty . Lastly, t.md©r 
nionooollatio coranetitian the perfect nobili ty of factors of 
produotleii i s aostly hindered due to transport conta, ^jovemeBot 
reiitrietion®9 patent law etc* Then© fnctori broak the rnarket 
Into verioua eub-oerket". We can, therefore, conclude that 
nonooolistle ooT?rtetition if? a Mtritet nittiation v^sore tla? 
T>roduct of one isononoliet n^ be, .it tir.os rtubotitutoi far 
the piwMet of another and \fhere r»rice Ir. par t ia l I:/ cffectivt 
a« a BMUui of coBpeting daaand. Tht mnaOyslt oX denaad is 
•ostly fudged in the l ight of tht nunbtr of oompetitoM, 
th«ir relatiTS shares of the aaxket, their sales polioies AtA 
their influence on prices. In aonopolistic ecapetition 
UMLTA B« OhaaberliA, the architect and the builder of tht 
theory c lass i f ies a l l of the adjustaents that a firm can 
possibljr nake under three headst price adjustments, product 
adjustaent and proaotion adjuetaent. Ve shall present the 
essence of hie theory in a siaplified and abbreviated fora. 
Traditionally, the short-run equilibrium of a representatire 
f i » producing in a monopolistically competitiye situation 
i s detezained as in Fi.ure 13* 
yigure - 1?. 
^? 
Thus the optimum price OP and optimum output (M i s 
detezained where MC>4(R. This output and price i s d i f f i cu l t 
to maintain in the long run for the pure profit PQRS that 
ex is ts would cause entry of new firms. Their entry in 
the industry would cause the demand to f a l l and to become 
more e la s t i c in riew of the substuatability of their products. 
Confronted with such a s i tuat ion, the original firm might 
well react by adopting promotional po l i c i es that might be 
expected to raise i t s demand and decrease i t s price 
e l a s t i c i t y . Since these measures are l ike ly to increase the 
firm's cos t s , the long-run equilibrium of the firm may come 
about as shown in figure 14 as a result of upward shi f t s in 
costs or downward shi f t s in demasid. Whateyer may be the 
reasons the long-run equilibrium of the firm would be 
yigure » 14t 
S U A N T l T y 
fs 
achieved a t tho point or tangency between the short-ran 
and loii^xnm avorago cost curves and th® aver3i{jo rovomio 
ourve# 'iQ can bo seorif th© 'larjinal cost oM "Bar^jinal 
rovonuo in ^i£jure 14 aro © i^ual a t auch a level of output 
'^lore tlio tan£;oncy ooourOf This lm:-)pens bocauso 'tba 
output lovGi a t which tl^o vitnGoncj oocurst t!w ratco of 
cliinje of avera:;o cost arid average revenue ore oqual. I t 
can also be ipthorod tnat a t t h i s level of output tho ra tes 
of ciiaiije or to ta l cost {3arai'\al cont) and tot^il revenua 
(rjarsiiial rovoreie) are equal. In tho above figur© price i s 
OP^  ana th© output i s i:i. The price OP^  i s Just o.|ual to 
averac© cost 4[1|» hence prof i ts are absent. 
I t i s not necessary that a firm uoidor n50noi>oli3tic 
coHKiotition wouM always obtain super-nortaal )rofita. I f 
si tuations clian^ ":© such as there i s declin© in docjand or 
esecessive irjcreaso in coot or both# Tlien in tliat case tl'ie 
f i ra njay even iricur looocs as depicted in Fisuro 15. Itoro 
price i3 OP.J which ia lovor tb'Jn the averas© cost ilt^* ®® 
t l ^ f i ro suXi'oro a looo \^ich io 04ual to tlm area of tlie 
rectangle ^p'^o^^Z* "^ ^^ "^ ^ s i tuat ion cannot continue for 
^ ' ? 
long, because in the long run the fixes would leave the 
industry as a oonsequenoe of i«hioh the doniud v#ould shift 
to the right and the equilibrium would be restored at a 
point where the industry oeases to be in a loss position* 
The necessary eondition for long-run equilibrium, therefore, 
i s that the demand must be equal to average total cost* 
This condition i s implied by the convenience of 
Figure- 15. Arc 
ease of entry and exit. If D ATC high profits will 
tempt the new firms to enter the industry and lead existing 
firms to expand; if D ATC, losses will compel firms to 
£<^ 
leave tha industry. The fliras will ^ on leaving the 
industry until B- .\?C, 
The oqpilibritEn of industry in the long-run i s 
also aalled grsxi^ ©'iiiillbrluni* The aain clifficulty in 
describine groi» e-iuilibrliKi i« thjst them are ^xsxaj firms 
oonsfcituting tli© sioncoollstic ijron;,) and t to t th© r^ricos 
char^o: tsy tliesie t%x^s differ iccordlns to tli© ^2&^p<i^z of 
consitaer porfonaanoeo and the hiisitt and elasticity of 
their danasid curves* For sioplicity salsd, \fe have assmiied 
th i t a l l f ims under laonopolistic eofj^etition hawe doviamrc 
sloping average revenue and ssarginal rev^xum curves and that 
the cost ourvest their nature and behaviour reoain sazae for 
al l types of firae* Si^erienee %fould gjhow that old ind 
establ ish^ firos on;Joy |)rivileged posltiai in natters oi 
fixing price sharing ^aorkets myd ao^udrii^ the services 
of the factors of production* In view of these facta 
ChQaberlin oaisos cex'tato asmitsptiemo «hich he calls heroic 
OXU.I uniformity aosiK^tionn. Theoe aasuE^tions are as undert«» 
a) The nunber of Cims in each product ^rouj) io 
so lar::^ ^ ^^^^ €>^ o^ ' ^i*^- exxjecta itfj price -and output policies 
6^  
to go unnoticed by its rlYala, 
b) All firms produce more or less identical 
products or closely rel ted and readily oubstitutable goods* 
Hence a reduction in the price of the product enables the 
aonopolistio firm to increase its sale considerably and 
eonvecseljr, an increase in price leads to decrease in the 
sale to a greater extent* 
c) All fims have equal efficiency and nore or less 
equal cofomand over the market. This in other vords means 
that they have similar coet and der^ nnd curves and we can 
safely extend the technique of price and output determination to 
all other firms* 
Keeping these factors in aand Ohamberlin makes 
use of twD types of demand curves- one is the subjective 
1 
demand curve dd and tht' other one is the market demand curve 
DD as sho%si in Figure 16* 
Pigure- 16* 
Qu/\Mriry 
« 
?h o curve rtdj in Flf-iiur© 16 i s an toa^inary d^aand 
curvo of the flra^ Th® fljta expects that If I t lovers down 
I t s prioo ^le rlvaX firms will take no n^^ tlc© of i t r^nd t1» 
firm would be able to sal© nor© both to i t s own oui^ tonjar 
as well T. to the oustoniors of tli© rival firms. Conversely, 
i f i t vtilB&s the :>ric© t }w rival firms i411 not follow suit 
aivj ac n oonsciinenc© of %phich i t will lose i t s custo~K>rG. 
TlJ® ^ ourvOf there for©, «111 ar>i»©ai* rolativ«ly sioro 
©lastlct Thinkir30 on the nan© lines if ©ach fira roducer 
i to iiric© in or:l®r to capture cK)r© sole siinultanoously ench 
will gciin only that izicrewmtb in oalos tliat i s duo to the 
general reduction in prio©. vii^i r iva l ' s actions will he 
aatched by similar aetiun of others, the ci©:!iand carve will 
not reiaain 6&^* I t will be relatively lece elaotic such 
as DD^ « The aeamd ourv© DD|, therefox^, can be colled 
as the maxtcet destand oirv© for i t ^»^ws ti« de.:nnd cui-v© of 
the laonK^olistic flna at variows prices uncier tli© aesuaptlon 
that the prSaen of i t s rival firms renain identical* Wami 
the firo fixes the prioe OP and saleo ou^^ut Off iti; dreams 
are reaUsed tor the curve dd^ outs the W^ cunm at point 2. 
61 
QtTOMXt Bquilibriwi i 
Wi shall now I l lus tra te the oqulllbriim of the f l m 
under monopolistic ooapetltion >d.th the help of the curres dd 1 
and BD .^ figure 17 shows such equilibrluiB. In th i s figure we 
have omitted the marginal cost Guad marginal revenue curves to 
avoid confusion. 
Figure^ 17 
SuAwrrTy 
In the short period the firm would f ix OF price* 
s e l l OM output and earn PQRS profit . Since there are above-
6^ 
normal profits* conpetltlon will take place. Each f ir« 
would nice to increase i t s profits by decreasing price in 
oz^er to s e l l nore. In t h i s process the demand ounre dd^ 
wil l be pusjied downward alongwlth W^ because of mutual 
ccnpetition and f ina l ly the new market demand curve would be 
D^ D2 and the subjective demand curve v;ould be ^i^p* which 
wi l l be tangent to the LAC curve at point Q^  as shown in 
Figure I89 
Fiifcure- 18 
!Che long-run equilibrium price according to the above 
figure is OP^ which is also equal to long-run average cost* 
6b' 
r;j.a aiiows tii^v ill tiid long nm th© firm will mXl output 
Ci^  aw price uP^  and wjuifi ©O^ TI zero profit* Xr tli© 
coopetitioii s t i l i pm'sists tlie d^d^ curve wiU fal l down 
i;tili i.ofe©i^  al0u> with 0<|t)2 bi^ t this Will ixsroUve losG«St 
CO <.ur^  iiissM would leave tii© iziduatry aM aa a coaseijuance 
of '^ fiivSli i^ ae ..M'io# win Ise i-octorod to tXiB level of OP .^ 
vo« ti^rciox09 ooa coiKxLucle tuat the oQUilibriuci of the group 
under sK»iopoli3tio ooapotiticm i s aohievod ii^ ion tbo 
oatici^atoci c;er3aiKi curve dd, i s tangent to tho lons^run 
over-ogo co&t ourv9 l^ iC at a point I^wr® i t oi ts tho Q3arl9»t 
aeoand ouxvo Dl>^ « 
Prioe CuttJTjg tmder Monopolistio Cw»®tition 
A Tina under mcasopolistic ootapetition IG a part of 
the groi^ «rtiioh i s ©Jaipos^ d of several fii*.^ o wFiOG© iiarkats 
are oloeely interwoven* the equilibriuo of fjuch a l i r a 
ii*(eii i t ie loc^^i in i901ation« i s Riaiilar to th-it of pure 
oonopolistiCt Simje no si^i^le fira doailnates tl-io irkiaetjy 
the products of various firms siro oloso subotituton for one 
another* Although a st:^ply ourv© oaiuK)t be drawn Tor a groi:^ ) 
beoauso of dif£&renoesn in £>rioe8 yet the behavi<Xir ot a groi;^ 
^6 
! • gcinerally reflooted In tl^behayiour of a f l m . If timre 
la a price war It 1« also refl cted la th'* action of a f i i« 
an showft in Figure 19* 
Pigure- 19 
f-
-J 
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Tbe above figure has subjeotlre demand curves dd^  and the 
market d«aand curve BD .^ Imagine that one of the flras i s 
at point A so that i t s price i s OP and output (M and i t i s 
i? 
± :> cr;J ,/L^: V.-^o ^r.-^Tit-:, I.limine too tiiv.it I ta owner 
z.^:. Ill;: .^rlce -irvlor t,ho ivraauiou th-'t ol;Ii?2-'s '.-/odld tiot 
fDllj*. t;\v. -lilt -'^ KI he Vivald be ^iblo to iacrea.';c tr^ .argln of 
hie ^rc'^itn, r. .t hir, co-pctltoi-s cut zk-^Xitv ::rlcc tv)0# ?Iie 
'ir.. .t'"'/or, :. -n ' tc 3 tloi-.r. tiic curv'c D:»^« 'I^.oucr. te> 
s.rJ.'-:', ,^t t..-' 1 v^/c. c ; .^--.cc v.r-| -^r-c -';J x-lilch c^ ro oiigi^tly 
higher but tiiey ii\i / 't tl-io coat o* .-r-ofl-i, lii tliic iirooess 
deL curve t / l l l COLIC down t c ddg* *«3W tiic price cutting Xlra 
again in i t i a to r a novo to cut tlie price ctiU. fUrti^ *or undor 
Vcsi sam© ln;?resslon that othere »teu34 not cut tlielr jjricou* 
-^ tiic© -acre Mm otlier flnas nould acc@|3t tfc© challenge and C»JC« 
ooro the ddg ciarv© ^iXi coae down to dd* alorjg witii J)^ 
curve. H ^ lovjored prlc« OPg wil l incroaoe Vim o«t,,.ut to 
o:]^ but tbe proi'ltc shall Uiea.ipear. 'xliia type oX' prlo« 
wai^  ©0tabXieh©u tlia o<|uliibrlua or the I'lrm aiii tLe igrot^ 
a t tiiiO point 'sd:ffir0 price O^OIG lUJLl co::;t jj^ d tir^ s cont 
curve I s taqgont to t JiO sub^activo de .iiad cuT'/e at t!ic point 
intersection o^ <i4^  or: Dlu. \5 car: b© seen in thio price 
war ()«JtrAat cei'^tairii/ iiKirea'-ec but at tho co;jt cf t)3& jroflt 
of tlie flrost 
£8 
Prlcinc i© <^y <^^ aspect of fira*s strategy* 
In a cliaa:;iA| ©conm^ %i)@re tastes and pr0f@r«^@s oliasge DO 
mioo9ssft& |}U3i£i@si^  can si^gl&ct i t s pro^iot poXicgr* ttm 
Np^stlcm of %f}at prodiacts to pro'iii©© i s c^rfcaluly a iteida* 
a®ntal aatt@r« floil Olwilserlain M0 sucj!f©£it©<i t»o basic 
cr i ter ia %*ii^ imMt b® lf«r^ 1» mind whil© decidirjg proclxast-
linet* 
i ) by feow fwoh is esHJh product cotffcribjti g saoi^  
to Tttmmm tljan to costs ? anci, 
i l ) isliioh prodUKJts are increasing and % i^iob 
ddoroasing in ¥Oli£^ of sains* Tr>@ r i i^ t OIK^ OO 
of product i s a Eiattor of pe^rchological ana 
sociolc^ieal irkKS^ r as m^kX as mi ©igiaeering 
oad «0(»K»io prol>i«i« II' tlie !>r«*!ct differentia-
tiofi lias to be succ^safiilf th© ?ITJ act mist l?e 
dijK5o*'nil>l©f idefitifiaiao ^M^ ro-i^ "iclblo. 
'•^ ince \m -w^ iatowjstod in tlie nrici??'' of t l ^ 
products 1/0 nfcMild re-^«at -t^ .-^ t th© M:-.?c cri teria 
in tho 30l0ction of t'm profitct rlini?2'' 1:15 coot and 
T>roritsbil4t-/» 
6^1 
PRicEKs aPdAianr OF THE mm 
MNMHMNMMWINMII 
k ptcullarity of th# pro(Mot difforeitiatioii i s 
that for •aoh typo of prcxSuot thor« in a oertalii oost aoh<Kiul« 
and a otrtain cl«Eaand soheduXe* Smm prodwits are of better 
qjuality while others are of inferior qMalityt SiaiXarly 
s^ae produsts have hi^er cost of production in e i^^ >ariBion 
to others %tfhich are produoed with lov oost of produotion* 
The firm selects that product out of imrious possiblji 
pro'.'uota «lii<^ yields aaxiiaum net revenue* 
Pro-iuets are defferentiated \fy brandSf desi^nst 
packing i trade-^ aarkf credit texnst reliability and proii^tnees 
of delivery etc* The aub^ective and not the c^;}ective 
factor is oore important* Product differentiation shapes 
the d s^and of Vcm product aa sbcwti in Fi^ire 20* The 
following figure oontaina two dcf^ and (mrves i^r product 
A and B* Both ^irves are relatively elastic because both 
are close eiibetitutes but product A ie aore etrongly 
deffermitiated than prodiurt B because ccnsucaer reaction to 
changes in Idie price of B is greater than that for A* 
> 
Chamberlin*s product Tarlation should not be confused 
with changes in quality induced by technologioal Inprov^ients* 
It deals wish the uss ot existing technology to modify its product 
to suit the existingtastes of the consum rs« The analogy is 
to hold cost curves and denand curves oonstamt* 
Figure- 20, 
i'iuAf'irtry 
Musli of the competition in monopolistic 
competition i s non price competition. Fro uct Tari^tion 
i s another form of quality competition. Mostly prices 
?/ 
under oonopol is t ic competition remains constant by 
custoitt or i n e r t i a hence t le fiiai manipulates the demand 
e i t h e r through product va r i a t i on or through promotion adjustment. 
Pollowing ChamberXin* 3 reasoning we take tvio 
y a r i e t i e s of products X and B alongwith t h e i r respect ive cost 
curvesAl^ and BB^. Sigure 21 exhib i t s the optimum adjustment 
for the firm when i t s products are v a r i a b l e , OPi i s the 
customary pr ice vdxich i s f ixed. 
Pigure* 21 
SuANTiry 
When the firm decides to se lec t qual i ty A, i t s e l l s 
the amounit OM and secures the prof i t Pj^RS. But i f 
i t chooses qual i ty B, i t s e l l s moi-e of 3 to the extent of 
n 
Off t)ut obtains profit Pa^ l-i'^ s^  yAkicSi Is 19BQ tkmi mm 
^ust as y/itma prico Is varlabXe* ttm fiana ^looofts that 
price tdiic^ yields the oaxlauQ mt i^ ovenue so also yAmn 
the product i s variable i t wouXa ^x»ose product A that 
yieldo greater »et profit. 
seiXim Costs and Eciuilibrlua o£ ih& Pirn 
In a faodem oconotay ^ t h a riaing inooiae perm 
head oonsuaers wmt to seek new axid varied experienoe* 
they refjuire new producsts or su^rlor versiois of older 
products* Evezy suooessiui businessf therefore* should 
have a policy on pr^BOtlng i t s products and this policy 
sust be closely integrated with price and product policies* 
In perfect coiipetition there i s no need of advsrtisenient 
for tlie fir!a*@ prlioary task Is to adjust the output to u 
given price* tn monq;>oly also the firs need not advertise 
Bixioe it has to chooi^ the profit aaxistizing output and price 
in a given set of oonditicais* In aonopollstic coapotitlon 
j^her© pro^ Hict dif ferentiaticxi estlats i t b©cos»es aecessary 
to disseminate sufficient information about trie product or 
to pormaade the custcraters to purch.ase tlm prodiwt frc^ 
/3 
amongst various cc^bijiations o^ old and new products* 
rhis n«©il6 @3<|>®iiUture on adwrtlsing or stollar typto 
of .irceaotlc^ial activltec \Aiida tim ooonoaieta oaXI selling 
oosta* Advortiisins budget i s deterrain^d soaBtimos <^ thtt 
basi© of a fiM&: porcwita^* of sales or •all»yoi*»oan» 
afford* basis anc! ooraetirr^ es on t!i© basis of tadc or 
cometitive parity basio* !lost of th® firas ©vcm adopt 
votam on invsatcant approach Ixi deciding their proraotionaX 
policies* *^iat ever laay be the basiSf the basic purp o se 
of tl)e sellinis cost i s to ^lif t the demand curve to the 
right so that laore can be aold at any givKi price. If prouio* 
tianal el^^ticity i s higher than price elasticity of d^sandf 
selling costs ajne ^re£&rred in cOE^arison to price cuts and 
vioe«*versa» ttonaally i t i s premisied that sellins costs 
increase deo^nd ti^jroui^ the alteration of oonsunorr. preference 
but aOKietij::eclt so lia j^pmis that advertising ca£^>ai^ proves 
ii^ffootiv© and ceoand x-eatdiio \^wr& i t was. In eKceptional 
cases i t Ims be<»i noticed th^it divertisir^ionto have oven 
dl-aini^ied tliQ deaand by at!-lire to tho aaloc of tl)& f i ra 'e 
e€»!tpetitors» 
7^ 
In case of prodi^ dlff^mxtiatloii tkm solution 
of th© gro(4> equilibrium is alao aohlevttd at tJ» point of 
tangenoyt on the assuii^l<^ that alX firms have 1 ^ amm 
costB and aarae shares o£ the mexicet* Si^ppose all alUce flinas 
are making net profits^ then ntw flxms will enter and oauae 
the sales of the old firms to fi^« In order to ooapensate 
this lossy the old firms will make Improvements In their 
l»tiduots* This will raise their oosts and shall go on ralslaf 
till their oost curves would be tangent to the oustooary 
price* Finally» sales will be adjusted at point of equality 
between price and oosts* The flrta as well as the grcN4> 
b o ^ shall be in e<|ulllbrium and there would be no inoentlve 
either to enter to leave t: e iiklustry* 
nelllng costs are m K ^ wider than ^ust advertlsix^ 
cost* They include advert!ses3x»Rt as well as all kinds of 
proiaotloaml activity to increase the drnmad for tb» produot* 
Chaiaberlln states that those oasts that are incurred to msk» 
the produotf to transport it and to make it available to 
customers with given wants and tastes are production costsi 
7S 
but those costs th t are needed to change consumers 
tastes and preferences are called selling costs. We May 
draw a curve showing thp reLutlonshlp between thp 'promotional 
expenditures of a firm and the unit -sales of Its product* 
Such a curre has been depicted In Figure* 22. 
Figure- 22 
\>jA>^-> 11 y 
The above curve Is more or less U-shaped, It shows the 
avera ,e cost per unit of selling any specific amount of 
output, for example. If we want to sell output OM we need 
?^ 
an ar^raife ofCM units each to se l l thut l eve l of output. 
Sliall ;rly for ««lling the output OH, the average cost per 
unit of se l l ing i s BR. The cost curve f i r s t decl ines , 
reaches a minliaura and then begins to r i se sharply. The shape 
of th i s curve depends upon several variables such as the price 
and quality of the product and i t s subst i tutes , inccaie 
and preference of the buyers e tc . In Figure 23, we h .^ve 
draMi three alternative aeliling costs CC^  CCg and CC« 
aloni.^with their respective demand curves BD ,^ W2 s^tA 
VHy We have Ignored aarginsl cost €Lnd i^rginal revenue 
curves but instead have located equilibrium prices P^, Pg and 
F^ under three different se ts of conditions. Our main 
contention i s th t the higher the se l l ing oosts , the higher wil l 
be the di^ aand curves, 'ilo^ coat curves 00^, OC2 and CC« include 
yigure» 2^ 
y 
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both -^rod^^tion ar^ «ollli¥j ooets* The above tlipjr© 
revoals that IT ti^i tivn*B milXijiig costs nm confSJWKi 
to tl*# first stagjOi th© firs seouresp P^ t | l^ r:;| 
;.rorit an;! aellB oi-itput »t | at priot (F^« If i t 
inoi^ases iti^ j^ lXIr^fj costs and cmio^itrat©® m% sta/^ t«o 
i t DcUc aitnut Cn^  at -^ic« CF^  and mrtm totfil :>n)fit 
p^ l^  Fl, ;' » .:.ino0 it.-^  total p^i^Jtit i s inertaBing » 
<"i ^ < « «S( 
til© f im aight b© t^rt'^tod to iniW«iin« i t s adiptrtiaiJis 
exniin(iitu:ii an! ^n^ 3#ciiro a d^ -^ am! mirv® DB^ * lii t M t 
situation t-:,^  Hrra fixes price C^ -'^ f seXis oiitpttt C^ '-t^  
bat ©ams no profit* I t i» thu« oloar that i f th© Hum 
ocm0©ntrat©e ^unt on itc; sooonr^  sta^ p© of eaei^aJlp) i t rnima 
o.'%xl-mo -.njfit by fixing -^rice 01*2 ^*^ veiling output C^ 4^« 
f'#3.1ing Co^s aKd th© ^-^giilibriusa of Ui© Oroug^ 
n—iWlSl l lHl l l lMl l l l l lWi , • «IIIHIII» I\ | l l l l | l l«l l«r«»<l»«l»w«IM«»<IWI»i l»i i l l l i l ] l«l<l»l i i i l»l«IWIM^^ 
In tliis ^Mstion 0^© ar© dealiiig with tim 
o<^P©titiv» aitvartiaing* w© stcurt TTOD a point wiMr© th© 
fijm© in a group nrv in ©r^uilil»rium* iicm© ©cuming abov©* 
rwraai i^rofito* Sri suoh a situation one Hi^ docit^ e© to 
75 
adr«rtl8« In the hope of earring more profit, Slnee a l l tim 
firms are alllce figure 24 represents a l l of them. 
Figure- 24 
O 
U 
< 
The in i t ia l equilihrium i s at output m lAere the firai 
secures aero profit for the average cost of production PC 
i s equal to the price OP. One of the firm spends money 
on i t s advertising campaign, ahoMi by the curve SC ,^ 
Curve SC^  shows how the sale of this particular firm can 
?•? 
ificreas© i f only t h i s finn advert ises. If t h i s i© th© 
only f i ra and i t proves eucceesful i t rmy mVL output OZ#f 
and optisaia oat:?ut whore i t s :!ia3nsinal co;st ( not e^diibited ) 
would ©viual pric©# The ftrnj %«ould Tail to olytain output 
OL oM th© not prof i t that ^o with i t because others i^uld 
also advertise* In th ic chan^ec' aituntion i t s oiit:Hjt would 
increase but not to the extent of GL« The fina w>alu a{:;ain 
t r y . I t s idvertising e?cr>enditui^s \!*CMld onoe cioro increase* 
I t s new selling cost curve vmM, inereano i t s output but 
notwasuch as i t desired. Finally, stable epilibrlufi} wi l l 
come about only i^fcai a l l finas would pro t^ue© output ON aiid 
have sell ing coat curves 3C,« Mo fina can nov/ ©am ary 
sore prof i t em&pt nonaal prof i ts hence tlier© Mjuld be no 
incentive to advertise* As can b© seeOf the oos^eti t i t l r 
advertising has increased the output frooi CH to <^ but the 
finsts are no bet ter off* 
B^ese Capacity 
Xz has already been rtincusa©' ear l ie r t ha t since 
in aonc^olistio competition th© lon@»inin e^iuilibriuia price 
i s not ©c|ual to th© lowest avert^ g© cost of th© firoit th© 
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firm* prowuce an out jut which ie l e s s than the soc ia l ly 
deoireahle idea l output . ThiB means a aonopollat io f i r « 
producaa the output aoaawhera to the l e f t of i t s mir>lnu9 
cost p o i n t . J?h« gap b«tW9en these two l e v e l s of ou t tu t i s 
knovn a s ezoess capacity idiioh has been i l l u s t f a t e d in 
Figure- 25, 
P igure- 25 
Under perfect competition th* pitjductive resources are 
i dea l ly u t i l i s e d simply because the maximum out 'ut i s 
proaaced a t the aininum ooet . 7his cannot happen ux^f>r 
monopoly or monopolistic ccmpetition in view of t h e i r 
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do^ flEiword 6lO;>tag d^ -jmncl airve» As can be semi9 thQ 
nonopolistio fins %dlX preduce output (m tn ths long nm 
vtxloh wcruld ^ less tiiaa the optimxm output Olj. :iMj i s 
thgrefoi^Ot etdl©'. un»u»©A w exsottss capacity of th« f ira . 
I t I J woi'lsh notiiig tlvit the concept of exoesr, capacity 
ic X l..a£^»raii cu*Kjej.-t »or in t t e n!'iort run there c.n be 
excCij;.. c«, aoit> la any ly^e f cornotitlon. ;:Thn,T,b©rlln 
iiT..' rc«ii.w\« .ivx'c wT iGtis the c'^ .'O techniiue to show the 
untno^ capacity l,y ti\kUig the help of jsiAjective de''^QnA 
jsid nxl::ot .:e.iaod, acct.'r'iir^^ %o hln the long*-run 
et|ailil>riarj u i^cier ooiiopolifltic a>i!^@tition can not be 
aolvicvo: '^i, tii© aiatouQ point of Icms-nm aiporag© cost in 
viefeT of tise liature of ooa^etition Urfc i t i s iehlew<^ at a 
point vtoere the sub^ctive dor^ sntir! curv© is t an^n t to tlie 
long«»nm average cost at a point inhere i t i s intereected 
by tlie adjusted oartet deitiand curve. Me regards the difference 
between the actual Xon§«run e(|utilibri\«a output and the 
output at minimua cost as aeaaure of r^o<!iicin*i a diXferentiated 
profluct rather than a •!i»f»^re of eseoess c«53aoity. 
a^L 
*1onopoXl«5tlc corr'Otition in ijootly c r i t i c i sed 
for i t r oxeerss c-'^-aclty. I t Ir arsuod t i n t .i:,>nopolistiC 
oofsr^ltiofi «ne jur-ijje^. tJ"*© entry of l a r ^ mrab^r of f i ras 
many of i!*iich aro Inefficient . Sacli or^ e of tlisss .aX>i.Iuo«s 
a (|URntity ^ . ich ir. not tL© aititmua oue. I^aici© ahia the 
oxisrte?soe of transport costs and the buyorn preCsrsntms 
finable even the l e s s efficient fIrnfj to contin<je# Instead 
of helping the o<mmst&rB the «3cist<5noe o? too r^ jany var ie t ies 
of the produots confuse the buyero, Coi\«etitlve advertise-
aent fUrttier coi^licaten ths t^roblea* The e^endi ture 
on advertisement not only rai??©*; the prices ot the product 
but also proves waste as far -is ttm contmjtnlty i r concermd. 
Despite a l l Uma@ def#cts siofic^^olietie eof!i^>etition la 
eoononloally usellil* I t sa t i s f ies nev desires of the 
oonsiraersi creato: awareness aoong then about the quantity* 
^luality 01*2 the price of the s^roduet* Above a l l i t i s the 
main cauce or development of the private ewterprise econoriy. 
.Uthon -^jh twj nuch orrorta are flevoted latvely to .':^lling "too 
rmny things wttii too rjamr braral nases but they satir>ry 
conmi?3©r*£ desires £or vm'iety and breath of choice* If 
53 
il .or \ le. 
Bilateral JonopoXy* 
Bilateral monopoly i s a situiati<m in *dMch a 
sin£:l9 a« l le r faees a single buyor* The ocKsnodi^ in 
4ii9stion has no oXoso substituto* th« tatyor i s ^ri»lly dopondtiit 
i|pon til© sell®!' iiKl tii© a©li©r too laas no ath«r outlet* Tbn 
•znln ^^robles in b i la te ra l aonopoly i s to find out *ihat ac^unt 
of the product will oe traded a t ^ a t prie«* w# s t a r t v l th 
tba assuis^ition that tiie .toller facoa a risliif; average cos t 
asnd til© buy®r faoos a fall ing nftrgiiial u t i l i t y curvo. 3oth 
collc-^- tzd bayei* Jutige tli© con odJty ^ t l i thol r reapectlv» 
prico -luumtlty scliedulea. iCach io lnte?rcjt0d i:i m^^itiiaising 
his RiOiiOfy ;>rofit# Lot ue a&tPJtoo "Wi-^ t tliio no:"«>i^ aly aolior 
ic a coal niine ^*iicii suypllef't ccat to the li.i© factoxyt 
tlif* orj./ bL/o^ cf the coi l in : re^loru Ttai. l..*e cool aine 
i s ,: i2K-'ii:;/ol/ aa. tl-i© li-.e Ti^cr^ry 1^ i -4.;iio^»sw .^ *X;"^ ^^ ^ 
36 l l lu i . t r tc:< t lx 300i"*Jiii.i i ":"' *K>n.;,ci/ _-ioo# *1ie 
ionoi^oli. b i s iiiBioilijrJAi'n v/aan l.o p-^ o ..oo^ tlx^ a .vunt ©^  
s^ 
ms-rgiiial revenu - t 'Oint A, hance he i s fu l ly s a t i s f i e d . 
Wi'AN T'T y 
Now l e t UB euialyoe the posi t ion of the 
X 
fflonopoXi^t. Since the monop^oonist i s alao inters.eted 
i n ge t t ing maxifflum surp lus , he would equ ite h i s marginal 
coat with h i s narginal u t i l i t y , fh ls i s i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 27-
Pjgure- 27 
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In the above f igure DD i a tlM> dewana curve of 
lime factory for tlie product of th«? coal mine. I t can also 
s^^ 
b« ealltd aargla&I u t i l i t y ounr*. SS 1B the supply eurr* 
for th« Bonopsonltt or It nay also b« o&lled th s arsrage 
00st of the line factory. Theupward sloppl&g supply eurre 
rereals that the nonopollst oan buy aore and aore ooal only 
at higher and highv prices. Since the nonpsonlst*s average 
ooat i s slopping upv#arr3. I t s aarginal cost MC miut also slops 
upMord but at h i i ^ r rate. At point B theaarginal ooat of 
^ e aonopsonist i s ecjual to i t s marginal revenue. The 
firm nould, therefbre* buy output 0N| at OP^  price to 
obtain maximum surplus. In order to f lM out the equilibrium 
price and output l e t us now ccmbine both the figures in one 
as shoimi in ?igure 28. 
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fh0 d^sand ourvo of the moiiDpoIist i s t l ^ mrginal 
u t i l i ty curve for the aonopsonist imd ti^« nm^nal cost 
curve of the lamK^oXiot i s the average cost or m^pply 
ourvQ fear the mmopmnlst* JUst as the nargiaal ir^venue 
curve for the sKmopoliot i s separate siiailarly the m^r^imX 
cost curve ffe>r the aoaopsonist i s also separate* The 
equilibrium priafi for the laonopsonist Sxi the above f l ^ r e 
i s C^ ^ at i ^ d b the X$sm factory ie willing to t ^ 0?i| 
amount of coal to obtain the madauasurplus, 4s against 
thia til© eciuilibrlua price tor the coal miim i s CP at which 
t±» aiooopolist i s viHing to suj^ ply On aiaount of coat 
to secure smxixaum profit* We are raw at a ^@ry interesting 
s t o ^ . The acmopollst i s willing to mip.'ly outiait OM at 
OP price Imt the isonopeonist is willing to buy output 0>!;^  
at 0P| price* If the monopolist lowers, the ia*lce below 
01' • i t can be dorm only at the cost of profit , siailarly 
if the Qtcmopeoniet raises the :)rioe« thie mmm aloo reduces 
the mir|}lus of the lacmopsoniat* Under euch a situation i t 
appears that h i l l i n g would proceed until an ap^eeraent i s 
8? 
rea^iod* w© cannot siy with certainty as to what that 
agre^wnt ^wuld be« What ym can say i s that the relative 
bai^ainlng position nml& Influimoe th» ranult* l£ th© 
sKmopoiist in relatively laore |>owerfUl the price tv'Hl 
approach OPj cojworsely, i f th« laonopwmist i s po*iorlUl 
taie prico tri l l approads OP.« I t appears that in bilateral 
;t<»iopoly the price and <|ia«tity are indoterrainate* There 
i s 1 fair anount of ogrocowit* Ko i^tveri, althoufl^ ^ant i ty 
in b i l i teml nionopoly is indeterminatei the price i s porhips 
not oo* '"idsiey liegel imd Laii^ rence S. Pourakor hav© shovm 
that the twiflency under sioiK^oly i s ssostly to share the 
joint saaxijaiia profit . The tend«ioy bec< a^ee stronger »^hen 
both of thesj aro well infbnaed a out the position of ea<di 
other. 
aiopoly md 01Ag^ly'« 
?be csKssMmt i#e f^oe situations interfswU^te between 
latmopoly and aonopoliotic ooa^titicoit we o<»ae to an area 
in yhi^ the analysis beeoniess too oosiplex and the resultB 
often di^ jend on the volatile psychological factors titet 
BS 
are d ic r icu i t to r«duco to an^ ^ apecific foi'aulation. 
analysis in t^iis area oovora duppolyt oligoiJoly arid tho 
theory of gaiaos in vfiii«ii the present s ta te of ecoaoaic 
tneory ie ijn a twuunh l e ss satisfiiotory atate* OligojoXy 
ai^ears to be a ooncaaitant of modem raethods of proctuction 
aiKl distri 'oation \^i©rc ^^ ^ o£toa asncountor a si tuation %ih©n 
tho:i? OTQ 'i.il/ a few iapox'tant -.©Hers who ck) not for^ a 
anoRyiaous stai^;., i*2d; .ii^iJs his o'wa busineso. 3ach watoJjes 
%hQ px'ico a .d out^>ut ^iolicy o£ his r iva ls and knoifs that he 
i s also beine itfatclied by tli^Bi. Instead of lo kiiitj to 
t he i r own demand and cost curvest tiwy csre preooci^ied with 
raartcet strategy* Despite the vis ible poaaibil i ty of direct 
eonfrontsrtien omong them* there appears to be a strong 
inciueeoient to retaain a t peaoe id-th one anotl^r* Their 
in te res t s coincide a t l eas t to the fl»tent of ndL^hing to 
avoid osutually destruotive priee'^cutting and burdena<^ coapetl* 
t i ve a^^vertiaing* Each one has a delicate task of advaneii^ 
hia position %dthout i ^n i t i i ^ an uncontrollable ae<#ienoe 
of actions and oainter»action* 
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.\pproach to OuopoXy. 
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In iioopoly Zov tijc tirnt fcir^ we tmX tSio need 
of ciistlnguitMag clearly' between the pi'lco policy aiJd tJi© 
oufci>ut policy or a ZUTAm As v-,^  kjiow \3ad9r gmrt9<it coapotiticqi 
only 3n o«t;3Ut policy is» poaslbl© \i*iil0 unuoi* a&rkopoly ooUi 
kiruJs of .jruiicics aixj pv>cslbl» »xit iv :>iake3 no dirfdi^ei»c» 
as 1-0 lAiXcli yrj© ii> Xullov/ou# *.ut ir>. cluc^oly i t aakec a l l 
tkm dirr©refiO© 'vvljetaep tlio f l m jTollowa an oii:t,>iit policy or a 
prico isolicy. .•'»nalyticall/ tias ©a.^ i.or wi^ :,^  i s to XoXlcw an 
out.iut ,)Olic/ tov i t Xoadj tv f i i r l y dotominavo rooui ts . 
Tho a i i^ les t ca;i« or i>uro duupoly of tliis kind '^ /liich can t>d 
analysov; witJi pi'dcision i s the ooumot cas©« .*iUgugtin 
Couraot pablished his tlieory in 1838 but praeticaXly i t 
rwiainod iieijl^ctecl un t i l the 1930»s. Altlaough Mo i s a 
cai3© of duc^oly, tho model can be transfo-raMNi into a sKidtfl 
of oligopoly. In 6cairaot*s ®od©l irf© aesuEaa that thar© 
ar© only two independent produceKWho pro;iuoe s i a i l a r products 
at identical coot* Thfly adjust t he i r out^jutst not t h t i r 
prices* Joth kn^ ov tli©ir desaand ourvii p rec ia^y mA ovon 
can s6e «v@ry point on i t* Hho t o t a l ^m&M oun^ wliich th«y 
qo 
d-m'-e i:, lii^nr* ' cth \rjnt to naxl'sl. '^C ihoir yivTitt^ under 
a i l clrc'Lt.jr:t(?jicc2. -o ac!iiove •"^,L: ob^ecilvo ttey dc Tsot 
conr. ixxi, ?:;or@ "uxj nmiy l'aiowloc%able o-.r/er:: of t?^ : it:)diJffit 
viiirJi ccin not bo ri,.o:ocl, Lz t l y , ti-Jlo •.a»s\?oiii,t'- '^i^ -xru^ 
of the mitual intordoiica'-onoo o^ th-oii* otrt ='jt :?lans, c c ! . 
i s f|Ulte I'-jnornjTfc of the ;irection ind ii^jnltucts of v'« 
revision In his rivnl*." -^ Lon that v^.ild l>o I'iducod by amy 
Given ch.in::o:: In hi-", ovm* ^enides tliin ©aoh as-;u'Te3 t'^iile 
-^-n'rinn hia r)1.3nr; thnt i;*r©- octivo to './hatevor pl'.infj rio 
t - loT^entn in m^ porioT*! hlr. r ival wil l ca in t i in rdc output 
10 nine lo^/el. 
'igur« 29 sliowii the pxioe ^'oraatlaa in 6ouniot*8 
oaie# t.ot us sup.iose tiiafc tlidra or© ooly two seliero A 
and .J and tlisy *aco a atiuiglit dauana cui've ID* a i s 
f i r a t to ontor* lio looiij over t^ i© aailiDt tmX pA o^dacoo and 
i^i ia iTolf of til© outpat 0:i a t QL' ps*ioo» in order to 
aocu."© auujOaua ijivi'it# .-.iiio© l)& i s aoiing as a laouopolistt 
}iibt pioXit imxialzixiis out^/Ut oamiOt go boyooi i t for his 
margiiial cost wliicli ia 2d£K> i s 0v|taal to oorgii^al rsvonue 
only a t point n* Mow B enters into tlw iiiarlcet* lie 
would t rea t A»s current output (M to tlw fljced and tr i l l 
^ / 
find liimself faced with a l e f t over demand given by the 
por t ion of the demand c\u:ve QD. Considering M as h i s 
s t a r t i n g po in t , he \*ould prodijce and supply half of the 
ro ia in ing demand eqxial to MM^  a t p r ice OPi to obtain 
monopoly p r o f i t . Thus p r ice would drop down from OP to 
OP^  and three fourths of the t o t a l demand wi l l be supplied, 
half by A. and one-fourth by B, 
P igure- 29 
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Now attain A would look a t the s i t ua t i on and finding B 
supplying one-fourth, has threeTfourth l e f t to dea l . On 
the asstunption xhat B would continue to produce one-fourth, 
A would produce half of the remaining t o t a l or the th ree -e igh t s 
of the t o t a l , to maximize h i s p r o f i t s . Thus A sha l l 
^ ^ 
Ikivis la cut l*L. oul, .v» 'xtcr *.-> i.'J'Jct:xnfc -i vjcal'" i; im 
wooXv. ca*ui*^ie c. ,j£\>'ichln^ -^  i XI-it a ^inal Ovpilibriu.i 
^voaltion iiKJVa at ijoinl .L H^IMJ.-'O each one or incr, voulC 
oujviy o:i©--:;lil.''a or thu- ^otal -ib 0?^ price# '^oth of tiiesa 
toi;ciiiKJi c iu l l .>u^ >ply t'wo-thi-'t! of 'Jic to i l '.e ^ 'ind rrjd -no* 
Uiii'wl vjoald i^'iaJUi jns'V li©'', \ alniplific?' a^'ithomtical 
cx^'!r,il« ur do.iniot'r, "jo.lel Irs -Jlven bolois/* 
JouwKjt's nio^el of fxiopol/, 
( Aasusptionss two ^ro-lucers A irs* vd-cli lint»ar ci«f3and 
aim! constant coctni t o t a l c^itout I s 57t^- ' "-init* ) , 
aaasnca ansseanssssn 
:hance I ' * r autr't'-t "'•^ f.y't'^irt 
usi,'i.j.vn;vmiiiii, I,>IS!SST:SSS^ 
Proomt^B of c@x»ratii3ti 
o r CKlt.jUt« 
t . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
9 , 
6 , 
7 . 
3« 
Xaast 
aSfOoo 
aitSoo 
I9td00 
19»3^ 
MMHA. «iw<wjapi«iiw» 
* i Of 37f600 
14,400 h of (57f600-.a8,300) 
i of (57»600-14,400) 
19,000 ^ of (57.600»2tt600) 
^ of (57i600-.13,000) 
18,900 h of (57,600-19,800) 
I of (37t6OO-»10,<fOO) 
19,125 h of (57,600.19,550) 
and so on and ^ f c»*th« 
19f200 i^!»ro3cinat«Xy 19,200 Approx* t i l l 1/3 
^3 
In ttiQ aao\m »x«iai>ie i t 13^ 1)0.^ "c, tiiat bcuh \ and 
3 ueimv© ill such a 'rfay tliat ^ f^ iioii on auuoJU\j. IAUCI; h i s 
CHXfcput whll@ ii ipes cm saxpfiu-idiri^ , xiit»y s'tiop au^a.-tiiv. tiiolr 
cwtpui; only ybsa ti-sey aoi i tt<.piiti mjoun%>h o^ - i^ach Gtibl© 
the sGtae ievoi of oui;p':t, .> 'i.^ o^ -Olf' wst -iliar Uio ouuput 
i4.tliOUt xiBclacirvi hin oro,"lt' ..tc. cr,c sx^ in ,i'-liC'ibla to 
A i r J*c o'.t-ut rtr'.:iIf;•• the :--»'«>« -Tien stable c .all lbriua 
i s reacKeC eioi or^ v i l l -luke a ^'.voiit joui- iilnth- o. tr*© 
;>rofli earaet: by a slrc^o nono'^oli-.t ot' bo-Ua of lb«>'n taken 
xxmotjQXiQt^ .JiKse x**^  ,>n>'*uctn-s,)i*o^  u.5@ two««air''n of th© 
coapotitlve oirtiput, n yroducar v^jald ^iro luoe . " .^ of th© 
n V 1 
ccupetltivo outp'ot. Th© greatc*^ Ulie numl-or Ox" I lie 
>/\>duoerc» tiie cloaar ia ths i r output t^ :^  tl)^ competitive 
iovoI» Ui. c 'se ^/oth zl^^ .c'o'ucer.-j d-j not giclopc to «.ich 
othfci' aut coilui© iTkU i>eci-> tc r^'.ii^ tiiO naxl- r^  ^.'-rofit 
output# i^c!i one of t h e : would nell orie iaartor» instead 
01' oise-^hird o£ Urn con-X'titivo output. 
^^ 
w/...ri..•>,•:., c-i.e call bo ccniio-: a^ . '"iiuivis-nalvaf** 
c-^ iic xiJ: i t s x^- ulL; 1... I '''^j so ic-Aj -; botn ', sma *. 
snc' the uaoc:o"sc locor-o:: if^ru'ioi-jbie, >"-io :-an7.lL51il/ i-mdor 
sucli 'jitaatiortG ifs t i n t of oolliif.'tan .In \i\icf. ciao -vmc )oly 
out>ut in oi'o-Jucoc! -it lornrx)!'/ _*rico« '.cv -i>c crjbiDjOi 
output iiiii ni"»ofitT tfoul"-! bo *Th?red a t thir, I c m l i ' ' 'Mr ^ 
to p ro ' lo t • yn'Kfzr:; 'My. hnfov^r, bo boll If ^J^-^ Uvision 
1.1 nz'^o e 'p - l but 1:' i t i - net n ' a ro t'le out:j3'se will 
Juooy/n u)f'tx*and, a i-'i-^icli ijatheiiai-lcian caile-* 
Cujir.ot*0 .iio.Iel a/: ii^iXy imreailc^tic and a^  vancod u 
:.au-.'i;i-uoe ,awwCl '^ ., '.ilu ova;, .*e claijfc vi.ut .^ ly *lr j^i ui a 
-^ouwvoi-Ii ^.'o.'iitiwa tolu^u :-oilow on uuiput ixjAicyj xjiis^oad 
:jofii- oi ruch rixr-c Jic-&uaiX>" ceii .>ri.oo aaa lo t out:>iit be 
d«n;cr .^d:o<i fc/ aoi^kot -Tor-cOG. *isu8 iils aoddl i s based on 
'?i' 
a"U *i-C**lfiCJ'-«— ^Oww«» «»*i'i».0"u i j i © ^UvL*iy v*ii.-4».'©-.* JUwv-CCu t» l^ 
t*is . . r ics imc-.ajri.^ 0<.« '^:* Uwau 'i^ '>s»>'af\L.l v '^- each coinoti'Sor 
beiievQs l i n t Im c»sn ca^l^ii*^ "C.AJ cnti.: e larlcn t^ b / l-'''<'^ oriis3 
Ills ^jrice j ; j t '^olow t-'vit. or i^ir, :' vn l , I : ono r'ro<^co^ 
O-Jto iil£i .•'-"i'^ e -?.(? ot. or . re'uc;-* ' x^t'^XUi-^ t*.' '-^i"^ t : ^ 
wu^ t i l l a ".Itua-Io-i 1.^  '"'r»i3.'''..>' \'*)en tho c^ iz r.c ii-.e-itiv© 
io i.ijjLj .>.;_• ;hc»- ,,•-ioci '-U-* UK, lu.-o r^ a :Mjn c:u. n'jw ^^IX the 
^ici.-^j.ial i<jarwlcy .tt r.O"K? ;:-o„is« Price lolla t o tho lev©! 
"T aor j . . 'Ith^u,::: thoro iz i ,, JSo ib l l i ty of ca^turln-:: t he 
c22iti.o iarlurt b / ; - r , I .er JLov/c'Inj, r<5i^ ei l-'^ © : r ico lc.> ;io o^ na 
Vvt'J. l i l t ' j '.- '"•- .•- 'o " i r •!":/ r^i: "o i l w: ' h i " '•-C";lcc 
!:lfj ^.>t;al c '. '.•"'. .LI<' e;<co*:;'l " i •- to t 1 i'-y;'.toe« ''-©ii Vf-ic 
!:i': -:tiori ir. r c i c h e . uotii .f?^-'-^ i rc In e .n l i r^ r lun , 7h©ir 
prloo'^ a-e 2'^i%L G.nd t h e i r ccTjoln©'.: out' 'Jt i ? -•^ li^ 'O e lual t o 
f io cc^-)Gt!tivo out'-iit. llthounh both thes« 'aodela ar® 
1^ 
ci-o e"?l^ V'u;. . 1 ^ , AIov . / tlv jL^iC" yl!:,a »_!/„'i;e 
t,:-in t.'it" C'. : c l l l v o n ioo ^J'^z a t ; . 1-^ . lar,- '.•" /i v ;t 
i t io ni"-:-. C ' P s t i s i j i i , - *^alu:t ulili: .arti '-.-i; >JIievo^ 
c ;-".petit 1 .n. 
anctlier rm\Ql \Ailch i s in *:iv •-ct.Je^'^' tA^iiz*' i;o .j«»rfcrouicl 
EiO'lci. 143 jj'iiLaej t i iat C-.o tito ,;ro ucc*i'j jj^ oUacwd an i con t ioa i 
pro.hict tt i. 'eji-Ic li. CG t..- \.* &i.^j^o ZUQ ..oiiiot; CtUaiX/* 
,:iicli t)c~iov 1 -.-.at .*!:; . ivcu i.i.ii 0;^ ;*;'^ :^  tiio u-i..^ ,J*1CO and 
b iti .^iiowi oa ti-Q ic„'i; ^^de o^ .* I'-aatl.j wiilc4i ifo co..uon io 
both. '. JLJ f.ie .:o ;iti.id cuivo JOJ- ;utl J..., uio ..oaMild 
-r!' tliv t o t a l ixii i t i ty t ' o .-j.d.'t iii v/ilti^ij tu abcwrb ..t 
ser."' -irice i;; ''^ + ->3« *"o .icuiur) L' it -i© vixiT.aM qguantity 
eac" :v\> »iaccr c-.n «i:x> uice i . CX. r;jr \ iM 'C2^ for 3 . 
^? 
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To begin with l e t us surrose tha t A enters f i r s t . 
He wi l l na tura l ly produce h is monopolv outt)ut OAQ 
at OpQ pr ice to achieve maximum prof i t OAQ DO P^ ( Cost 
of production i s aasumed to be nerio ) Now B en te r i the 
flL^rk t under the assumption th t A wi l l continue to charge 
OPQ p r i c e . In order to s e l l h is raaxinum out ut OB, he 
fixed a lover price OR. This enables him t o obtain ORL^ B^ 
prof i t by se l l ing h is maximum output OB byt a t the cost of 
1 
the output of A. A now reconaiJers h i s p r i ce . He assiimes 
tha t B wi l l continue to charge OR p r i c e . Under t h i s 
s^ 
J O I .J .ii., -*o« "1 v>utj,/u*/ -.« - i c e u, ^i.. c ir...^ t X' ^..^•oi'it 
I ' t i t 
1 1 r 
: ,a: 'jv.^  tot-a -^  •\<^ : ai .^ it .4:, -.icc I'-, i*- r'ono} 
"it 
•^, r-^  *",1'~''icil^J^ i^ri'Tf"?* ''" <' CO'.'"*!*- '(<T"i!^ ''l "? '.'lit 'I; " ' <^-
c -^tt c o m '"^ f vMch in itr.-^rc "Ict-'T-lf*. 
CIiti,4»A.'i*ii*l*.i •>JUCi. S 
t h e o u t u ^ d^poKiuanoo ox t 4 ^ eooii^etlng lii^Ks ai-Jd b e l i e v u s 
t i ia t toe xiitas iiavo fUli ana foi^oiga'tej r eoc jn i t iun af 
ttioix- intt?2'jeiJ«rfcL;0«o© as wsi i as i t s ooEusequoiKSts. ')©oIc^3 
t h i s daoi'i i'iiia «JEIOW»3 t o a t i t s r i v a l I'iJtM i a or e jiial iiy,e 
**L4W Tuii iuiayaec^g© OJ-' d©.;.aiid and it. u prQii% oaxinlzi^-^; 
aa4.iV« Jiiuoi^ aucti coiiolciofis i^hoi-v-siaiii^K. -jia l^oe cattiiiig 
con j ^ iLX^lMik oat because mtoh on© k£K>W£i tmi ; ove^y pr ic« 
/o^ 
cut wi l l be net by e imi l s r pr ice cut by i t a r i v a l . Since 
the yroducts are eimil r the f i i a e must oh rge sane p r i ce . 
Dearite the absence of an / t a c i t a,'refflnfmt the firms aet 
i den t i c a l pr ices t monopoly level th-it maximize t h e i r 
individual and ^olnt p r o f i t s , T=;quillbriiaii i n Chanberl in 's 
caee i s s .able for once the equllibrl^Jiii i s reached the 
COTipeting fiiTwa-'ver th inks of following any other course 
of ac t i on , figure 31 which i s a modified version of 
Coumot*s BOdel reveals the pr ice end output decis ions under 
ChBuiberlln*8 sophis t ica ted model* 
Figure- 31 
u. P 
Ci/AWrrf y 
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BJ) i s t he demand curve to r t h e mineral springs and M i s 
the corresponding marginal revenue curve. Let us assiras 
/o/ 
t l iat A, f i r s t Alters the iniiustry* li© bohavos liKc a 
mo»opollst and ca l l s out?p«fc Oil a t OF price and cecures 
(MJP prorit# Artor hin, 3 ont^rs . H© also bohavsa la a 
a in i la r imrmetr and so i l s IJJK) output a t OP^  price arw! obtains 
OKQC^ P^Q /:-oCii. H w'.;lo rt.:;:jc A roc;-f'nx,i(,« tl;c .Td'oi . 
I, - ' J.-
..L •: :• 'JVC -i, J.• : - , .*x -W.JCJ. -< . ^ > . r ->'L .L- ''i-t^A 
•sor^l llit/f th^t t .Ir ty->' f -"'jr'f'fllrtJ.o ocrF^etIt 1r>'- n-ai 
f^nt "^"sroI'm}.,'»'*• 0/ t! "-ir ''^Iv'iis* 
011@QpE>lloei 
SO far wo have oono^ntratod on (iitopoly* l^it us 
r«>w consicor .«ricliic tiaaor oll^lopoly, Oii^ c?.>oXy IL d 
aartxjt siUiatlon in i/iudi a saalJl rs-iiaber or Izd'ge riitSw 
wl»th®r pjnoduoins hoiao@eru»oaa or dlfforentlated prtxiucts 
/^5 
dominate im ia^stry mv^ yihore asny change in the oitput 
or price of cme seller i s most iikel;/ to provoke retsiXiation 
from the aiother seller in tlm industry* This reaction 
can take aany forms smih as cartel anwigiKiientsy prioe 
lea^^ersh^j, aonprloe coopetitlcm and prlee regidities* 
Although in oligopoly the producers of differ^itiatecl 
proauote have acme ft'eedcxa in setting their pricesf 
e9Q?erienQef hoi«wver» shovs that they do not imnt to U|>set 
the status qmo* Price cute once made are not easily 
revearsible* They trigger o£t a series of romtioae and 
in the long run ef»^ one ends w> ^ t h lower profits* 
Cce^titors under euoh eitusitions* therefore* ameemtrate 
siore on pro^ct design* <iualityi service and advertiaing 
than cm price* since price diani;es tend to t;^^t the 
oligopolistic market the genex^ tendency i s to change 
prices infre^Lieatly. It is because of this reason that i t 
i s generally said that oligopoly prices are relatively 
rigid for they are not fiaratd by max e^t force© but are determined 
toy the adainistrative action of producers* 
lol 
Sw»»gy Hodsl s 
So long as the flxn i s a price leader or a price 
follower th^re i s no serious problem. The real problem 
arises -«dien a number of firms are fa i r ly equally matched and 
vAiere there i s some doubt bout the pattern of their 
behariour. Paul Sweezy's model with the linked demand curve 
i s perhaps the meet popular model which offers explanation 
zregarding price r i g i d i t i e s under o^ligopoly. If the 
individual oligo o l i s t expects that i f he weire to raise his 
price above the nrevailin^^ price, his r iva l s would not follow 
the s a l t , whereas i f he were to lower his yrice below the 
custom sry price, they would quickly do l ikewise. He th**refort 
faces a kink at th i s price. Under such circumstances he 
adheres to h i - quoted price and does not think of changing i t 
unti l scMie upheaval occurs. Figure 32 portrays th i s type of 
equilibrium of an o l igopo l i s t i c fizm* 
s. A ^ 
- " * — X 
I6li 
In th© abov© figure th® fXtn*a doaond cii3?v» has 
a kli^ at point - . TlMjr© aro two coer-s^its of Ui@ ilanand 
ouj-vot via*, D2 and .©*• ,^poso tljo f ira i s pnxUaoing 
output 01! and ©ollii^ i t at OP price? i f i t lower© i t s 
priooy rival flrma %dLlX retaliate by loirferiiig tlieir prices# 
Tfcis liind of ^'VQrQiQi& revenue curve iiaplioa that there i s 
a clepreoaeci niarket aiid the 6m:mk& curve associated with 
price cuts Mc very low elasticity betiieon points H and 
T>A* As against tfclSf price iacroaiios \«ili result in a 
deoreaso in tot-al rovmiue because rival *ixt3a will not 
foiiow tim price r ise oi* tiiis f t£n« Tl^ e riitat '^i&re^r^t 
facec an elastic deoand cui've l^ otweon poiata D and .v. 
Assoclateii wltli th© Jilnk in the ueaaad curve is a i>oint of 
discontinuity in tlio :xirgir*al revenue curve uet\!<een point., 
X and y vertically below point ;"i» Tiie ga$) in tli© fira*s 
aargiixal rovonue curve really esploina the rigidity of 
price* i^eeause of this <iiscontiauity» price would rezaain 
at i t s mistosiary level Cf^ t deapite a significant shift in 
raarginftl cost curve froa IC^ to HC2» The profit siastijaising 
ou^init of the f ina shall ccmtimie to remain 0^ even thou^ 
lo$ 
thft marginal coat of th« firm can fluctwUe conald«rably 
between poinste x and y. 
t?he BfM9 kind of analysis can be applir d in cases 
where the kink in the demand ourTe i s in the opposite 
direction as depicted in Figure 33« This implies that there 
arebooa conditions in the market. Th;^  firm believes that 
though i t s rivals will init iate an increase in price, they 
will indeed not follow a price reduction for busine.s i s 
already good* 
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In the ab^ve figure kink in the desaand is at point R. The 
DR ourre is reLatively inelastic but ?J)^  portion of the 
areiage revenue curve lo comparatively more elastic. The 
lo6 
profit s>ajd!3ial«g output oX the I m will tm On cteiplt© 
oon^iderablo stiittB in marginal oost curves b@twe»;i points 
^ and X tvom ^ to fCg* H8r« the tma&mioy wiXX again b« 
for DP prie« to r^min stabl** Tb» mmXysXa reveoXs that 
tlw priees uniler oligopoly shull rmmin sti#cy ao long as 
thero ar@ no sig^ifieant ^langos in oost oonditions« fha 
laodeli no doubt proifid«@ cxplAnation regarding tho ciaintonaiioe 
of rigid prieos b/ tinnsi it^ howvvert £SJXQ to show how th« 
rigid priod i s established and hov a tmr kixM i s forswd 
(ground a now prioo* Despite thoa# dofeots observation 
suggests that there i s a good deal in it* 
Cartel .^ rrsart^ e^ entot 
v,1iGn over an esnliclt or isi)lioit agreeta^it i s 
reacl^ ^ botv-«*on the inriependent firsas on prioeist output or 
division of sal©?! territories with a view to tmximim ^oint 
prf:>fitr: of th© laeaber fl.r'ic, i t i s knoim as oartel or collusion* 
Cartola ir© of two types -» perfect oartel s and in^erfoot 
eartelr.. \ perfect cartel uexjidLly results in the maxJbtisa* 
tion of tlie ^olKt ^rofttB of the oompeting fims but i t 
.•je^n-, V-Q .ib.'Ject •surren'ier of rjtoision-^saking by eaeh firm* 
/<5? 
Th« ocmtrolXlng body under p«rfeot cartel has full 
knoiOddge of the d«aani for th9 output o£ the industry* I t 
Q«ffi ed3.cuX&te i^ argiziaX cost nz^ aax^inal vemmm for each 
volufse of output for audi industry* since the controlling 
autiiority also knows the mrginaL costs of a l l the firas i t 
sets iadustiy nnrginal revemw e<iual to industry rmrgiiial 
cost to arrive at price miA. output for the industry • 
Finallyt the board allocate® to each co^^etixig fiiis that 
CHitput at ^ i o h the arm's aat^iaal cost ecpals intiuatry 
sarginal ooet* te against th is ini^m^fect cartels do raise 
prices and profits Uit they fai l to reach the levelf^ of 
faonc^ poly* 
If a cartel has absolute con^^l over a l l the 
firms in a indu«tx*y that have eoisbined together vith a viev 
to set a price that could laixisiise total ijs^ustry profitf 
i t i«ould set the same price as would a saonoi^olist* Let 
us SLsmsm that there are tm^ r i v ^ firms A mid B with 
different costs of prodxictlon* ^hey have set up a cartel* 
with the intenticm of eliisinating cd^jetitiari and fixing 
such a price and ou%}ut level that will wecnimlm industry 
profits. The Induisftry detsantl curve and the firms* aarginal 
lo8 
cost curve* tarn been shown in . Igure 34. The aarginal 
cost curve of the industry has been arrived at by adding, 
horisontally, the marginal coat curves of the fizms* 
? 
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In the above figure. Board of Control ofthe Cartel finds 
that the optimum output for the industry i s CM and the 
best possible price Is OP because at th i s leve l or output 
oairtel's tota l marginal cost ia equal to the industry 
marginal revenue curvf». After having deteitained th i s profit 
maximising price/output l e v e l , eaoh firm's output has been 
and 
dettxmined at OM. forfiloHU for B by equating each firm's 
marginal cost to the previously detezmined industry 
/ O f 
profit^maxiiaizins sargiml ooat Iev«X» The tw flrr^s wllX 
haw to fix th© Sam© prlc« OP but would sell different levels 
of output depending upon their cost ourves. It has been 
observed that the cartels are often ohort-»lived« The 
iiapulne to ;5oint eoticm is str^oiger in the earlier stages 
^)eoially taring the course of depressed defaandf but once 
1 ^ cartel i s fonaed» quarrels over the division of Joint 
profits arise and tt%i3 becctses the Uimdixig cause ot the breaku|;> 
of 0uch arran;eKaents» 
Price Leadershi|?t 
Apart from non-pilce ooRipetitifwit a very significant 
form of price fixir^ under oligopolistic conditions i s through 
price leadership. Price leadership results i^en one fina 
in the iiKiustry i s recognised as the leader and i^ pc^ escaan 
and .-all other fims follow th© lead of this firm. If the 
prOfAicts ar® ld«itical» prices are usually imiformf but i f 
tlio products are differontiatedi prices are either uniform 
of conTorra to a definite pattern of differentials* Hae 
5i^lficanoe of this pr^actice i s that soae firsao do not 
have a pricing policy of tl-ioii* owi but follow the price of 
//o 
their ooapotltor* This praetlo© Is laostly followed la 
industries producii^ standaiHiized prodt^jts and that too 
only v*»n there is a rising temtenoy of prices* Ilowiiv«r» 
i t oan also !>» isound elsewhere. Price leadership my be 
divided into harosietric price leadership md dominant price 
leadership. In baroaetrlc price leaderoliip the fira doos 
not dominate tVm other iiran but i t is f i r s t to announce a 
price ehsin e* hs against th is d<MaiJ^ n.t price leadership 
i s one in thioh one firta actually dominates the Industry 
because of i t s siae and strength or due to i t s cost efficiency 
or ae a result of i t s abil i ty to fcrecajit rsarket conditiaid 
accurately* ftonaally the price leader is the oldest fircif 
in Gtimr catsea the largest one* I t £dioul<!toot be premtiaed 
that price leadership i s linked with tac i t or open collusion* 
xvach flrsa generally acts Independently iMle folloidng the 
leader^ the only dlffer^ice la that the price leader carries 
out «bat hm already beoosaes inevitable because of changed 
oiroisnstanoos* 
A slEiple fona of price leaderahlp bassed on loiwr 
costs i s sho«n in riguro 35* Thei^ are two flrao L and F 
with different costs but with hc i^og^sious productn* Hexis the 
/ / / 
f l m L i s a leader vtiidn. faces a prloe/output problem 
similar to a Bonopolist v^ile the fizn F i s a follower. 
It faces a oompetitlTe price/output problem. Since the 
products are identical the omnpetitors must se l l at the saaie 
price. In figure 33 BT i s the total demand curve. The 
marginal cost ovarre of the leader i s MCL and the marginal 
cost of the follower i s MC7, MCL i s lower than MCF. Since 
both share the market, each one has the demand ID, >diioh i s 
half of DT* Each firm, therefore, has the earns marginal revenue< 
Fjlfiure- ?^ 
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The price leader will act as monopolist and set 
PL price to maximise profits. Firm F being a follower cannot 
maximise its profit because it cannot set its profit maximising 
IIS. 
pri09 FT* It must rail at PL prio« instead of P7. T2w 
output of ths^at t\«o flxms -ak^ together %dll be t\d.ce 
(ML rather than 1 ^ 4- QML. We aay alao eea«z'llie this 
case by assuming TXC as the total market deiaand ounre and 
MGL and KCf as the marginal cost ourres of the leader and the 
followers respeotir^y. Since the price followers are price 
takers rather than prioe makers, they %|L11 produce at 'Uiat 
lerel of output at vhich their indiriduil marginal ooat vould 
be tqual to price. Accordingly th^ MC7 t&ioh isthe horisontal 
sumation of the marginal cost curves of a l l the follo%«ers 
would beooae the supply curve of the followers. ?igure 36 
reveals tla&t at price P<| the entire macket would be supplied 
by the followers, leaving nothing for the prioe leader. 
Ho\^ ever, at a l l prices below ?^, the horisontal gap 
be:^ we«i th& dombined HOf curve and the market deaand 
curve Bf represents the dweand faced bj the leader. lor 
example, at prioe p2» the price followers will supply 
Fi|^y>?^ MC(_ 
V.vNV t n y 
Ui 
rl, and loav© output %-'U to !» supplied by the price 
leider# 3y plott ing a l l .guch residual de -^imd quantit ies 
below ?^ \go can aixiire at the dinaiK! <wrvo Dl» ti<^d by tf« 
pric« l©ad»r« In %'m above figure DL i s the de«naiid cui've 
of the leader and i t s related nRrginal revenue curve i s 
:^ H2*, '<"4}ixkZ nonopoliet t^ie price leader vwmld fix output 
:L and se l l i t a t P« price to jwKsure !8oao->oly p r o f i t s . Fbr 
pr ice folloiiBrs price F^ shall be a datum* Th«5f wil l t r ea t 
i t as i f i t were t J ^ i r mrs ina l revenue. Th»y wil l «j^">ly 
outnut ^^  - Hj by adjusting the i r oi^ptit in such a liay 
that the i r taarginal costs equal the leader ' s price* 
3au^?!0l's mdel or Oligopoly: 
.111 the models o2 oli^xvvoly w© lave .'liGCuz-se:! so 
for liad the prorit-'^axlialzin^ asctjn/.tion bui l t into tliea* 
Viiiiara j * ijauniol has preoeoto-' -x ruodel of oligo^joly in 
wMoh the I'iTO raaHos a coanroniis© between tJie vola?>e of 
aaioe aiid proult:;. i-Ie c la l .r. t l a t large tiv^m do not 
..iciJualiy ;iaj£i:-:iiie p r o n t s but instead t ry to raxLiiao 
G-iler rovciiwo subject to i nlni .oia ;^rofit coiiGtriiiTt. One 
i'accor t t o t pi-'ovonts tl^o rir..i fro.s at taininc mxi:3ui3 profi ts 
u^ 
18 th» lack of information aUout pricea and th« market. 
Another one can bf» the presenoe of various other objeotivta, 
Sottetines tVie oligopolists themselves put restraint on the 
maximisation of profit because of safety, stability and 
oonservatiao. Such firms, therefore, have a tendency to 
pliy It safe and accept reasonable pxx)flts. They look u on 
their total revenue as an end in i t se l f . Business exeeutires 
go on increasing sales even beyond the equillbriias level but 
within the limit of a minimum level of business profits. 
Figure 37 presents Baumol»a modfO.. 
Figure- 37 
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TB aoni rc «ire Mm total. i*ovemi« and to t a l cost c^irves of 
th© riixj* *'i I s tiri© t o t a l profi t eurw ^ i c h r^r«s»n«s thu 
diX£ox*9i:)C@ batuBGn l a and l'C» AB i s %im minimm profi t 
Moo* If tho flrEB*6 sole ob^ootlire Is to laaxlmlz^ profltf 
I t wuld .*rotluc« cnatyiit 0 . becotu^ iO Cfe-. lov«i of out^jut 
corar^spoiKio to Hg tlie top of tii© to t a l prof i t ourv«# If 
tho oojectlv9 of 1^ )9 f lr>A la to ^saxiialise i t s s a l t s then 
in tha t ease tb* output would be CU beoauae output O^ 
corresponds to the top of th« t o t a l revenue curv». 
.^coA^inc tc .Jaii'aol the oligof>olifitlc flr:^ Kould produce 
and coll output CHi^  and oam th© •nlniniiM profi t OA by 
scttlTi; r0V«nu© at t ;« hl£:!iei3t level i that Is ocmslst^at 
with the tali-'JjzjJtm -^roft, thin t^bmm that the f im ^xmdMT 
ollgo^'Oly ,>r-oduo€is taore tlian profi t 'laxlni-^ing outrnjt. 
Thi.::. no^ Tol !ian been crl^icined on the giruiaKi t^a t i t 
iCjii^ i'G': inter'Q'jenr'cncc oT ''ihe f-ricpo ^'^ich i^ t*© key to 
a l l ^ricin-; under ollfp-:oily# ''orid^s thle ' IU^BOI o.f'f'orR 
no cleaj^-'jut ofinit ion cf ":ho rinlr- 'n ac<:^,-'tabl© retrofit* 
Econo'iiist;:: have offered varlou'i e^Ian-ntlons of reanonable 
I 
-•'rofits* I t lK>vi«rvt5r, rtufricei for the working of tf-^  TOflel 
;/6 
i f Eiliii3is3 profit i s defined as &x^ aaamt less th-m the 
maxiausi one* 
gic«fc*Prj^ e c^ >aK»ttitiani 
U<m»priG9 eoa^tition is often umd by the 
ol igc^lies to booet their drnnBOdm This e<^petitive 
teohnique ifuaaetioiis in about the mmm itay as prioe 
oos^etition* Convwfitionaiiy i t i s divided into two broad 
oategoriesf product varietion and sales promotion* since 
oost of the oXigopoXists are afraid of price war they tend 
to use this fora of eoaijetition to win over the rivals* 
It has been generally observed that the absence of price 
ocnpetition in oligopoly is mostly made up br^  vigorous 
rivalry In product and advertising eoupetition* Instead 
of wi^in^ a prioe iwar &mmti;^QQ these finss vage a var of 
product isiprovetaent and promotion ad^ustsaent, until their 
profits are iriped off* aiolitatively* tliis i s one of the 
saost interesting and varied aspects of oli^opolyi but 
fflialyticalXy %m can hax*dly say anything about i t precisely* 
i f a single first operates naively in the sense that i t does 
not take into consideration the possible reactions of i ts 
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r iva l ' s adv9rtisJLiV5 ctapal^t i t s s®31itsg coat© oaa b« 
9^ai*i:t@4 tmm the ssamtfaetoring ms^m^mB* But cmo® t)t)e 
rivals bocxwae sophisticat#d» t l» pr«)tol«® btooai® oumbersoa©* 
A prim mst i s ^c^Kthing that ean be s ^ Isiit an ^dv«rtisins 
ea ipni^ i s auigW3i9rist oi'^iougli t!tm oos^«titor stay tje abi@ 
to fight %dth his oountotvaiiing aXogan but i^iat m^uid 1»« 
tlm rmt r e^^ t t i^ bander* it sot i^x»8@ibl# to amly2« cm 
a priori^ btaia* w# mm r«jroreiuIat# th« oXigc^oiy siodeis 
hy substituting ipaii*^ of th» pv^smt or cpiottt^ of 
aivertisetient for priee* l^aoritieaily the refortaiIati<m 
ai^uM not giv® iIiff«r«Bit r©s«its« For mmsi^X0§ in#t9ad 
of prise otittingt the 6m3p9X$Mtn ut^or Bertr^»|*3 s^ daX 
tmy involve t^ eK3s@lves In n #^ar on adVttrtiiwsBxit or 
product improv»»nt until aeith^r mm ol^taiRs m^ profit* 
Prodi«3t variati<m mnA innovrntioim %n advi»*ti3i»g oim wHm 
play a ^jsf role in the leaderahip moMk* Stoilmrly th«re 
oan be oollusiony e a r ^ l mrmigmmB^'s aM |^uci@i«»®greenieiit@ 
on pnxMot aotl advertising |}olioie® as liftll as on prioe* 
The aiialysis of fionpriee ooapetitioti iieeds Am^mr ei^loratiim 
of !mr!€et strategies parallel to those discussed so fi«r* 
Unltiokily t l« rehouse h%s ziot been wicotiraging. 
lis 
The most important morit of n<»^rlo« ooiapetitiwi 
i s that the ooisEpetitors odrtainXy reaot to mxtAk ohangen as 
iiapnywiaeiit in styXing* boost in the advertising budget* 
easin; credit termst training of salescMSi or provision of 
store eonvenient location but these changes are less obvious* 
I t ta«ac ti;.ie to not© that some chatn e^B have tg^«n place # 
ijosidQG t^il&f theae chtmros s^in aver the custoi^r by 
laodiiying %ho attitudoB of the consumera and «ioe the 
customers are lost i t i s difficult to regain th«a# Thus 
the advat^agoa of nor^rlce co?npetltion laat longer than the 
tiaeXy b^usfits of a price cut. Ftothing can be said regard-
i j ^ the l lu t t of non,>rico con!>etition» fkjwever, as a 
general rule i t can be stated that th is type of cof^setition 
el»>u]^ be carried to the point <»her@ the isiarginal coat of 
the action ia e«^ uQl to the n;^rginal revenue produced by i t* 
In t } ^ 69id 'm oan» thex^foret ojnolude that in 
practiQ« oligopolies are tmach ©ore cosmion than duopolies 
and nQfiopoii^s but t^iese are proaisaed to be 1 ^ oonnintmst 
with saaximsa ecoiu^ic welfare* vUnce oligopoly con have 
maxy ahajMia ilepending i^ pon the array or r!*odels# no precise 
Ilf 
state .ioat cnn b© sadc rogorJing tli© loss -^f vrelfar©. The 
weiMTar© aspect of nKj^ nprloa ooagjotitlon poiiessnew pix^bliKas 
*!ue to the laclc of theoretical t oo l s . iJespit* the 
oo'Tiq;)l&xitjUir of dyn^it^c changes i t can b« naii^italned tliat 
thB allocation of rwsourcec imdor oligopoly aro toloraljly 
cloT© -ix) officloncy in tho loti']; x\m bocau:;© t l » proscur©s 
to rcKluc© coftn rtre strongor and tho ^i-otluction too b©coc»s 
rert'Tonnive to consur^jer taotos and fMWferoi^ e!::*, I t Xvin be«ii» 
ho(*/©veri fel t ti'^m «nc' iigain tha t bocjiuso or tliao abcenoe of 
1 net of 3j^ ro©fVir»or. wxlols tho theory of oligopoly canaot 
1:^  a : o l i e ' to problems of econc»iic policy* Let us iK^e 
that t^ >e lutjjre will brisig foi'tli bettor taodels taat %dll 
throw jjoro l i ^ t n to tti© proj^or fUnctiaainfi of oligopoly* 
R^ 
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Tlclnii Practices 
I t i£3 orton fol t t t o t thoro i s a diohotoqy botwo®i 
pricing tliooiy am prioias practicest but it ono thorougiily 
uiKlorotanda tho ^jrooeduroG used in actual pricia:^ dooisioac» 
ho can sc3o fox- hiocolf tliat tlm oo-oallod ccmnict botttfoon 
theory an,, practice i s ooro a;jparoBt than r ea l , LXXQioally 
thoro aro t^ s© ways to lock afc »ricinj problor.o. ua© i s tli© 
,'-t^scriptivo a^Mi'O'icI) Uwi^ t« a:>p2.y tocliniquos of ecoiionic 
analyoia aod foj'railatc lo j ica i n r i c in j ruioo. Tlio otiior io 
the cleacri-jtive a;?, .rs^aca Miero %i^  t ry to otutly x^rit rirrao 
acttiQlly do about thoi r oricoo. In thio claptor an at teapt 
iQ ri^de to o^a-iino a \narioty of pi'icinj practioeo with a view 
to denonstrato thoir oooraaciic rational©« 
Tho recent advances ~Xn the field or adniniotorod 
priooG an inTXation ha\ro oiioo Toro foousocl at tention on tlio 
inaaeauato otato of itnovio.^o of tlie .)rico-:.iakin.7 prooo,.ao3» 
In pGt2i:icu.lar lorc ©::|>©rical infort^ation i s neoUod t»ith 
I'ospoct to tl'io noclianics oC ^rico fonauiaticn and tho s-^ci l ic 
ob^Joctivoo u^ >on xJbioh p r i c i a ; .'oci iono aro ..ado. I t io 
pTQanrjQil t i n t uacinoGG or*-aniaationo o^Jict to r^kc ni'oJit .imcl 
/a / 
henoe they pursuo th© slnsl© pr lc las 3oaX of profi t raxioiza^ 
tion« i-^nirlcal inveotltiatiofic reveal that profit aaxlai'^a-* 
t ion 1G r-aroly tho sole pi^toing objective in actual bualfioQS 
l i fo* % variety of otiisr objectives are alco puravtsul hy 
th©0® oi^ ]^ mi2safclono« The -rjost fro-iuently cited nrlolnG 
objectivoQ orei ( 1 ; price otabili.^atioai (2) nialntonanoe 
of .miisot share I (3) tarnot return on capital i (4) to 
CiCot or srovont oo .pet i t ion; arki (5) i.1;hical Pricing. In 
riost of V.M fir-ic one oi' tlK? coals nredoaiiiates a t on© tit^e 
iMit evidionco intiicateo t l a t no f i r s io alveyo ruiocl t^ a single 
policy oLjectivo. 
Pr^c^ s^b j^ l^ t^ f f l 
s tabi l i sa t ion of price and csar^in i s one of tl¥& 
al ternat ive pricini]; ooals of the f i m s , Firas ufKier t h i s 
i^olioy attenpt to keep the i r ;»rio0o stable iidLtliin certain 
liitsito despite ©very l i t t l e cmiver in decimd or every l i t t l e 
f lu t t e r in coots # Having eartjod an a(!e:pato i-^tum ttie big» 
sized rin;.G lumaiiy rofrain froo uppins tlie priceo part ly 
bocaiise of teio fsar of upoottit^ the f!arkot and part ly 
becauce of ti;ie fear of dacjagin^ the soodwlli of the f i r a . 
rro tUont pi'ico nuctuationo not oiily prove costly but are 
i^:i 
also diff icul t to Jus t i i y . Thoy orov© Innaful for fon'/ard 
iXamiij\i of turnover, stock, invootr.ent aiid finance and aico 
projudic© tlj© flitur© -srowtli of tho orsanlaation. The genoral 
tendency thereroro io tliat wlion ©".and i s heavy, out:;ut i s 
steppea u;) but iiricec rcy-iain mialterod, Convoraely, v?Sisn 
cie„.aiid ia alaok o i ^ e r aaleo eiJox'ta arc? at@pf>eti u;) or out-^ut 
la ouiiiailo.* but :.>rico in r.Jroly 'Ujuchcl. 7ii*nr. baoe thoir 
price policy on lon{»-rua trenda of costs ana productivity* 
ilioy .:i3rx5{prd slx>rt*run chant;os in costs ceid ie-.and, tootly 
the bur ion of casual fluctuations in wage ra to , raw tratorial 's 
nricoG anci pro uotivity are bomm by prof i ts and m>t by pr ices, 
''aintonanco of > Market c^iir® 
• iiiiiiiiiiiiwi i i i i» iMi i i i innwi mm iinl 
•ichiovonent of a naxioura or minlimjEi sharo of fclie 
:iarkGt i s fro-iuontly liot©<! as a oignifioant aotominant of 
.•ricic^ i50licy# .5iare of the rarkot i s aostly thought in 
torrss of a oaxiaua, bearing witneas to th© caTsacity of the 
orjjanioation. '21'^ tar<j;at share of the aarkot as a guide to 
pricing i s ordinarily uoe:i by ouch roputaLle ©rcanizations 
that are niore intorostoil in otoody growth, tlnn to reap 
:?jiKSnma bonefito of ta2|K>rary nature* Largjo-scalo organisations 
are usually aaiicyjoc W salarlod pooi^lo whose a i a intoroGt 
1^1 
l i e ) hi the Bi^a Q£ the concnt) thaa iii tlie l'-?v©l of ..xxjiifc, 
oinoo tl-jQ Tooti^o or tlie rir-: in .oi*e toti'^tel/ rolatod 
wit^ i^ i t3 •'ar!:ot sharo thai: i t s not oaniii\jn ttes© e.<©cutlvc8 
even -iicririoo t'iO * roaent lovel or t ro f i t s for tLo on!*© of 
increasia; tr'ic shirx) of t^o .j.rkot« ?!)©/ x-etiin a coiijiiorablG 
tho ro^aixiki:, 'ortion a:o*-jj t .0 xih Tolxl orn, 7hoir laln 
corjcem ie tiieir s^ilar/ .i»l Tatar© yroaotio.ia i^;!iich ^re riot 
affocte. ty tiio 'iviJemia t!»oy anr^^uice but by the rate or 
grot/t!-, o^ " tl.G organization, I eno© i t hio been otnoj-v^vi t'.afc 
al'noGt a l l the m.-jutable or^^nisatians conaider 'xilauonanoe 
of naricot a^ iar© as an JUi^ortant d©t0r:2iiiaiit of the i r pricing 
r>olicy. 
Target xrtum an Janl tal 
\ predetor^ilnod tar jo t rotarn on ca i t a l invest nent 
io *"Oat fro jjontly 3^;^ir.lod ao a lor^^-run :jrioin^: objective 
of a flm* Jlio o f i r"3 \^ x> rtJXIow th i s objoctlvo ©sc^licltly 
iUviloato t!.it^*oy Jornulato thoir prices lainly with a view 
to rxKsJli^ o a i-kiiiJioalar ra te 01' return on tlioir oa-^lt-al* 
rarcjoto are aot aeoordin^ to tlio indivicltial ;^ocitlun3 of tl:o 
f i n e , one 0*300ify 20 ner cent return on ca-sltal aJ'ter tajc. 
nlj 
wiLalo otliDj'O oaiTy ou x^lmir vonturos with r.ior^iy CJ io U 
1^ 0*' ceat . -.lO i'Ou.3ona Tor tUo -icoMtion oi' t!ie tai-'i^ct-rotidiEi 
Q.J /roacii o^ e^ .ja*i/f y^at k,h% .ajor irii '^iuoiiceG »Suo.iii to ;.aver 
Loor. an JUiv;:"oawiiiti a'yuroiio^s »>n Jui-e poi^t oi" ilso -.jatkije iOnt 
Joi- ..,;x!*lt-<ia -it,^ <L-i,iT/Ow»*;.iaiv ..laimirij, and Ga,>ital uu^jotii^;; 
>0ri"ur--Ai*cc Oa.' eacL aQ;_^o-c u* bac.i4i^ £,a« .•ooidoa tiiio fjio 
plus iiace<l Too -;iOt;iiO<i and oUier &k:illac ooncracfcuai an-orxje-
•tw Xoilow th is type ol prlciJij ijolicy as a r-joans to riGht 
cc:.i petition within roasonaolo i i i a i t s . 'raf^ot-rotum n^'ioin^ 
io opocirically followod in ca-i© of now produc;.a since they 
Jiavo no close rivalo# In oiidi oituatioao pricirii^ uoi^IIy 
takos tJi© fora oI skiixiinc "KXJ rjiarket by ©x-'loiting the 
iriolasticity oi: ue,aiKd in di:.'roront ':iarketo by .laintotitiln:;; 
a 'vlerinlto yrico aa loiw:; ac tiie rrotential oonpetition :>0r.-it;o, 
or 2orioti':os a i)©jetratioa price policy i s dosl:^€d to 
caotoi'G tiie r2aii;ot via low price with a view to (sam hi:_:hor 
i-'OtUiTis later# In nar^ conconis a oloo® intori'^lationship 
oxicts -xxotKi t a rco t - re tam prlcinii target r.-ark0t-»oharii'\c^ 
/^f 
pr ic i i^ aitiiough they a^ -'e incoiT^jitlbl© vitii oach othorj 
for i f a o<Ki.>any ueai-'OG to crri-m' i t c rarket , i t chall havo 
to placo ieoG ouiiasi,^ 0:1 lz2 r l j l J idhorenco "to f i rgot -
nstum poiioy. 
To :]e©t or i-r©v©nt Cessrpetltloa 
To sone flnnsf tlio rociulrernont that tho pro^uois 
nrlco r3©et or foreotall <jonir>otitlon apiiearod to pr<)ciua© tl-ie 
©xiotonoe of ai^ pr ic i r^ f»oal a t a l l . rijoco f i ras tiiat accorded 
significance to aeetlncj competition did 30 bocaus© they Xelt 
t h i t 1:^ policy offered a por^anont threat to potential 
prico-cuit©rs# r r i c in i policy hao oooa aanasorial aiacrotion 
v/.Miro tJioro ic con'iiflorablo t^gree of in^jerfaction in tlio 
coD-jotltioii# The thoor/ proves noot a ^ro-^ri^to v i^oi-o an 
indiviaual £i£%i*Q actions in f-^et pi-^oiaco reactioaa on tho 
•^art of i t s oo.:s,->otitora« In ;riny iiacc tl^iio , u i i c / lias l^ oon 
>at0rially inflaonood by ,iariiol>s!:.iro p3yclx)lo.2y# ' !ie*'eevor 
tho coo*-)anio3 >ii"e av/ai*o of G..aciflo con-^ctitiv© pro .ucta tlioy 
t ry to cjatch tliO priQo:; oi' tJujir i^ ro net vitii t h i t of t t e i r 
r ivala to 03c.>aijci -wl'io vola e oJ" t:.oir baainosn, ijyeriorxj© 
howevor i^voaio that raoat of tlio f ima are iwt ..lorely intorootod 
in rj©etin{» coa:>0titiv.n but a; .)oajf to b© koen in ireventincj i t* 
/56 
'. rico cut 3 ar© often rolio^ i»®d rwt with a view to survive in 
the oocrx?tlvo onvlroaoont but to riak® natters ^^rno £QV the 
rlvQio* I t s0o:33 tliat th© rationoliasation at tli© policy of 
!!5O0tlnG ooopetltion Is far Xroa 0labonit©» r-'irotly tliO us© 
of th© phrase '•nseotlr^ oosK.MJtltion^ ar)oars to be laappro-jriat© 
tor thor© is no sr^clfio coopotltlon to lOot, Joixjjxll/t I t Is 
u.'iiMC©8sary since scooting competition canr^t bo di^pnified as 
ono out of sovoral altonvitlvo (guides to action* 
Epical Frloln^ 
Tbe r)ricln<5 policy of firsia anxious to create a []iood 
public ismge Is often lnton^ov@n with ©thlcal conBldoratlons* 
It MQ boon obDorvosi tliat siost of the big business organisations 
YnvQ chaniTOd frc^ daoolcal to r-aanagori-il ob^ectlvoa* Thoy 
arc no iTsor© Intorostod In imxlaua profit but In S',>o<i relations 
^ith oraployooSf si^pllora, creclitorst public and jov@ns3ont» 
'4lK>lr 'iotual t^ 'rlooG ar© c^ uotod on a qiaasl-^l^lcal Isisiot 
taldns into account tl»o roaoonablo return on capital , i'art 
of th is attitude la wltnossod in tho shape of cooperation 
id^th Urn ijovemcaont in oarrylns out I t s ©conoolc programes* 
\lthoU;ih profit lays a fliiKlaiiental rolo in tholr buaineos 
declalons but the diff€»<mioe is ti^at thoy do not oam i t In 
/2? 
Lioral vQomm, Instoad or s^uoegiA^ the conmrjoro tI;oy t ry to 
help tl'jQn by ciiai*sliv'!; !3odoratc p r i ces . .Inilarly tiiey clo iiot 
dboat or 'rslsload tbo oiuployoeG in order to increase tij-ofits 
but oay adduat© it tention towards tlie iaproveaent of tlieir 
^ n d i t i i n s * 
?!ie foroi^oins enu .©ration of i^ricinG goaia i s not 
onoujh. r!^re aro various otLoi' i^oalc such as i)Poaotive 
TXJlicy of a@w r^roduotst stoady t^ aoiisin^ of rlants» r::aiiitonaEK5Q 
of coT^fortable l iquidi ty ^ocition ©to., yhich tkm f imo i^By 
oet while tsU l^ix.* Driciai:;; decisions. In puroii t o-C i^rice 
;:>olicioo ono tiling io liowovor cer tain tl^iat tii© existonce of 
a Giixjlo -irloin: joa l for an organiaation i s a>r0 the ejcoe-jtion 
ttmi tiio ro le . *it most a l l tho firoo roecify one or -mre 
col la tera l al-:o boaidoa the i r prinoi->al orlcla^ objective. The 
only difference i s t i a t aono finne are interoated to prevent 
eoQpetition ratlier tlian 'TaintainiiKfi the i r :-DOoltiont wlfiile 
oti-iors aro nialnly ooncomod with getting a fa i r return instead 
of stabil izing pricoa. \B a^iinst th i s there are r:m^ firms 
that s t r ive to ..eet cosjpetition aloi^? isfith caaintainint]; tli^ir 
Dimro in tlx> tmrlset. "ow firi^a oven desire to s tab i l i se 
j r i ces besides achievin:; a tar^^et return on investment, -o 
can thus conclude t t o t tlie pricing policy i s in alcaost every 
1^8 
cas© equiimXent to a oocpai^ policy t!-ut represents on orior 
of priorltA©© and choice firo^ aaojis vailous alternatives 
rather tJ^n a policy sovemo:. by aiiy sinjle objective. 
TIio priolncj ob^octlvos dlscusaod above provitlo th© 
guide lines Ibr taking actual prlclris doolsiono^ .^ettlns of 
the prio© is i^ortetps t!ie moat Inr^ortant single daclsloa which 
aXTocto til© ©ntir© ornaalaatlon* 7t^ ?rlclno; decision is not 
sla^ly a aaiikotlng or financial cioolslon but i t is t i ^ soneals 
of the rovonue* liasioally tljore are t^o T^s&Vcsoilsi to arriv© at 
the actual ^jlllng price of an ©nter^rlG©. vine of tl^ese is 
called 5ull-oo8t or oost-plus pricing and the second one is 
knoioi 00 raarglnal pricing* The forMwr nettod consldere cost 
as the prliaary factor in the determination of price while the 
later recognlzea the doalnance of sarket forces in 5^0vemia{3 
til© actual pricing policy of business concern* 
Oost-»plue Pricing 
• I  III mumtatmmmmmmmmmmmmimmmammm 
Til© ao3t prevalent pricing oethod triiployed by Uiainess 
t iros is Imotm aa coat*plua pricins or full cost iriolnn* 
There are various vai^ietiea of co3t«»pluB pricins* In i t s 
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©xtro;,i© fom i t i s based on t!;c belief tl-it prices are 
[SavQi'imd 0/ averaje cos t s . I t i s a synton in '.rhich a fii-iod 
or fioxibie rmriiu; or :;onie hix^ i s aadcd to the co-t of tlie 
soods, ill© actual price dstor i i rut ion tnkoo place in 
sucoGsoive stois* Direct coGt»3aiiil/ t n to r i a l anci labour oro 
f i r s t eoti^iatod. TJion a cliarse i"or ovorl-^vids or inairoct 
eo3tG io ad l^od uauaiij^ l>y alloc.itin£; thoa at ; jo^ ra te per 
imit or dlroct labour» uU l^iim? lic^ara ©tc* ."^Imllyt Q rKjr 
cento.;© siaricaj:> or ::i2irgin ibr profi ts la added to arr ive a t 
the actual price. Por inotance, i f a f l ra calculates the 
average variable cost of i to nrotluct to be 0 4, i t aight 
decide to add a charge of 150 pes* cent of tliat variable coct 
or I G» Tor i a i i r ec t costs or ovorheid, thus i t obtains an 
ostiLiated rully allocate*, average cost of $ 10. To t h i s 
fissure tiie f i ra iai,;ht decide to add a 20 per cent taarsin for 
prof i ts or 5 2 to arr ive at a price of $ 12 per un i t . 
In actual practice nsost of the f i n s calculate thoir 
oosta for socio standard output a t r,of^ arbitrary percontage 
of capacity. Otiiors use oitl-ier actual costs or tlx> nost 
rocont or i t o o»>©otod coctc an t lwir basic cost fi<':;ures. 
Ttmro are fow \tho ovmi construct t l ielr cost figures by baolai 
150 
thcia on er\';ia0orin,^ 0Gtl4.«ai_j of o^rioieacy arid various 
ph/sical rolation3liii)S« • ©ij^ inLlloss of '^i^o JO'UIOU US^I GO 
calcuiato costOf t.-o uvm^'-aii aafcui'O u^ iuo QQWX^PIUIJ .r ialii j 
a;) roach Is osGontiaiXy tiio oauo» .e far la t t e c i lca la t lon 
of trie 'jar^ u,"> i s concoraod, t*.o ©vi^ *onco ii'^alcatOQ no i e r tn i to 
<3han^ ;lA3 conditions of tne aricot. .'or oasmsXe^ in cajo of 
floidlbl© or variabio -:arkii|) pricii\|» UWQ cotpr.i*jance iu t.il:on 
of auoli conditions by providltij tor a variable arkup over tfie 
eouTG© of a 'ooaii'iess oyclo. joliox's i-^is© t l ^ i r r^ar'^iiia 
durin: boos .>erioU3 i< d iovier t;h9i3 iii roconaions. This - inct lce 
or cliirjiAj wiuk who trairXc can bear la ijot X'oiloWQ^ hy 
noaijo .oiit v i^on tlKsir objective la to ost-ibliaii a i'-^ir j r l c e . 
-ioaiucj u.*i3 ic ro -^iaii-'Os rro«iu@iit; oat i ate:; or aa. *irkl which 
ro^iuire .aor© tiv4>, e-i'orto at^ c "lotioy. In aJ.:ition, theitj i s a 
con .on bolior aaoj\| nan/ basX*M?s3:a0!i th it -che lort>i-an {nXo 
of t t e i r Jroduoec i'3 .>rico irjolxitlc* It^  i s noi-x; affectofl by 
inooneCf .Vi^/ertitsinj, rj'r/oi- uT faniiXien r-cc.t t'l'in ^rico* 
i42nco thoy au.t.\/u oujl-, l^o i'Jsuhor t:.aii *io::il-lo ntui?a^ , rt;inG;« 
r:'i0 eviiencot lK>*.«?vor» irKlicatoo t . a t iLm'-G aro v/iJo variations 
in the jercentci::© of markup duo to Cirforenoojs ia cu:itK>as, 
HI 
ooopotltioiif csoots and accoimtincj prac t ices . Tlio factor ^ i o h 
a-jpoars to bo of oonsidorable sisnlfieaiice i s tlje fcolia^ on 
t l ^ part o£ buoineasnon roaarain(» the !m,-:^tu£i0 o£ the ..larGia 
^ i c h tlioy bolicvo to bo fa i r or i^oasoaablo* la caioulatins 
U-m f a i r taar^jia aorso ttooo an ovorali profi t tanjot i s Tii'ot 
oot and then i t i s dlvidofl ^'x^nz tho virioyo ;,'ro':i!ctr.« In 
yet another cn^^s i f JbMd rctiTn cm lnvost':sont i s Coterisino-.' 
and :..ri«30G nro fisojc? to achiov© tlils objective* 
•riio r'itioaaio or ilili-cost ..-rioius iioa in i t s 
:3©ch.inical sl'i.iliGity .jtul i t s a.-.>ar@rit r a i rne s j . I t a£):>earG 
roaaonauia that coot iioto:'::-ino price and ,..r::ce Uased on coai,, 
ia a Jufijw :>rico. Tho uusliKJsaMon aro just i r iod i i ' tlicy cii-^rjo 
tlUij >rioct -.'^  a.'xuiiatioii coa "oc lovelLed aj:ii:ut thera of 
tKMsthicai corfc-^ aat. Thii; s/stoa of prlcin;; helpw public 
rolatioiix; »i"enu;;w;^ l7 uccauoG concu. iOiVi will aacopt _;rico r ice 
tail®! ooat-jj r i ro aiid \/oiii~- ix>i c i i l i t -JXI oiploiliJion* I t 
hoipo tiio r.u "^i to oul'-ln aic^nctc : . rori t wliesi uo-k-^ nd ia not 
Unowi ajxl cot3.L'iiohoo a c-t:»blo irico v4-.icl: in rwoL. v i t a l 
oai)«cially for t^.eso iTlr-^ .n s^Aoh coci'ilt theanolves on ;jrioe 
throu.:!h Q^ivortiserjent ^^r%l cit;ilo:xG. rho appairiint s lnpl ic i ty 
o£ a35f>»,;.l:ti3 -^riain^' is •r'atizc^l by i t s lack of Qconoaic lo^ic 
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and QommXitym ThlB approacli aasuraos tfeat a l l amtuKioturias 
costs con bo tx^oed to indivMuBal products **iioh io oloarly 
invalid. Purthort aOdias a fixed or tmxrxH aar^oj^ to cooto 
aixl ts-^itini^ i t as tJi© selliiit; price prosunos ©Ithor that 
thoi-e i s no ooiapotition or tliat tliis price is a ooc^Totitive 
prioo* The prioo oo <i0torml330ci iaiXs to refloat oosupetition 
in terrao o£ r iva l ' s reactions and the potential entry Q£ now 
finas* Ono of t:.0 iit^ront wdalsiosOTS of cost«f}lus fiscod^foo 
prloios is that i t t&adB to diminish tii© Int^root of the seller 
in cost control* 5o long aa the bi;^ers agree to bear certain 
costa inotirrecl by tlie oeller along with a fixed porocmtage of 
profItf tho aoller i s likely to exert l i t t l e proaaure to 
olniL-sia© oostOt Aj»th©r sbos'tocKaing of WQ cost-plus iirioing 
raotiKJd i s that aost of the flras ta*ier th is system es|)loy 
hiotorical accounting costs lahidi bav® l i t t l e relevanse for 
decision raakii^* The :3ain cri t iciaa against fUll«-coat ',»ricinG 
is tliat i t diarOfiar'do d«»and« I t la a aiatai«>n :>olic/ not to 
take into aocouat the douiand of the iHjyer aa a ooaaure of hia 
purohasins power# l-Jt^ ero are oooietiaes willing to pay a 
h i j ^ r price th^i the one determined on a full»oost baaia» 
Tbe fira under such oircunmtanoea omi eain higher profits if 
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i t deviates ir^m fUlX-coot ,>riclas. It i s also sooetioes wis© 
to produoo and sell at a p2*lo@i b©liw lUll oostst but Qbov» 
imriabl® costs sine© t'lm iira s t i l l oajwa sojuethlac to Qo©t 
fiseed oost myA tliis i s bettor Uian to te^ tii@ plcmta idle* 
In a (^ fnamic l^aricsrt situation oharaoteriiEQd liy <shaii@0 ^id 
umsm^taiiktyt pricing: at £till*ooot i s not a eoimd policy* I t 
inay b© a useful starting point proviclod tli@ sellora are 
willing to d«viat© greatly trots, their tai^et price* This type 
of priotog syateo c^>erat©s saootfaly in sityations yfysire 
historical oar^ins ar t a; plied or in oases where a taci t 
asreesHmt oxiots aaor^ the firas not to disturb) the existing 
e<iiilibriio by oc^^etitive price bidding* 
Qoim iut& Pricing 
mmmtttmiSimmmmmi i iiiiiiifiiir« nniiiinmiiijli 
?h0 opposite of fuH^oost pricing i s going rate 
pricing in ^lictj Uw ocphasis i s on the narket* Going pate 
pricii^ ia not the mm® thing as accepting r>s*ioe set by tjerfeot 
siaptcet* the fira lias eoeie power to £$x prim imt instead oi 
e e t t ^ price i t adjtist i t s awi price policy to tlie g^ieral 
oricii^ strtwture of t!ie industry* This prioir^ |)Olicy i s 
timielly adopted in situations liiere coste aro difficult to 
measure or %fhere the firnia ocmtrive to eaca|>o t!^ haaards of 
I l k 
prio® rivalr/# ?hia taay aloo b® a ratloral policy in casoo 
uSior® a prio© loMer i s ISR&11 ©stablislwd ai^ oharoinij aocordifig 
to v4mt oth©r toXlamsPB ar® dsarsing rray b© tbe osHy safe c urso 
opmi to th© f ira* I t r ^ alao b© i©a®t oostXy wad less 
troublQdc^e to charge a soiisg rate i^th©r tliaa to fix once own 
priod aftor exaot oalouXations of ooats ami d^iai^* This poliof 
i0 not oonfiintod to snmll buainoas* Ev@» tlm iai-^o coticonis 
Itollow a prio© s@t oit^ior by a prio® Imdor or by "to© narket* 
:ios0 fiTEso i^ i i s t t ^ i r oosts to a pr©-<l@t©itiiiJ@d pilo© by 
ko^irjG thoir eosts within p®rc®stag@ limits of selling pric# 
in oi^or to acliiov® a target profit . Thia polioy auits those 
products ^^hlah havo roachocl Q nature stag© aiid ^lor© both 
ousto^rs aal rivals Imvo ooci© to aoo®pt a ©table price 0 The 
pFobloa ia such aituatloiis i s o«e of costii^ and of controllins 
ooata. In ooatrast to ooat^plus tliooiy WQ thus Imve a thoory 
of prioC4g %«Wl^  can b® oallod a prioo^aimis theory ol" cost* 
Inoroa^ital»»ooet .Prioia^. 
7h& altemativ® to Xull-'coot prioing i s aorgimX 
pricing or iixsr^ioatal-i^jost pricing* '^ li® Qll*p@rvaidif)s aisi of 
tho firm aooordliis to olassioal t-^ o^ory 1© to aoliiov® tho cBstiJiaia 
profit and th© way to aoi-iiov® i t ia tbrough oarglnal analysis* 
l i > ^ 
since each additlonaX imit prt^iuceci entai ls an additional coat 
as «©ll as brings forth an additional rev@t%]a» the lo j ic of 
profi t ':3a5ci:ni2atlon stresses t t o t th& prodiKstion jliould b© 
s t a b l i s ^ a t a point v.^r© nnr^l'ml revem^ Just covers t\m 
sarginal coot* I t can b© arguod t h i t --arjinal oostp ratliar 
than avorcifj© OP fully allocate", ooott i s th© real coot .'juido. 
rho roason io tlnit for oac!i a l tomat ive oours© of actiosi tlior© 
in aasocintod A livon mr-^l ••al coot infi u con'co^ridini; 
ngjjM.4r>«al reveniio. '»y oo^^aria; thofiie sets of d i t a , i t can bo 
docitlofl ii/fiother a certain cour.so oi* action aiiool.! ^ roii<^«?j 
or not. /llttou^h Tiarninal coats in thenoolvoo do m>t 'iotor-
nine pricot t i - ^ set a floort and arkot conditions a c©ilin3» 
within lAiich profitable pricin,:.; decisions should IKJ niade. 
I'oohnically incr^siental cost and •.«rjlnal coat are laot s a i e . 
r^rninal cost repreoonts t t e cliaaje in to ta l cost result ing 
fraa a t»iit c^ng© in output whereas incremental coat io the 
clifm'ia in t o t H coots result ing from a decision, Incr©:.iC5sital 
ro'isoninj; invlvoa estl'natin'j tJi© inipact of a decision ly 
etresoiag tlie ohanfjes in t o t a l coot at^ to ta l re^^nue that 
resul t from t s^ adoption of a par t icular coyrno of action* 
rho incre«!®ntal oriiKJiTjlo s ta tes t!^iat a decision can bo called 
/3^ 
soima 11 I t Uvirmkaos rGVomie tsorts iium tiie coctSf or dXninidkmQ 
OQQtiQ ooix? tiidi Um r@v0f3y©# *^apit© tth® i'act tiiat JU:^ro::ioiitai 
c^;^t aiKl .jor^Jbial cost arc toci'uiicaXIy dix'fer^ritt ^^ns l]av@ not 
troatod th^3 as rmitually emLusive because in v^ny i^racticol 
dlacua&io^is U-m twjt © q^-^ ii^ ssJUius m-^ used synononKiualy* 
tSicler !3ar(jiaa2. prioiiaj fixed oosto are ionorocl atd 
prices are doteiriinod on tlw basiB of oaitllnal coat* .'larjiaal 
costs roprosent v i r lab le oooto Tor fi»o^ costs tovo to 'oo 
incurreJ regardless of the level of production* i-ith rjarjinal 
systeot the prices are never rendered imccaaipetitivo bccauoo 
of higher fixed coots and oraers wil l rjot necosaariiy bo 
rejected diie to the fact that the prevailins price i s below 
averace cost , "he gap betwe^i t o t a l revenue and to t a l coot i s 
utiliaocl to cover fixed costs and profit* riar?»inal :>ricinG 
hol'.^ o a iMQixiOBman to jHiroue a far siore f^fjpossive f>ricln,rj 
policy tlym does full^oost rjricinc;* I t also f-^lpa in pricing 
over the l i f e cycle of a productt which reqtiireo :hort*run 
•!ar:inal coot and 3e|>arablo fissed cost data fX)levant Lo oacli 
ota,'je of t l ^ cycle* aar::inal ooat nor© accuratoiy rofloot 
tJioso c?nn.,;oa in oontn that rof.ult froo a decision i^iiXo to ta l 
costG include fir-cod cootn wfiich are i » t iiKsurroa as Q i-oault of 
Ih^ 
tl.a;. CealGi^Tu .arjlnal j.-^ichXj, i^ "XH-Q aijOfiH t h i t iXiil ccjt 
r.rlcii.j because oi.' tiie nrovaxe;KJO or uulii-jipo luct, ::jul"ti« 
oi-o^coG cinci Liulti--arkct aoiicroiTJii i-'liicli u-Mikec llie absorption 
o£ ilxoC ccota i::to ^^r^Juct cojt • i . ' i l cu l t , 
iu ia aoEJOti^ aoG tir,tju^ thai; Dariiinol pricii^s caris^t 
uo ap^'iicxi iii praotic© Docauoo of tlio adiainlstrativo d i r i lou l t loa . 
;iaHy buQlnosocxsn oven do not Know about r^arslnal cjoct and 
cMTgija&l rovenue. a©sl4eo th i s I t i s d i r r iou l t ior thooo 
Ixislnesi^iion to ©stlmto XUfcuro d© .aixi and oosto acourat^oly as a 
ooasequonce at wtiich t^iem exis ts a cllsorepanoy uotweon planned 
and actual i'lgures and profits are never .axlmis®:* AiiotiifOr 
orltlcia 'a against the ap a ica t lon of raarjlnal pricin,^ lo t h i t 
I t XoidG to froquont prloo clunjeo %tiiah are not Xlkod hy tlig 
oonoLcaerot "aycro pt^efor etat'jlo prices and <]© not lilco raising 
lirioos In periods of t e n ^ r a r y sliort-i ;os» FUrthcr» a prloo 
out nia/ Lffiiijottlo tho .aHiot and i t nay prov® dif f icul t to put 
i4> r^rlcec a r tc r a previous priao out . K^OO c r i t i c s s t ress timt 
t!ie adnlni£JtrQt;ivo cc>ot of o toi'-xzhi^ t h i j syatmi i s hli],U Tor I t 
involves oacl.liioiv lor oiitti^tiOi': denand o iao t ic i t i es and oaloa 
I'orocaatinc; oto#» vilioso oosts for £i3X\a proclucii;)^ dirroroiit 
Ite^.jo nay 'UQ pixjhlbitive. Uiatly, i t la alioijocl tliat :iiar£jl:ial 
prlolnc 53ay load to loasost aa ovorhoaOa are rsot covorod. 
IhB 
1% i s true tlmt d^aaixl and cost t&T®m.n%& ar© 
s©3A>si pr®cia®# I t i s a l ^ time that ft»©qu®nt changes to 
r^rices 4istm% th® bikers. I t i s also i»t imtnie tiiat tbo ooot 
of op#3mtiJ^ r^Fsiaal pr icl j^ ia gpeator timn that of fuiI<K;oot 
pricing tsjt t i» viovi tjiiat tl.«5s@ di^fiouitios QJT© ov©r ^^tiolains 
i s liDt truo# Tij© vifiiw tisat : arginal prising Xm^B to losaos 
is basoci on t to aasumption t l a t f.afsinal costs or© always telow 
avoraii® eosts, %»li©r©aa tl^ ©^ aor» l ly excmKl t te avorog© costs, 
A rigid appiioatian of l^i«-009t prioian may prov© disastrous for 
i t i s a fsistak© not to iroduc© b®caus© tli© pric© does iK)t cover 
til© full cost* riai^ tintos tli© ifit®llig©sio0 de^^attds t to t %^  
aliould prodycj® b©lov aver^-^ cost in Qt^.im' to inoroase total 
pro.Cit rattjor thm, to atop t:jro4uctioa» The icportant t h J ^ 
to r^aeal3©r i s that rargioal p r i c i ^ provides M^QP and Im^sr 
Ikii ta of iirioe tslien^a tl-M5 Itill-coat prlcins oliiMIQ o^y to 
t l» aiddl© point. *.M1© i^j'ilyifij of^ theory of pricii^- '^ no 
tlieory ohouKi b© e^oliidod» Ino'toad laotii tfeoso tiieorios i^ aouM 
ho Xa^mi liitfj assotmt aino« botln ayatotns ot pricitijj roial'oree 
each otl^ ®r« !#• .ioalsodi Ms rit#itJ^ reaarkal timt **t^ o 
•largiwiliat stould witch avossm.:© price liiea ^ieoiding whether 
to accept an ordtor aod fiilX*cost :>rieiiig j^sotiia be aodifi<Ki 
by paying attention to th© atate of deaaisi*'* OQ tlie basis of 
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a ll:3it0d a,fxmtt of oroirioal vBBmroh i t is dltTioult tso say 
t^oioh j f tia© i30th©ds io in actual us®. ,kmo stocli©o suguest 
tli© ,ir©doQiimiK5© ot full-ooct otiiors stress that nargJ^ialiaij 
io wlJoiy a:\4i©. '^tmr^LB £mi apQ^* of the tiairiaij© of t l» tw» 
fh0 cousa^yst Ii,^ 'w@v0ri suojo^'to *^ ^^ ^^  ^^^st of tho hvmUnoQijmnt 
on tlio tiSioi@t aot®ro.la© prio© on th© basis of tli© fiili-oost 
>rii4Cl|>l0 but ttey aak© cexixiia QdJ:jst i©atfi regaMias 
QOEisiiaorQ* r@aoti.^ jJS and aarkcrt oonditions liiiofe £Uifil tli© 
oorKiitiotio of ttm rorgiimX theopyp ©v@a though ttooo ad^ost* 
2i0fits ar© t^ i^it© oftcm iap®rf®ot» 
'3o far ms bav© discuaaed t w rjmin jaethodo of iricirr;* 
'40 yo sliali soo thor® i s no siaglo prioii^ aothodi idiich firsas 
ai«Qyo am* Instead MsiaoasEMin «pploy a variety of ap^ -^ roaoheo 
in aott i i^ prio0©» In oi\l©r to iilusti^t© th®G® vmrimm 
ootixKia we mm turn to Cf?rtais sots of pritialijlos % i^fih Imsinos^ajiw 
Dootly mspXof as guides for ijat©lii||<mt pvij&ix^ tiocisiono* 2t 
is to bo aotal tliat tl^so approaot^e ar@ not imftually ossoluaiv® 
by* 3oaoti3©s cot^J '^jioKt and Qoo^iaos mipiJlocaoat c^ no anoti^ior. 
Intutivo Prioir|| 
Intutiv® prioiaij i s a t^& of pi^^ioloi^ioal a©1^»d in 
y/histh pricos ai^ teaod on th© "foel of tli® '^ mrlset*" uii^ s© th@ 
IHO 
s^otea iB siab^ectiv© rather than '^ loolmiiicalt i t s a:>nliaatiOfi 
diffors froQ situaticm to situation vaxying rroa .irlcos baaed 
on *j»jre Iiuiiclws to prices bas©;! on ®3^ ©ot©d trends In costs 
amd (i< i^and« .'-lostly tlie prio© bas©c' on ooat-^lus f^t3ixi is 
f i rs t d©torairicKl mxl tli^n a^ljiistiiiofit ia oad© in this 
prwiioinaiy prio® ©stiiaat® in acconiaiioe ^ t h the degree of 
Qoo^tition and th© natitr® of tl*@ narts@t# This approach thus 
&Mi%xmm oost-plaa pricing with flaxibl® !!iarla^ prise • 7h© 
osrshasist hois®ver» i s on the subjective factors for they are 
b©li®viKi to b® i3or® influential in affoctiiaii prictog* 
.)©t0n3ination of th© coi*r©ct prioa is certainly a jgatter of 
gu0S3iDrk» i^ T®th©r don® on tlio basis of der^ and curves or on 
tho basis of un^stoQisofi twsinoss escrjorionc©. ?li© corr®ot 
pric© estiiiiat© li©s within a rai:^ © t i» t i3 l^ fcsito^ by tb© 
pris® timt tl-io fijrci boli©v®s i t needs and th<j prio© that t^ io 
oonsitaer fool© h© oan arroM* Chos© l i a i t s caight be I'^asonaiily 
close togothor if both shared thoir l)©liof and kmawlousot Jut 
^ 1 3 ^©y do not. Eviaontly* intutiv© prioiijj ro^uiros a liiijh 
d03r©0 of prio© aMironoas and self-conficienc© ©ino© th© finals 
if©lX*»b©ins will ciet^ ond on riow proclsoly MU5Bag®ia©Rt can ^usas 
futur© trends in deraand and coe^t i t ion . )#spit© thes© cl©f©ct8 
this aethod is fairly oomion for i t involv©® :mny pooplo in a 
}MI 
pr'4cln(; docioion mil t!i^ r©ljy njTioves tha rc3porisil3ili.ty of a 
wroas ^^sision froa t^ i© sbouitloi^ ot any one person. 
acperl-aontaX tt'loiziG 
This systen of pricing whlcli la often oallod triaX« 
and^^rror pricing tea acquired praainenc© in r@cont years. I t 
is a teclmiqpe to arrive at cm optinua price by takias so^ ao 
oo^nisonc© of deoand* Tho usual :>roc0dur0 i s to soleot a 
jKyr^ lo of toot wirketat oatablish a s ta t i s t ica l ©soorioofital 
aesi:^ a«i vary pricot observo olx»ioo behaviour airjd thon 
arrive at a nrice ^lat aaxiaisea profit . Jinc© doter^iinins 
a price that aaxioizos profits is a difficult job, tli© oonspon 
practice i s to chooao a prlco ttiat .axialsoo oaloo. EKperl-aontal 
prioiHi; lias boon widely used in tho pricin^j of new products 
©spocialXy at tlio rotal l lovol. If tliis aetlMxl is pro'periy 
c^ijlied i t can not only yiold rich oQiiiot iiiforjiatien but 
also provide a suitable base for a aor© profitable pricing 
structure. Tlils ap^iroach shouldt however, b© used with 
caution in oligoi^oly situations and in situations ^ ^ r e 
bikers cannot bo sealed off into separate larkets. 
Ikk 
l a l ta t ive . r icin^ 
This pr lc lnj taolioy occurs ^AiQXi Q Xirss decides to 
fix i t s prioo ©quaX to» or a t soiao proportion oX, the price of 
anotljor firra. TVJS f i r s t h i t i n i t i a t e s a ciian^e in price ic 
callod the price leader} a l l other firms that e i ther Liatch tiio 
leader 's price or so^e different ial of i t are oaliod price 
follo^-ors. :4Ksh a pricing practice i s <4Uite faa i l i a r in 
oXlao o l io t io situations^ I t i s also foilot^ed to avoid 
provcKlnj til© j r i co war with tlie price leiKi©r» i^iKje a px-ice 
leader i s a fiiw witli a auccoasful prof i t hiutoryt ai^jnificant 
rarbet stiar© and Ion,; ©xporionc© in sarketin/j %:att0r3» tlie 
iMitatii\^ fir:io follo%f tJio leader in tiso hope of oamins 
laj-^or ^I'ofits un.,ler the r^fuk'je of tl'H> leader ' s price 
ur^rollQ* 
Imitation ia eaoy n tho decision - akor« Ho ut i l isoo 
another f i r a ' a aar le t analysis without worrj'inci liiaaelf alx?yt 
deoand and coot eatiriates* '-)omo iranagers prefer to Diniisiae 
Uie tifse devoted to pr ic i r^ decision aM hence follow the 
Imitative pricing. This policy however l imits f l e :^b i l i ty 
in jseofcins local conditions but as i t helps to ^ain tlie 
b€«:K>f i t of til© e j^iperiono© of otl-jors witiiout having to ej^a/j© 
Ikl 
in i t laony laarkit^ers ijo out of tho way aad acoc^st I t . liosiOeo 
tlila, since i t aavos treae^ioua t l ae a«d OK;[>onsos o ^ loavoo 
aanago-nent to coiK2©ntrate on xjon-prio© cois^^etition* i t i s vory 
ooa.on in r e t a i l t rado. 
sono Jpocific rjuideliiios for xTio© Flaeation 
• iMiii i im i w » » i i » i i i i i i iMiiiiiiiijiiiii iriiii mmmmmmmiimmmmmm i •imiiiwiimin, ••m 
.10 far yo haste diacussod funeral principles nortly 
ap -licablo to a variety of situ'stiona. In th i s section vm ^VB 
r«?viewins 3 ^ocifiUs idoao conoominj the fixation of prices vihlcii 
liavo homi sujjGested r^oja tin:» to tirae by vorsoos ^^ lO "mro 
invDlvo'l in deoiGion Qaliing. i'lieso ideas never provide a short-
cut, they siiT^ly su^:;oGt ,:3Uidolines for br ids ia j t!ie z%'^ bet\v©on 
ttioor/ and prictico* 
ioneerin^s rXcina 
I t i s a fact that tlier^ are various >;>hi3os in tho l i f e 
of conouaer cjoods. tk> goods coriaand tl^e saa© position for a l l 
tismQ to cooo* A continuous flow of new products aiipoars on tjie 
scene ^ i c h has a tendency to replica tlie established ones over 
t i ne . '^\rtor an i n i t i a l pionoerirjti staf;® the product siocoiaoa 
ostabiisiie-i arxl carvoc out a -market shai^ for i toe l f . '^  period 
of e5!;:)a:'ioion follows urj to «i co2i;'iin point § tlien staejaition 3<?ta 
Ikii 
in, t»«iich leacln to tho decline tm^ fa l l of U^Q jroiuct.*'** 
Consetpontly, th© rrlcin-r policy should be roraulatcjd in t!ie 
l l ; h t of l iro-cycle phases of t\y& proriuots* Joel Jean QIGO 
ar(ju0G that tho analysis of price i s closely rtJlnted vi th t'.e 
lir© cycle of -sh© product, Thoso -oroducts th-it are c-iturato' 
oir>oric:jce .:sx>v/tii only Sraa aoctitir trends • Irowla^ finr^ 
©Itlier IntroJuce mm products or l-.iltat© products \#Uo1i others 
Invo auccoQofuliy ;;ioiioorew!, i n i t i a l l y tho .^I'oduct Is nor,3iill/ 
ciiatlaot t.iiich confers a lar^e (lOtSree oC ^srioiaj .T-JCKIO.! OH 
tlio oaiuiractus'or* Ihla dictinctivoi-^ss cii -.Inisiies 'v?it;!i 
CKKapetitivo vie joiientioa. iioa t.-o diat lnctivo reatiiros of i 
iim-/ pnxiuct declinet tho rnxlucora power to -junl:>ul-jtto nrlce 
alao Coclinos# '*iio pricing i>olicy aliould thoreToro be suii»bly 
.adjusted ovor .ionoor stajo and i^fiture stojo of the cycle 
bearinj in alnC the f^ct t ' lat tho process of Jogoneratioi) is 
inevitiLlo* 
1* ^nlsoai» LaoslOf op« ci t» .'• t>3« 
Ik? 
The QruDial dooiGioa with respect to r>ricinc a n©^ 
product ts th© choic® betwsont (a) Q high prlc© t to t skla 
til© croaQ of <l@:nandf and (b) a low pi-*!©© th:it aorves as on 
a^ont for aarlsot penotititicm* 
(a) .^Wtoino i-rioo* hx th is oas© the firci decides to follow 
hit^ h p"io© policy ini t ia l ly to rocoi^ :? i t s r©3oarrh and heavy 
;>rotaotlonal esc 'Ofiditur© before tl-45 entry of th© t ^ t a t o r s , 
»ii-ico th© cl0:saad[ Tor now pixxiuotc i s lil;oly to b© less prio© 
elastic in tlie cKirly atOtSos tlian latort the irsitlal hli^ -prioo 
aorveo to t&iin tho orean of t!io lar te t tfiat i s relatively 
insmMsitiv© to price* This priolng lX)lioy pitsvidoo a basis 
for «ilvidi2\'3 tho ^larkot into oe^saento of dirferlns elaotioity 
and is GoTor in aituations when decani ©laatioity la 5aikno\m# 
'TkyQ akifaciinu i^rioe also h©l:>a thoo© firas to fiaano© t t e coots 
of mlsing a product that are to fisiansQ tiie co Jts of raising <5L 
product tliat are not in a position to finance tdi© product 
floatation out of tl>© reraot© future revenue. \t later stagosg 
however, tl:lo pricia^j :x>lioy io converted into differential 
ririoinc ^ith a view to extend ti50 rsariset to lo^^r incor:^ S^^ups 
tliroujih oucceoaivo price roJuotiona* 
(b) Pmsotration - r ice . T!io altoraative policy oryon. to t!^ 
JLjG 
Innovator Is to use low prices as the prlnolpal aijent for 
penetrating tlie rarkots early* '2hQ so-^aiXoci pcmotratioa rsrico 
or imrkot e3Q>anaion price is th® rovers© of %lm aklnsaing prioo 
and is adopted id-th a view to lons^run rathor t ten to ahort«nm 
profits, Tlii© policy i s quite appropriate where tl^e product i s 
laost likoly to toe accepted by a sass of conoisasro and tiiore are 
3i&0tantlal cost savin^o froa volua© production. In contrast 
\tith th& hl";b skl'Tiinj price* ^iis .lotliod ai:ns at lijQOdiat© 
<»^anaion or tlio niarlset» baaed on price appeal* I t dotoro ttie 
X)Otential oospetitiorG to onEter t to field and helps in roQpifio 
SoO£l profits in situations where the coiKsiKiers price soneitively 
is Iiigh and irfhere an luaediate lar^e turnover can reduce 
production and distribution costs si^inificantly* 
r^ioing in :iaturity 
^Uter ^se take^off» th© suooessftjl products roach 
tiie Qtai.:e of oaturity. Coc^otltion takes place in prioo» selling 
oifort3» technolx^^ and proaontation aa a c^naequenoe of t^fhi<^  
1 ^ preference ft>r the leading tirarMi is %«ealcend ^S3& i t no 
lontjer coaaands price prK3it»3« There are three basic aspects of 
cjaturity i^ilch should bo talcen into account. The firct la 
teolmioai n^iturity ciiaracterize^i by increatiiaG standardisation 
iHi 
is&d less and less -^rMuct devolop-aont. ?Jtaider this situation 
Physical variation m^ng products ia aintoi^ed and -s^mufacturiiss 
processes becoci© ^^il-©stabii@li®d# Tlie second aspect of 
^mturity reJTera to siaiijet sturationt usually indicate:! by a 
woBksmXxui oi prof©r©ace for the leading product mM aa increase 
ij3 tho ratio of r©plao©r.-^ nt aales to now sales* thirdly, the 
.mturity i s imiioatOil by stabilisation ot production !3etlio<is and 
ijiortjaoitiii stabil i ty of ^mrk&t shares aM pric© stmctur©8« 
To cioter^ine pricin.-^ polioios appro^-^riatc for Xator 
(jta,jOQ in thjB cycle we -^ust witch tho syspto^.s or comp'Qtitiv© 
do.f|0a0ritiori carofully • ' hon the product @i2ter®s tlw csuture 
cat0£;or/ appTOpriato pi"ice retluctlons, depciivllTii-^  on ootlTato^l 
deaixi olaatioity should Im aid©. Tim f i i^ shoaltl try to tali© 
rmrt in rostrictiv® agr@®'3©iits as»aj I t s rlvala and should 
substitute various foras of rio»»:)rio0 0O3-'>etitioa for -jric© 
competition. 
Cyclical Pricii^ 
:iai^ of tlie -sricin^-j decisions of tli© flra rel it® to the 
Iluctaatioao in :;©r©ral buainess oowiitlooa* To stei>liiy 
decision aaliir^ in reoponse to alterations in the ontir© ecoiionic 
i^a 
systQ0ii i t i s necosaary for tho fina to have sorm kiiiBci of policy 
based on cyclical price behaviour. I t has boon observed that 
aany firms do not chan,^ the i r xjrices frequently. They attempt 
to l imit price cuts in periods of declinin{j business act ivi ty 
and also rofi:^n from najor price increases in porioda of booni 
and infkit ion. iltliough concealed price concesalons are scae-
tl ' ies followetl during periods of declining cleraar^ and price 
hiiieo are adopted dui^ inG; inflationary conditions nevertheless 
the raajor portions of the econooy are characterized by price 
inf lexibi l i ty ri t l ior than price flescibllity. ilio .':id '^OGate3 
of :-,rice f lexib i l i ty clairs t b i t flexible i^rices cut^aliort tl^e 
doQoend into do^^roaaion and i»oduc© fluctuations durin,^ booci 
conditions. -JOQpite these laei'its inelas t ic de-;andt coot 
r ig id i t ios t olicopoly tentions OTKI the concept of fa i r profits 
3ug.:e3t for price s t ab i l i t y over the cycle. 
In formilating policy on cyclical ^ricinj various factara 
concerning deft^ and, cost , coaoany's strate^jlc ^joals nnd fliietmticns 
in jeneral bu3im»3s conditiotis should be taken into aocotsit. 
Jyclical belmviour affects various aspects of the firci. Ttie 
firsi ouflt, tlKjrefOi'o* raalfie s t rategic dociaion on ''^-lethor to iso 
Ik^ 
into a d0pr©saion with i^i^htin^ pricss aiid .;owi»jradl!%*j or 
to s i t I t out in order to nialntain quality«»and»»3rlco 
reputation imtaniished»'» 
l^cteiign^ Coat Pricing 
I t ia an ©stablished practice in oortain induatries to 
take prioo as tho start ing-point for stratonic calculations* 
:iost nets? proiliKsts are designed to neet a son© of co:--:petitlve 
price and naJoJ^  sollii^Ij efrorts aro lad© to pi^otluco tiio vest 
ciuality in Ui^it t^ric© rango. In an extrer-ie Tor^ a s e l l i n j 
price i s detcnsinod r i r s t .and by ^fstrkii^ .ack fro-a tliis 
pro-iuct dosi,:5n i s arrived at» '*n exa:aple of t:-'.is Inverted 
coot price relat ion i s a .anufacturor of car 4^io s t a r t s with 
a taM:'get r e t a i l price by assessirig a Liarket in toiyia of r.iore 
siKJcessful 'Twdels* Having.? decided on the pricet he ;>rocoed3 
to build tho best car he can a t t l u t p r i ce . 
This backward cost oricingj de'.iond baclward pricing 
or reverse-cost plus pricin^j whore price appears to dorsinate 
co3t ia a ,plicable only when p2*oduct design i s fluid ind yfhQn the 
predetemjinoi price i s shjiri>ly defined by the economic environ-
raent iii respect to dejaand of the ;?i*oduct an \««J11 as i t s 
sub3tltuto.'3» 'henevor a now pi'odUGt i s to be launced business 
J^'O 
research staff tnvestl^-it© «;':«thcr tbore Is a chance of success 
for cuch a product and what type of product I t s?io:.ild be^ 
.©searchers normlly suggest a narrow price ran^e combined with 
an 0stii':iate of possible sales before embarking on any costly 
venture, lifter deducting profi t and distr ibution cci t they 
proceed to inariufacture the ^rodiKst within that •^Xven cot.t 
ronse, u^ch pricin:; policy is practised in tho donestic 
e lec t r ica l ap-liances as mil '^ is the automohlle inriustry. In 
tiiose irKiustries an acceptable pi'ice in relat ion to com )etin{; 
goods i s locateJ f i r s t , Jubse-juently a nmf oiodol i s dssir^ied 
in tho l i j h t or accented price of trie atandar:, pt^duct, 
Usually selection of the price i s determined h-^ aasojsin:^* tiio 
market in torsas of the noro successful products or the jroduct 
of the "'rice leader, ;iuccess coiaes to those firns wliose 
product sellinii a t tJie conventional price fetdies tlie greatest 
number of people, ^^  corollary of t h i s teclini |ue i s t i a t the 
prices teve a tendency to be inflexlhl© and hold stable for 
loncjor -periods. This approach of priclnij hio a ird.de acceptabi-
l i t y in view of tho fact ti^at i t s t a r t s with j^rikot-i'jrico 
r e a l i t i e s and views tlie p i ^ i w t as o vehicle to bo aodifled 
b / oconooic omriroinait in orJor to satisfy the specific 
r«>eds of tijo ojnsirjero. 
I SI 
rrlcirtg yruciuats tli^it ore viosignei to aa i t tli© 
speciric neodii of buyers are tlie area ixi wliich ooat ap.u-onrlately 
pla/tj a aoro pro^ainont roie» xlioao products are ticneraliy 
:)ric©d on ti.e basis or incr^.:j©ntai co^ t^ pius a oei^tain .aark-i^ 
equivalent to that v^iich tii© finu could ^ara elseviiiere, CniGr 
t h i s system a >^£*ic© floor i s set JXHI taQ se l ler ij. en,iaj&i la 
rxjiUGal :>ricii'i(j Xor he has W aociC© wl'*@tiier or no I X,Q ,^ro^uc0j 
ho io not involved In Miat to charge for the proJuct ho !:as 
already doclded to taanufactuj-^* In mich s i tuations co3t seta 
u iloor Tor pr ices; it a piXJtlucor gets rjore thin flooi* ^^rlco 
ho i s toapted to increase tl^ io area or operation. 3ut i l he 
fai ls to QQt even th is price ho bas no alterrtatlve but to 
refuse the supply of the [product. This type of pricinii is 
ivjiown ao refusal pricing. 
Odd-iluaber anS Cri t ical Kuabor Pricing 
:',ar^ firria believe that the consixaors have a part icular 
strong price sensi t ivi ty a t certain c r i t i c a l points . I t i s 
r>articuiarly noticeable in r e t a i l t rade , fheae fii'.'sis act 
prices in ^ c h a way t !« t tlioy end ei ther in an odd nixiber or a 
roiBxl nx^ef^ I t io widely lioM tlicit odd nuabora are nioro 
a t t rac t ive to buyers tlvm oven luiabera. A priUjo of 33 conto -lay 
15S. 
ior some cwrlous rcffiisoriSt be aior@ at t rac t ive tlmn 32 cente 
or mmn 50 oonts, 'atv tradero claln that a !>@imy !>elo¥ -aio 
«o%t shUiia ' i or a siK oens® .J@1OW tii© msct pourKi aakes t!^ 
ft©* kind 3ore ©iastic. lore wld0sir©ad arul plausible i s tli© 
oeliof that rQiolri,3 tlio prico to t^ie r^xt s h i l l i n ; or potmd 
wulfl rcKiiic© sales disaTjrof>artionat©lsr« Tlio oal© oT a product 
a t 24,7 oenta or 30«9 c©nts :iV0s tlie loprasslon t i n t -.rico 
rodtictioiis tov@ bimn iau©# un tlio oorrtrary i f t o o3i® 
•roduct i s l>©in^ sold a t 24 cents or 38 cents tlio conusurxsro 
do not jC't t i n t 48?r©S3ion» I t i s a widely hold o-^jiion to 
certain trados tiiat conaumora iro quit© ©©naitivo to the 
difference betwten 42 #7 oonto on one product aiKl 43 conts 
on aiiotli®rt but insonaitive to the difforofioe botweon 42»9 
antS 42#8 c@nto» This liolps to fix price a t 42.9 cents ratlior 
than a t 42.a* 
Jonversely i^ ta l lo r s witii reputation for quality 
believe feat consuiaers are not sjuoh coacemecl with the odd 
additional sshillinss wma the prices are -quoted in guineas; 
tfiey even .irofer -a/in^j i^uinoac to ;)Oitala, 2hey jenorally 
follow a policy witli a oreferenoe for roumk aiirabers* Iliey 
fcliiali that :>rico3 of 3 j , 0 0 or $ 3.SO are oioro ooaaistent 
/^3 
with th© reputation than t sdoer. l ike S 3#39 or f 4»27 that 
giv© tli@ i:::^ressiori of a cuWrat© ap^eirtmoe, ;lnce t!i® 
at t i tudes of ccnsu"5er'5 !er>©tTKl Iiri|el>* on the price otructur© 
provailinj In a jr ir t icul^r -laiii^t tli@ probl^a of yiana^jensnt 
i s to d©tcr:3ine th it nii.ib@r \^ich has tl-^ ^iretat^fit a >peal, 
ij&z.Qarchez so i'-ir ^-rovi'le l l t t l© f^uidaiice on t h i s isau©. 
imnevQr th© 3aiiufacturors t ry to prooot© the sal© 
of the i r products by sell ing a t a lower srio© to tim retailorss 
by putting aoney-off lebels i t i s kiwwn as naoo©/-©!:! p r ie i r^ . 
UrKier th i s pricin^i aetiKKls original price i s not printoci on 
til® packet aiKi th© ©onsuoers are suppos®?! to know tli® re^sulir 
prio© of th© product* Th© virtu© of the device ia tlmt lit i s 
simple tmd fle3Sibl©» i t ©an b@ adopted easily and speedily 
a t low cost and can be u t i l izea to i^ ieet local price co^'spetitioiii 
Ihe ©xr^erieno© nas, howevert revealed that a s m l i redaction 
in til© shipo of sioney-off has l i t t l e effect on tli© promotion 
of tim sa le . I t i s t tl'icreforo, smrjeated t t e t a manufacturer 
sJKJuid offor a lar^^cr reduction on j^iall quantity than to 
spread a ssialXor redaction over a larger volu'®. 
J^'i 
Most buati^ssswii beXlove that prico»cuts on a 
Xinit&d mmXmr of itmm aire aor© oondusiv® to Inoipeaslng 
tyrnover than a soall reduction on a l l Goods. I t 1® a g®n@s^ liy 
aocept©a vl@w t in t coasuraurs do not r®caMl>©r a l l prioest lienc© 
a s@l0otiv# prlo© cutting is laor® us®f^ to ^oost th® sal© 
than a sKirginal reduction on a l l prioo® ^liioh reoain umnotiood* 
:%in0y*off pronations <io giv© a t^poraiy filliij to sales but 
have n© lasting ©ffoct on th® Xong-^ tena trend. If t ^ firja i s 
dealing in a group of itens this teoteiqu© *^f pirovo useful 
provided a price reduction on one prodluct results in an 
increase of sales of ooa^le".entary products since i t vsjuld 
more l^an coi^ensate for the loss on the line that has been 
cut in price* h special form of this technique 13 called 
loss^lmider tactics. 
Lose Le^iors 
Loso^leader tactics in^ch are wideopresMi in retailing 
have been the centre of rnoxM contusvoiw* '^» ^» llaynes defines 
loss leader aa »^i item the price of %ihich produces a less than 
cuetoaary contribution or a negative contribution to oveirtjead 
but «^ich is expected to create profits throu^ it® effect 
on future sa4es or sales of other itefBs»»^ riostiy this practice 
2* liayneSf i* w, op* cit* p 366 
isf 
refers to the sale of "ttie pn^uct at leas than invoioe cost 
or at a prioe sharply taelcnr th© cuotoaary price wltli a view 
to draw in customers wtio will bi|/ other products and to 
arouse interest that wiXl ev.eixtuaXIy increase the deoand* 
An exas^le of the loss leader oould be tea sold by a retai ler 
at wholesale cost* The purpose ia to attract the cu3to:aers 
in the hope toat tliey would l?uy other it^aa* This technique 
is effective if the buyers krK)w the prices of the oosraodity 
in other stores and the price differential is large enoui^ to 
be perceptible* Sesldes this the buyer^s purchaaos of Mm 
c03s»aodity j^ x»uld be large $ the deciand for the cotsaodity should 
be inelastic and the price reduction should not signify a 
reduction in quality. If the negative cross elasticity co» 
efficient between the loss item Jind other product i s not largej 
the price elasticity is hin^s and the supply elasticity is 
low, the technique would fail for the direct losses would 
mat be oonipensated by the indirect eor^lefisentary gains* 
The term •Los3*l©ader' generally s i ^ i f i e s an extreme 
fona of selective price cuttinrj* I t i s a jaisnoaier because a 
;^ood loss leader i s always a p£X>fit leader* I t i s alleged 
that loss l^ider selling; i s tmethical since i t !3isleads 
/^fo 
o^msiners* llai»ifactur@rs iisfcerdst Is also pro^udiodd a@ U^ 
price outs dmtroy the h l ^ quality toage of th© product* 
Further priQ9 cutting spoils tl:^ iMrkot» I t loads to prie© 
%mr and lowers rotal l aiarsins as a conse^u^nee of «)hich th© 
shopke^ors I03© interest aiid substitute t«bls product with 
other produK:t offering h i ^ e r isroflt. 
Double Pricing 
Doii$»l@ or dual |>rioing is a teclmirp® «liere t'w 
prices are ahown on t ^ price tag or on the pack of the 
article* the original price is usually crossed out and 
substituted with a new low price* Two lines of w^mmnt may 
be suggested in this respect* I t !!iay be argued that th is 
pattern of prices misleads or confuses the constaers since 
i t sug^ats a 0OHUine price reduKjtiont thoui^i isa practice the 
reality might be guite different* Monaally s^mtfacturers 
set their prices at an exaggerated level and leave 1*0 task 
of actual price setiiag to th® retailers* The retai lers over-
step moommMed priooa only in exceptional oirtmastawces* 4s 
a rule si^sjested price tends to be the oaxtoi® price in pircictice* 
11m consiMera too are reluctant to pay h i ^ e r price tiimt that 
Kftach i s printed on the pack* If t l ^ average osnsiner finds a 
IS7 
new loner prlo© published in th© prio© list or featured In 
advertisements he ia tempted to buy the product. Thus 
pretioketins of prices above or below tli© custotiKary level 
is an unJDair aothod of contpetition* as it aisloads consuK^^rs 
about the value of the soods* 
It is debatable whether the interest of the oonsuaors 
is harraed if dual pricing is practised. It often boosts th© 
sale and is welcora© by the consuoers. A number of investigation^ 
have* however, shown t-hat when tl^ consuoor lacks infomation 
about the cpallty of the product he oonsidei^ price as an 
indicator of quality. Soa© people would sofsetioo choose the 
hi^er»prioe of two competing brands %feen acting purely on the 
inforpation of price. Therefore, in situations where consusDors 
are less price conscious but more quality conscious this 
practice aight harm th© interests of th© dual price setters. 
Prestige Pricing 
Price awsireiKJss and price consciousness play a 
siisnificont role in pricing decision. The forsaer denotes t^ ie 
ability of the (Mjnsuoer to ren<inbor prices and Vnm later 
siisnifios th© consueier«3 sensitivity toirards price differential. 
High price consciousness tseans the consigner is very sensitive 
]SB 
to a hi^er price. Conversely a low price sensitivity d^fiotes 
that he la not disturbed by paying more for an article of his 
liking. It has been asserted that low personal incoaes make 
tJie consuraer highly price conscious. Consequently in such 
situationa low price policy is considered most suitable. As 
against this articles whose possseasion confers sonie social 
status or prestige on their owner may sell larger at a higher 
than at a lower price. Tl^ presuotptlon is that h i ^ price 
articles are better-quallty article and high-quality articles 
l^long to h i ^ class society. 
Fbr prestige products the classical denjand curve 
undergoes a x^ical change. It flattens out and niay eventi^O^ly 
bend back a^ iain &Q that a rise in price leads to an Increase 
in deiiand. Tills extresie siUiation ©ay arise if price in 
increasingly affluent societies or high societies cosaes to 
serve raorely as an indicator of quality or prestige. Vmvi 
investl^tions have underlined the orediblllty of the idea. 
Still the notion tl.at the price differentials express staiiia 
dlffercmoes persist to a larger extent even today. Froa a 
theoretical i^ oint of view a positively inclined defiand curve 
is an exception in economic t^ ieory but from the view point of 
/S'? 
practice 4t is most relevant ©specially tor such products 
as diamonds, fine Turs tii^ e^rjenslvo trlps# Do^lte upsetting 
influences >!^ lch this typo of deriand curve iiay have in theory 
the presuraptlon is that such situations exl3t» at leact for 
a Halted ranget In the real %forld» 
Fsyohologioal Pricing 
Econonilc theory postulates an economic nan who in 
the process of being economic is also rational* He is supposed 
to have the kno«le%e of his environment arui possess a skill 
in cocsimtation tlwt enables hia to reach the highest attainable 
point on hia preference scale* ascent reseaixhes have raised 
£jreat doubts* It can not be d«rvied tliat apart f^ra rationality 
he has whiiast j^cies and irrational preferences* Todays 
oonsussor cannot exercise a truly rational judgment* It lias 
been susseated that there are psychological aspects of price 
judgments that have ix>t received adequate attention* Just as 
prices and ^alities of the product tend to be scaled so do 
consumers tend to scale theoselves and othei^ in teras of their 
relative v»K)lth and culture* rhese social sealings exert a 
power:ftil influence in pricing behaviour as they relate to 
ability to pay arid to appreciate ^iuality* People that rate 
I^o 
thonsoXves hU^ on the social scales tend to accentuate t^s 
difference by their Durchasiai behaviour • they feel that they 
uhoiild buy above the standani level. Conversely the goods 
that they buy la esoensive and of hl^h quality* 
rsychologioal prices re ^ resont tlw type of deiiand curve 
sotne whit similar to tl^te de^iand ijattem that would exist for 
odd number and orltioal number pricing. It has been observed 
that this prloinei: pattern yields a step type drr*and curve 
stating that a cJ^inse in price has little effect over certain 
itwiges of output. This deraand curve differs from that of odd 
pricing in that '*tlie curve need not hBvm any positively inclined 
segmentst and tii& critical points are not necessarily located 
at each round mKsber but only at prices tliat are psycliolotsically 
significant to Uiyers."*' 
Custoiaary Prices 
It is a conjQon e3q>erionoe that certain prices become 
traditions, the consuniers look i^on them as the right price and 
they are used to tl^ta. such prices are generally known as 
3. Spenoerf Milton H» Op. cit» p. 279. 
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oustoaar/ prices • ^n 0x&m,>lQ of ,>ro'iuct:. witli such pricsa i s 
ehowtagycit aolt drinks am! candy harsp th© prioas of ^ i o h 
ar® a nat tor of tradition# I t olt^fi hapports t i n t Li'Ana^ je&tant 
does not a l t e r the p*"lc@s ol" sucJi ooiwenloiic© goods dospito 
h l ^ e r or lo i^r d^ncmd. These prices p0rsi.1t for long periods* 
tlmmg&^w&nt a3si8:M5s a kinked d©"arei c««rve a t customary price 
because i t i s gmmt^Xly obe®rv«d that a t prices above th© 
customary price demand declines rapidly thus showing high 
e l a s t i c i ty ! a t i-irices less t^ian %fm custosiary price demand 
Increases but less than proportionat®ly» therein evXd^acing 
inelast ic i ty* I t i s fre^aaently seen that siost candy 
sianufacturers teM to reduce the size of candy bars *feen deniand 
essceeds the available capacity I'ntlker than a l t e r the i r cusfcoaary 
price* Equally y^.&n deaai^ i s slack the aanufacturera pretor 
to reduce tho supply instead of cutting prices* The general 
tendency, thereforef i s to olmntie prices in fre'4Ui8atly# The 
variations on the custoiaary price ares prioe-llnlngt price 
points, priee»2oningt and below round figure prices* 
Price Lining 
The policy of price l ining frecjuently found both in 
respect of conv^iience goods and shopping joodSf refers to 
1^^ 
s«4)plyins oX 1 jroup of ^^ i-Ovlucta la a United nuiiber of 
price lin-3s d^enJLinj upon workaaaahip, design ami la ter ia la , 
i'rice l ining i s a technique of exploiting luaii ty d i f fe ren t ia l s . 
ctice the l ines are decided tfiey are held constant over ti.se • 
:hanse3 in ir^rkct conditions are adjusted for by v^r ia t i as in 
I ' ^ l i t y rather than price lineo* \coordlns; to certain opinions 
only three basic price l ines are necessary to cater for low, 
raodiin and hi^>»price demand, 
The chief advantages of t h i s technique are tha t i t 
often involves standardization and sitnplifies 1 ^ price structure 
niaKlng buying and sel l ing less ooaplioated# I t avoids tnaking 
fre<i!tient price decisions af ter the i n i t i a l price i s established. 
I t has also been su,<|gestod tJiat self-»soleotion of products 
i s faciil-cated )>^ price lininc» loadins to furtlier econoaies* 
.Tice liningf hoii«ever» introduces inf lexibi l i ty* In periods 
of r i s ing orices established price l ines coiao WKier heavy 
pressure* In order to saaintain midh prices qtmlity has to be 
deteriorated, or else firils are to be added to the sierchandise 
to ra i se i t inU> the imxt higher price l ine* During periods 
of declining business ac t iv i ty the existing price l ine i s to 
be maintained by ic^roveraonts in quali ty. Gince i t i s 
1^5 
coG^otitlvely dl5»advaata4;©ouiO vj aoopt t h i s practice in phases of 
roiiin^^ i>ric©s iw amy be wiser to drop th© pr ice . A variant 
o£ custotaary pricea i s price-zoning mmrQ a price range i s 
IniyTOviuced ior a l i products instead of a lixec; p r i ce . Tne 
r a t a i i s r i s ircfe to Oj^jrate witnin Uiis price l imit depending 
upon Ui& cLrctisataiises or ^ach ca^e. The widespread use of 
uda practice has initiaiiea .aanufactuzHars to t a i l o r the i r 
o^ /n pi^ices in oriXdX' to l i t rt^tail p r ices . The retai lersf 
Iiowov^ jPf have soa@ choice with regard to ijuallty of goods 
Iw puixjiiases and presmjably the laore he pays the more he 
should try to increase h is sales in order to aiaxiaize hir; 
p r o n t o . 
:j©aale r i ce ."^intenance 
fvesaie price -aintenanc© can be described as a fora 
of ver t ica l price control in ^rtilch a price agreeaent i s riade 
between the si^^plier and his distributei 's a t different levels 
in tlie distribi^tlon channel ndiereby the former iniposes the 
condition that his product l^aring the producer's trade aaiis 
should be resold a t a fixed price or for price not less than 
a minimum one. fiesaie price raaintenance can be In^osed by 
the manufacturer, the wholesaler or the isjporter. Usually the 
l^'i 
oaimfacturer inposes the condition of resale price maintenance 
either on the \stolooal0r or the retailer or both. ..ocMjtlraes 
1 ^ contracting parties ore aanufactui^r and wholesaler or 
manufacturer and retailer or ^ ^lolesaler and retailer* Peoale 
price aalntena^ioe can be Introduced by an Individual supplier 
or a group of suppliers, 'Uye collective resale price ralnter^nce 
is generally su^Dported by a horizontal agre^nent aiaong suppliers 
to counter act the t&ywea of price cutting dletrlbutorn* 
Suppliers attesapt to enforce resale price maintenance by 
vith*holdlng svi^ p^lles from individual price cutters or hy 
« 
obtainincS the approval of buyers v«ho undertalie to maintain such 
prices* 
iiesale price ?aaintenance has several adimntages* I t 
el lmlmtes price ooa'.>etitlon a t tlie r e t a i l level and sets a 
uniforta pr ice , i'rice rmintenanoe protects consisoors from 
re ta i l e r s especially in si tuat ions \AmvQ c<xapetition i s 
res t r i c ted . The public i s saved fro^i the trouble of shopping 
around to find the best s e l l e r and envoys the convenience of 
getting the goodn a t the nearest shop. ?'\urther, benefits are 
obtained by consi^ Eaers from the wider selection of gk^ ods and 
the elaborate st?>ply of services. Fimllyt i t Is claimed 
tiiat i t safegi^rds the quality of the product* for free r e t a i l 
/6S> 
prlod oos^etition exerts a pressurt on the retailers to 
deteriorate quality In order to secure higher sarglns. 
This teohniqMo of price fixation is not without 
faults* It disregards the fact that there is a cost of doing 
business which varies trom retailer to retailer in setting the 
uniform or minliatEa retail pricOf the siippller must, therefore* 
allow a reasonable soargln to all distributors* It has been 
generally observed that prices wider this technitpe of price 
fixing are hii^er than under oos^etition* As a consequence 
of urtiioh retailers divert attention from price to services* 
ik>t being able to aanupulate prices they offer more elaborate 
services to attract siore customers* At soiae stage these 
exp^Asive services swallow ^ e initial aargins and there 
after pressure is exerted to increase retail prices* Uniform 
prices also affect the structure and efficiency of the retail 
trade* ilesale price siaintenance keeps evmi least efficient 
retailers in business* Innovators who intend to introduce 
new techniques are prevented and as such uniforo prices stand 
in the way of necessary changes in the channels of distribution* 
The assured high margin on a price encourages retailers to 
display and to advertise the prodi^t to the extent of wasteful 
/^6 
coapetltion. It is iirong to b»liev© that this ^ 0 of prio« 
protects the oonsuoer* instead it provides a protective 
umbrella to the retailers* In the endf thereforet it can be 
oonoXuded that the resale price siaint<»iance does provide somo 
benefits to the oonsieaers but if these benefits are contrasted 
with higher prices may oonausiers would prefer to displease with 
them and would like to pay a price « ^ ^ is fair to all* 
Product*Line Pricing 
Hicroeconoaic theory of the firm is based on the 
assumption that t he firm produces a single homogm^ous product 
if product is defined broadly this assuo^tion is not unrealistic« 
From the view point of ruaiiaseaent a broad definition is 
unsatisfactory* A typical modem firm produces !i»jiltiple 
{KKlels* styleSf or sizes of output each of «^oh can be 
considered a separate product* Although product lin« pricing 
r©<;paires the sara© economic concepts used for single product 
priclngi the analysis is complicatedt however, by detaand and 
production externalities which arise because of substitutability 
or conplesimitarity between the pi\>ducts on the derand or the 
production side* on the deaiand side if the products are 
/6? 
ifiter<»reXat9d either as cc^^leiaents or as substitutest a 
change in the price o£ one vilX influence the densand for the 
other« 7he cross siarginal revenue ternts stating these inter* 
relationships can b© positive or negative depffitiding upon 
nature of the ease* For ooa^lementary products it is positive 
whereas for substitutes it is ne^tive* The price determination 
in the !8u}.tipIe*product oaset therefore» requires a thorough 
analysis of the total effect of the decision on the firra's 
iiu$o?iite» 
It has been widely accepted that product line pricing 
for substitute goods should be priced either on a ootasion mark 
v^ basis or on the basis of varying the size of the raargin with 
t ^ level of costs. In first case the prcKluct is priced in 
proportion to cost, the sanie aiargin is esuployed for all similar 
products in t^ ie line* A3 against this in the second cage t!ie 
size of the taargin is imried with the level of cost, the more 
costly the product, the greater the margin and hem»e hi^er 
the price* Despite their wldespreswi use both of these methods 
are defective* They do not take into consideration the 
difference in elasticitiest oos^etitive conditions and the nature 
of the market* Further accounting method eo^loys to divide 
l^s 
4oint costs ii %ifholely arbitrary* Xdoally the optlstum price ia 
one that yields the largest oontritmtion tmrgin without adirersely 
affecting other lines of production* 'Approached in this way 
the optirml pricing cajst be designed in such a way that it is 
based on a proper application of increiaental reasoning smd 
takes into consideration the total iapact ot the decision* 
7he second type of interrelation is Imown as 
cos^letoentarity in uribdch case tmiltipe products are related 
'titirough their production function* the degree of oofflpleeaentarity 
can take nnai^  fonas* i^ r^oduots may be ^intly produced in a 
fixed ratio or they may be produced in a variable proportions* 
In a most retaote forsa the various products in the line may not 
be jointly related in use but merely augment tto general 
reputation of the firm by enhancing one another's acceptability* 
Although the ultimate aim of ooapletsentary goods» as with 
substitute goods is to discover a price structure that produces 
the largest contribution margins an essential differenoet 
howevert is that since a decrease in the price of one leads 
to an ii^rease in the demand for the othert the pretctioal 
significance of this is that sellers will find it profitable 
to price an item low in the hope of selling the coaplomentary 
£9 
item at an above average margin* 
Th© pricing strategy of the cos^IcRoentary goods can 
take the sha^ of loss loaders# tie«in sales or two-part 
tariff* ha MO know most retailers sell a ooraoodity below 
custoaary price with the intention of exwouraging the custoasers 
to buy other prwiucts* CJivon the prices of other products 
a change in the price of loss leader produces larger sales of 
other products such that tlie incremental revemie is greater 
than the incremental cost* In case of tie«»in sales the seller 
requires buyers to combine other purchases with the featured 
goods* An ideal opportunity for tie«in sales exists when the 
seller possesses exclusive control of the products d^xich are 
difficult to substitute* 
A variant of tie-in sales is fUll-line pricing 
where the seller asks the buyers to accept the firm's entire 
product line as a condition of pi^rchasing one item in the line* 
Two part tariff is another fora of coQ^lira«itarity in pricing 
whez^ the buyer pays two prices for a ^oint product consisting 
of a fixed and a variable coi^ponent* The objective 
of two-part tariff is to cover initial cost with iUrther 
incoae to be derived from the variable service or as a source 
of revenue frc^ both ocKi^onents of the product* 
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liecosiincnded Prioea 
It is iatportant to note that the retail prloe is one 
of the laost signlfleant faotors In determining the volume of 
outputs henoe no sianufacturer is indifferwit to it* He laay 
assume three different attiti»ies in respect of retail pricing* 
Firstly* the prodiwer may leave the determination of price 
of his product to the fx^ ee play of omrket forces; that iSt 
at retail levels he saay allow the retailers to sell the 
products at what ever prices they dees fit* This tmyrBT means 
that he is passive* He is in constant touch with the prices 
and if he feels that retail prices are too h i ^ or too low^ he 
possesses |K>wer to alter th@s* The next course open to the 
manufacturer is to achieve full control over retail prices 
by ii^osing resale price taaintmiance y^icix we have already 
discussed* The third altemativii to influence retail prices 
is the application of reootfeiended or sug^^ested retail prices 
by the sKinufaoturer* In this situation tie producer specifies a 
retail price for his product but seldom insists on Its enforce-
sient* 
Keoorraiended prices are nonaally treated as maximum 
prices both fcy retailers as well as consiKaers. Retailers 
/?/ 
sometimes overstep recocaaended prices but only In exceptlonaX 
circumtances such as in situations %»her© coa^titlon is not 
efreotive or when the coat of distribution is exoeptionaUy 
hig^« The oonsuraer is also reltiotant to pay a high price 
than this tor an average oonsutner considers the printed price 
as the msximm one. Jferraally the retailer fixes his price 
soae where between the trade price and the recooBiended price. 
He is Msically governed by his gross margin if his raaxiaum 
margin coincides with his ummX mrgin by following recommended 
prioOi he %K>uld be least interested to change it. Hecent 
investigations reveal that recoomended prices are welcomed 
by the retailers singly because such prices can be crossed off 
and substituted by new prices so that the extent of the price 
cut may be perfectly dear; to the customers. If the 
reooomiended price is set &t ^ low level it will act as a 
disincentive for the retailers to stock the products since 
thsy will fail to earn even their normal profit. Keeping 
this thing in mind maimafaoturers normally keep recommended 
prices at a higher level in order to aoooratdate all retailers 
including the inefficient ones, setting h i ^ recoasaended 
price 3ives an opportunity to the retailers to offer a great 
' ? ^ 
price reduction to hio customers, (m. the face of it this 
a:5p0ar!3 to b© a proiaotional method for the rsanuTacturer, 
unluckily it is i»t ao» Superficial price reductions are 
unlikely to b© a euooesaful policy. Furthermore it sight 
create suspicion in the minds of the conaieaors vith 2H»spect 
to qpality, if the price reductions are very often aade. 
Finallyp it will be self^dofeatina for the -rjanufacturer to 
set a price too h i ^ since it %«>uld be brou^t dowj by the 
forces of ooopetition as well as tl^ pressure of the 
retailers* 
Multiple Pricing 
Hetail prices are usually esqijressed in tenas of 
one unit, Experience however* reveals that sales can be 
increased if more units are offered for a price* This 
technique of pricing is know* aa multiple pricing* Fbr 
adopting multiple pricing technique certain precautions 
should be taken* The multiple price-offer should be designed 
in such a ipay that it appears to be a saving for tlio consumer* 
The saving siay be iaiaginaiy or a real one but the oonsuaier 
ii8iist feci that he is .^ jetting a substantial benefit* v^oiaetiaes 
articles are offered at imiltiple prices without offering any 
in 
saving but this does not last Xong* fo bo effootive these 
prices should be set eUghtly beXew iadividiml unit prioes* 
F\or exara^Xet if one unit was offered for 10 eentSf 3 units 
should be aold for 27 owstSf thus offering a genuine but msnaXX 
saving to the oonsuoier* 
MuXtipl© pricing helps if the arithematic involved 
is single because ocmsuiaers do not like difficult calculations. 
The coQiaodity selected should be such that it is fre(|uently 
bought by the oonsutaers. The effectiveness of smltiple pricing 
also depends i^ pon the sisot availability end price of cosseting 
goods* The experience of few researchers showsd that the 
laost effective area of matiple pricing was within ttm one 
doUar limit. Above this level "constaaers tended to think 
twice before buying a larger quantity to obtain a siaall saving," 
ilulti*»atage Pricing 
Multi-stage pricing method was developed by A* R« 
Qieenfeldt of Colus^ia University* It takes into account six 
successive steps i^ich are necessary for arriving at such 
price. At the first stage the firm selects a class of consumers 
regardless of their income or just a siaaller grot^ such as the 
high income class or oonsi.»aer of a certain age grou^ with a 
1^^ 
a viev to observt their prioo oonseiousness* Simultaneously 
it chooses a brsind natwt product deaignp ehsuntnels of distritai* 
tion and the price %fhich is in harooi^ with the requireiaents 
of the consumer group so selected* the next step is to choose 
the correct laartceting oiix with the sole ob;}eotive ascertaining 
the fact whether the proiaotion of the product should rost on 
price appeal or i^iether price should acquire a subordinate 
role* liaving done this the fira then has to determine its 
broad price policy* It is at 'Utis stage that decisions are 
made in respect of the prices t i^iether they should be set 
abovot att or below tho coi^titive level* 
The fifth stage determi^s the pricing strategy* 
By pricing strategy Oxenfeldt feels that it takes into 
consideration unusual circumstances which are short period 
phenoaena* The question of price strategyt thereforet deals 
with how to tackle a special market situation concemiz^ 
ai^earance of now product or checking the declining of sales 
etc* After the coopletion of the above stages a certain price 
bracket es^rses wi'ttiin which the aclaial pricing can be placed* 
It should be noted that onilti^stage pricing does not lead to a 
single price but narrows down the nuiaber of possible prices* 
/?r 
It auggests that in ddtermining the price the whole range of 
imtora suoh as oonsuiaers aooeptanoeSf cost of produotiont 
paolcagingt advertising and sales proootions eto«i should be 
taken into consideration* 
geographical Pricing 
Geograi^iioal pricing is a special category of 
differ^itial pricing* It involves around the nature of 
transportation cost and certain legal oonaiderations* Leaving 
aside detailed aspects of these facers* nm shall concentrate 
only on sonie essential points* It is a coimnon e3q[}erienee that 
some buyers reside in ^le saae to%ai as the produoert other at 
longer or shorter distances \xs> or down the oountry* Various 
transportation costs including insurance costs are involved 
in every transaction* It is within the purview of geographical 
price to decide how to handle these costs* The correct 
policy is not to charge some price to all buyex*s with the 
result that buyers closer to the plant pay less and those that 
are atns^  pay more* Instead nK>st economists would argt» that 
the correct policy of pricing transport cost is thait in which 
every buyer pays exactly the actual costs from the producing 
pVmt to his vmrehouse* If this is done no body is discriminated 
!7£ 
against and no txxly Is subsidisod in respect of ouch costs* 
However* if the businessoian Ixioreases his turnover by charging 
dif£srent rates froo different personst he %K>uid be Justified 
to char^ disproportionately more for transport to aofse buyers 
and less to others* 
In deciding a geographic price each tairyer's average 
reveiuie curve should be treated as a net denani curve after 
deducting transportation cost* The elasticity of each buyers 
curve then becoo^s a dooinent factor In the sense ^lat the 
correct net price to each iiKlividiml is the one that equates 
the GEiarginal cost of the entire output of the seller with margin^ 
revalue* There are various variants of geographical pricing* 
The method under iiAiioh each buyer pacya actual transport cost 
between the factory and his hoate towi is known as ex<^imrks 
pricing* If a sinp^e price is applied for the ii^ hole country 
regardless of the location of tim buyer the iiethod is referred 
to as unlfora delivered pricing or sinsle-aonot or postage-staiap 
priclns laothod* 2omN»dellv0red pricing 11®8 betv^en ex«»works 
pricing and unifoana delivered pricing* Under this system the 
smrket is divided into various zones acoordlitg to the distance 
frost the production oentre* Prices are unifona within each zone 
m 
but differ as the distance Increases from the centre. Frel^t 
ab9oz*ptlcii pricing is a fona of price cutting la different 
markets to ellolnate the coiapetltlve transport cost benefit of a 
supplier situated near the byyera« fhe aost controvertlal 
taethod Is the basln^«polnt system or parlty«»polnt system which 
enmires that ld€»itloaX delivered prloas are qtK)teci to a U 
oustoowrs of the same locality \sy all si^pXlers. Two main 
forms of this system have developed* They are single and 
miltlple base systeas* Under the slngle^baslni]; point system 
one specific location Is chosen as tim t^se and all producers 
add to their Invoice price the saiae freight charge* As 
against this inultlple«baslng»polnt systets Includes t%ic or taore 
basic points and the actual quoted price Includes the ex-vorks 
price and the cost of the freight tra^ the nearest basing point 
to the buyers location* If the plants of a company are located 
In different countries such oo&^>any can f&llov a national 
price policy by charging an Identical price or laay decide on 
regional price scheme which will reflect the cost differentials 
of production In ^trlous plants* Siailarlyt geographic price 
dlffermitlatlon can take place betwecoi the hotae raarket and 
ex^rt uKurket* An extreisH» form of wxporting at a lower price 
is called dunging* 
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Tranafer Pricing 
Transfer pricing is one of the moat ooo^lex probleras 
in pricing w© find it difficult to provicio a correct solution 
to tlii® probleia* \.e can singly suggest certain guide lines for 
optl-nal transfer rules. t\*e grovfcli and developaent of large 
scale oRilti divisional organisations has given rise to a 
problem of pricing ooaaaoditias that are transferred internally 
fvtm one division to another* If incorrect price policy is 
followed it leads to aub-^ptiiaal levels of activity and restilts 
in lower profits* 
The siai^lest transfer pricing problea involves 
products that can be sold externally in a coti^titive laarket 
the coal produced by one division is sold to iAm steel division 
of the saaie concern* In this case since the transferred goods 
are sold in a cos^}etitive oarkety the laarket price of these 
goods can be appropriately treated as a transfer price* If 
t^ iis is done it not only oascimises profits of xhe division 
l»it also helps in ei^iancin^ t^ ie profits of the organization* 
So long as the intenaediate product falls idthin the perview 
of the <x>iBpetitive aax^et 'Uiere is no serious problect* Mien 
no external max^et exists tor the product intra«firm transfer 
m 
needs thinking, i^searehest however, suggests that intra-
fir© transfers shOiiXd be based oa fMa:^ inaX cost of px^uction. 
There are sevearal other situations vhere transfer 
pricing probl^as might arise* For exaapXet tlmre are 
situations Where asany interml divisions ooB^ete for the products 
of Mwther division, or inhere two or aiore divisions provide 
intermediate pro<iucts to a third and so on and so i^rth* 
Optisal intra*fira pricing in such situations requires that 
transfer should be recorded at marginal cost i^tiier than at 
c<»i^etitive martcst price» '•To «so extwit that we can generaXiset 
our analysis suggests that transfers should take place at the 
ciarket price tor intermediate products that are traded externally 
in a coti^etitive siarket and at laarginal cost in oost other 
fi4 caseo." 
Peak*»Load /ricing 
Peak load pricing 9P*eiN|$ presents a special problea 
in itsanagerial eoonoiaics* *^  examle of peak loads is in the 
electricity industry j^here the conamptlon varies over the 
4* Brighaa, Kugene P* and Pampas, James L« Op* cit* p* 313* 
l8<^ 
day and over the seasons iHzt the eapaeity mmt oieet the 
peak oonsuoptlon* Siiailar problent arises In transportation 
industry in v^di storage is is^ssible* In msch situations 
the probXem is that of determination of best price both in 
peak and off«peak periods* 
£^ ono!itist8 suggest that rates should vary from 
peak to off*peak periods •» higher rates should be charged at 
the peak period and lo^^er rates should be fixed for the off* 
peak period* The failure to charge different z^tes results in 
price disorlAination for the cost of production during the 
peatk period is certainly greater than the cost for ether 
periods* The utility taanagers find it difficult to tackle 
peak^load pricing* Zf they follow the advice of eoonoiaists 
on marginal cost pricingt t^y face unfavourable public 
reaction* Ck^ nstraers usually rettot imfavourably to the 
Instability of price* They prefer to know ^ e rates that 
they have to pay in advance rather timn be the sub;}eot to 
sharp shifts in such rates* But if the oanagers base their 
prices on full cost and try to average out rates over peaks and 
off«pe3ks» they are held responsible for waste of resources* 
In view of this dileenaa taany oon^ ;>atties have opted for non-> 
price techniques i^eh aocoo^lish the same objective* These 
l8l 
IzioXiKie increased advertising in off-periods to prosiote t)ie 
use of appliances « h i ^ consume «iergy in such periods and 
the develop&imit of new maxicets or nev products to use 
facilities in slack periods* These ncm»prioe devices are 
easy to operate* Consumers too are tolex^oit to such procaotionaX 
activity* nevertheless the problem ia difficult* *The 
public %dll have to mk& i^ its siind wiietber it %iants rates 
«Mch seem fair or ones which actually are oondusive to giving 
the most for the dollars spent•"" 
Differential Pricing 
Differwxtial pricing is a n»thod that is used by 
soiae sellers to tailor their prices to the specific situations 
of the buyers* It siay be define as the practice by sellers 
of charging various prices to the saae or to different 
buyers for the same product without correi^pondins differences 
in cost* It is a practical device available to the manageiaent 
3* IlayneSf ftote and Paul* op* cit* p» 361* 
I3S. 
tor dnXarging proifits* It e3q)loit8 tho dlfforenoe in d«mand 
elasticities among buyers as a basis for establishing suoh 
prices* There are various Aortas of exploitation* The laost 
cofiBaon ones include quanti^ differentials« XooationaX differentia isf 
produet use differentials and time differentials* For 
aocoQ^lishing differential prioingf segmentation of markets 
is necessary* The zaost prevalent techni<|ues utilised tor maiicet 
seaXii^ are* variations in product designi quality* choice 
of flannel* time of sale* patents* packaging azKi advertising* 
Bach of these areas offers opportunities for segntenting the 
market and enhancing profits* thus l^eir study is SK>8t vital 
ftxHa the point of viev of {aanageoent research and i»cperimenta« 
tion* 
The eoonofflie aspects of differential pricing are 
apparently clear* itodem utelfare economics theory does not 
Bvipport the view that a disparity in cost-priee relations is 
harmful for the eoonoaay exci^t voider certain assumed conditions 
that are highly unrealistic* Only on economic grounds a 
blanket condemnation of price discrimination is not possible* 
24m& forms of price differentials aie no doubt good and some 
forms b ^ in teniae of social criterion of the %#9lfare* The 
oonnoteition of injustice in price discrimination %^ch produced 
I8i 
various aatl trust and regulatory acts ware not b o m of 
conoem about welfare or Justioet but were the product of the 
reaction of independwit retailers to the Invasion of their 
markets by tiie giant organisations* 
The Xe^il aspect of differential pricing is not clear* 
It has been observed that alsaost all systems of pricing where 
there was any inipllcation of oolluslonf conspiracy and attefapts 
to laonopollse were subject to legal attack by jpverniaent* 
Govemiaent has usually i^>osei three kinds of o^nstraintst 
(1) Operation controls such as t^ges and price controls» 
(i^iali^ controls and oontrols eoi^eming safety and security 
of workers* (2) Constraints designed to ainiaize monopoly 
profits» and (3) antl trust and related laws designed to 
achieve a workable level of coa^tltion in the econoiay* In 
such cases tihere the businesssoan can separate their bii^ars 
into distinct groups and charge each section the maxiisua price 
they are willing to pay differential pricing practices are 
widespread and shall continue to exists for a long tlste to coiae* 
The obvious reason for price discriaination is that a higher 
profit can be obtained by segrlgatlng the various taarkets tnm 
each other than by following a unifona price policy* Businessmaiv 
lai^ 
ther«for9f %fl9uXd always find differentiation %. good teolmiqtjw 
for enlarging profits and facilitating their ooaoems growth 
provided their price structure is based on such eoonosiio 
principles tl^ iat Is in haraony with prevalent socio-political 
Opinion* 
Realiaa in Pricing 
Pricing as a vital area for eacploration i^s staked 
out long ago by claesical econojoiat®* T h ^ postidated on 
economic "emo, «Aio besides being econoaio was also rational* 
He had knowledge of the relevant aspects of hi® enviroi^^itf 
i^ iioh if not absolutely oos^lete* was at least iii^ressively 
clear and voluminous* 4s a consular the economic man was 
raridowed with vast asiount of Inlltni^tiom He had a well-
or^aniaod systea of tastes and preferences and a sound ooa^uta* 
tion skill that ^oabled hist to calculate the ii^ pact of 
alternative courses of action in order to reach the highest 
possible indifference curve im his preference awp* l^e was 
also knowledgeable of the configuration of attributes that 
coa?jrised a product a M could detenaine his marginal rate of 
substitution for each product involved in a particular purchase 
I8f 
docislon. As a producer ha Vocam the demand and cost pattern 
for hiB product at different levels of prioesy <paXity and 
advertising i!iedia« He fUlXy knew his custotaers* their buying 
habits as well as their behaviour pattern, i^garding the 
nature and reactions of his rivalsf the classical producer 
lias fsr zaore loioidedgeable t^mn the aodera businessinan* The 
theoretical aspect of price detenairtation vas thus sia^ile 
and abstract* F^r the detersaination of pricet i^ liat the 
eoonoaist was sii^posed to know was$ the nuaber of buyers 
and sellers i siobility of factors of production* the time 
period involved and the barriers to «atry in the industry* 
It is an axioei of classical economic theory that the 
prices are deteroined at tifimt the aax^et can bear or at that 
level at which su^ p^ly equals denand* The familiar denfsand* 
and supply curve explanation i^ iven in the text books is 
deficimxt with re^rd to iHJsinessman's knowledge as well as 
the nature of i&ie market* 1!he average businessiaan knows 
little about his «ivironcient and fails to take into considera-
tion el«!ient8 found in the s-^iroture of the firm* In the real 
world the consumer is also not so fortunate as to know his 
environment fully* His purchase decisions are made with lack of 
Ibe 
Inforoatlon regarding his option. He dooa not Mv© all th© 
infonaation conoeming th© attributes of the producer. Mis 
percepticm al>out his purcliase plans i s an adaiixture of a 
variety of information imioh of ii«hich is surrounded by s^stery* 
The classical theory thus "taakes «3ant provision for the firm*s 
influence on the smrketf It i s prescriptive rather than 
desoriptivet offering no e3q>lanation to actitfO, price decisions*" 
It relies too mxki on rational behaviour» perfect information* 
goal consistencies and profit maxiaiasation as a consequence 
of ttfhich personal biases* oon^eotural interdependence* in^ >erfeo«* 
tion of niarkets and the organi:sational inHuenoes are ignored* 
MeutKy investigations have revealed that businesss^n 
never think like economists irtiiie fixing their prices* More 
often they rely cm coimon sense and past experience* Joel 
Dean* thex^fore* has sw^gested certain elements of the 
econoinist's logic to improve the pricing practices of business^^zv 
Some of the eoont^^c factors* sitHeSa. a tnisiness^an should 
take into consideration while fOnnilating prices* aret 
(a) the distinctiveness of the produotf if^ich is measured 
by the buyers' attitude and their croas^elasticity of demand} 
(b) prosx)tional strategy; (c) choice of channels of 
/S7 
distribution) (d) nevness of the product) (e) ooss^etition) 
6 
and (f)costs of pzt>duotion and diatrilaition* 
4coording to H« w, ffuegy the fundanMsitals that 
affect pricing decisions aret (a) oonsuioers situation) 
(b) cost of production) (c) structure of the market) (d) protao-
tionai policies? (e) rsanner of quoting prices) (f) legal 
obligations) and (g) other considerations pertaining to the 
individual firm and the entire eocmoa^* Practical pricing 
decisions are cade in complex situations in which the lo^ jic 
required by pricing decisicms is often obscured* itodem 
pricing is one of a great varieties of sales promotion devices* 
The decision Qtaker» thereforei caisiot determine price without 
simltaneously considering product design* packagin^t 
advertisingf perianal selling and hosts of such otiier means 
of promotion* To«Kiays* laarket organization is no longer 
siniple* tim logic of teolmology has caused business oraiani-
zations to grow to such size that their entry or withdrawal 
6« ?ield» G» A.p Douglasi Field* J* and Tarpey» L« X«» 
Pricing ittrategy edited by Taylort Bernard & Wills, Gordoni 
( U>ndon, Jtaplest I969 ) p» 261* 
liiO' 
trom the cossetitlve situation sigalfioantly affects prices. 
Products are heterogeaaous rather Uian identical* 3very 
effort i s faade to convince the buyers that each product i s 
different. The siailiet place has becoiae so cos^lex and so 
large that none can be fully informed» The governing force 
%*iich hold a l l diverse processes and provide siotive force is 
no 2»re coi^>etition« 4s a consequence of such cl-jangea in the 
struDl»JU% of aarketSf '*sioi*e prices are determined on the basis 
of adminiatrative Jud^aents rather than tairou^^ the autoamtic 
processes of an in^rsoiml and k&Kily coi3i|>#titive a^ilcet*'* 
The ohjeotives of pricing are not ae clear out as 
- t^ey alight appear* Seonoraic theory assumes profit laaxiaiissation 
as l^e sole cri teriat but under conditions of uncertainty 
ointotalng the risk of loss appears to be acre appropriate 
than saxialzatlon of profit* 
Classical theory usually stresses buyers and sellers 
as prominent t>arties Involved in pricing deal but in reality 
the eust«^ers» oou^titorsi potential rivals^ suppliers> 
raiddleiien, salescien and i^pytmrmsi&aX, are the sain parties to 
be reckoi^d in pricing* ^11 of the® taken tofjether exert 
181 
pressure on price. Iricing policy* thereloret caiaaot hQ 
analysed without socioloslcalf psycliologlcal and legal bias* 
It la sjorc difficult tor the present day constj^ iei* to exercise 
l^e rational deci@i<m* Todays comiunier is not an expert buyer. 
The selection of goods has grown enorraously. Fresant day 
consumer n&for buys a single Jwmog^ieous product, but purc!iases 
various types of goods such as convenience fjoodSf shopping 
g^>dsi Speciality ^ods and occasional ^oods* Convenience 
goods are purchased frequently, iimnediately and with tBinlmia 
of efforts but shopping goods need selection with regards to 
suitability, quality, price and style. Speciality goods 
are those ^ods on which consuKters insist and for w!iich they 
are ready to laake a special sacrifice, 'tost of the buying are 
ii3]|>ulse buying. They are decided on the spot aiKi thoir object 
is novelty, "any a tisies the consumer slves taore than one 
interpretation for the price. 'Several interpretations raay 
co-e:ciat, often nakins choice difficult. Higher Incorae brackets 
often chooses the highor-price of the two alternative brands 
wljen their only differential inforsation is price. Such 
finding© suggest thqtt demand curve niay not iiwariably be 
negatively slopped, a higher price may sometimes increase 
!1c> 
rather than docreas© the sales # 3uoh behaviour jaay appear 
odd and un©<x>i»inic but pertiapo not unreaiistic* 
The individual in the imrlxst is always aubjoot to the 
two fold inHueooe of the past and the future* The past is 
expressed by the economic dimension yA^iXe the future by the 
ecoxiomic horizon* Tim eoonoraio diswnsioiif i s a soiae lAmt 
^nebulous label representing an approaciisate value* or a 
relationship betv^ een the value of the object under eonsidera* 
tion and other o b ^ t e uaed as benohs»rk8« rather tlian ^eoifio 
figure* <* The economic dimiBision la the only s^ ana %<heret^  
historical price exerts an influence on the future* As 
against this the future is totally determined t^ economic 
horizon which is real and objective on the one hand* 
psychological and subjective on the other* The mirror of 
consiKier mind t^us transmits unfaithfully ima^s of various 
changes that are incapable of analysis* 
The development of theory % l^ch can explain the 
oaking of prices is **^olly unsatisfactory* \n atteinpt to 
rationalise the scope of pricln?* theory and paraotlces are 
currently being explored in great denial* Ho% v^er, these 
I l l 
approaches to prlcix^is are s t i l l very much l a tho laboratory 
stacj© of development, '•'Jatil tliose fcectuiiqMes and others 
reach an advanced sta^^e or z^I iabi l l ty t pricing decisior^ 
iii the f inal analysis aust be iaade on an antalgaia of current 
aral projioctod oariiefein,*^ researdh data and infon^ed opinions 
7 
ra fchor than on formila«i«l>aa0d deciaions.'*' 
7» Taylor Bernard and wills Gordon, Op« c l t . p» 533» 
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